EU Structured Dialogue: working paper from the ITUC

DIALOGUE- AND ACTOR BASED “CO-OPERATION” for improved development effectiveness

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Glossary

See for a more extensive glossary in the field of CSO Development: CISOCH webpage

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ITUC</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ituc-csi.org">www.ituc-csi.org</a></td>
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<td>TUDCN</td>
<td>Trade Union Development Cooperation Network</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tudcnetwork.org">www.tudcnetwork.org</a></td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Structured Dialogue (also called Quadradrilogue) between EU, EP, Member States and CSO networks</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.i%D0%BB%D0%BE.org">www.iло.org</a></td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation. This is the preferred reference term for the group of social movement, Non Governmental Organisations and other non-state actors. However, very often NGO, CSO or NSA is used as synonym although these are not reflecting the difference of type and scope of actors.</td>
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<td>CONCORD</td>
<td>CONCORD is the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development. Its 18 international networks and 25 national associations from the European Member States represent more than 1600 European NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions. <a href="http://www.concordeurope.org">http://www.concordeurope.org</a></td>
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<td>European Consensus</td>
<td>This statement presents a shared vision to guide the EU's activities in the field of development cooperation, both at Member State and Community level. It also sets out the concrete action to be taken to implement this vision at Community level. <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_en.htm">http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_en.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) refers to the integrated approach and methodologies in development cooperation.</td>
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Intro

This is a working paper from the ITUC as a contribution to the discussion in the Structured Dialogue (SD) organised by the EU commission with Civil Society platforms¹, the EU member states and the European parliament.

The SD is looking at a more effective CSO – EU cooperation and should find consensus on a number of improvements on both the programming and development instruments for CSO as well as on the content and format of the policy dialogues with CSO on the broader development agenda.

Full information on the Structured Dialogue is available in different languages on the Civil Society page, designed by the Commission².

The main aim of our contribution is 1) to place DIALOGUE in the centre of the development “COOPERATION” strategy and 2) to propose to the different stakeholders an “ACTOR-BASED APPROACH” that is more adjusted to the needs of the trade union movement (and many other CSO actors).

Our proposals are based on the needs and practices we have been identifying within the diversity of the trade union development cooperation area. This may or may not be representative for other actor’s experience. However, we do believe that the actor-based approach may bring responses to some of the important challenges of development effectiveness. Although it is surely not the one-size-fits-all solution, it may contribute to change the paradigm of development effectiveness away from the deadlock of the technical debates of the development cooperation business, towards the politics of a people’s driven, owned and sustained development and social justice.

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¹ 10 platforms are currently invited: CONCORD/development NGO, Cooperatives Europe, ENoP/political foundations, Green10/environment, HRDN/human rights, ITUC, Platforma/local authorities, Red Cross, Youth Forum and Chambers of Commerce.
² see: CISOCH (click)
Executive summary

1. ADJUSTING AND IMPROVING THE COOPERATION SYSTEM
The current system of EU/governmental engagement with CSO has proven to be problematic in terms of its quality, quantity and above all, its deficit in visible results/outcomes/impact, as shown by a variety of recent (donor-driven) reports and evaluations. Those point at a **structural neglect of the full potential of the CSO channel for development cooperation**; a lack of permanent and structured dialogue; the inadequacy of donor support mechanisms and their strategic thematic and/or geographical choices. They also spell out the existence of **multiple biases concerning the CSO right of initiative**; the lack of predictability and long-term strategies and inappropriate PME methodologies to deal with results- oriented programming in the CSO environment that focuses on sustainable change and improvement of the development patterns.

The recent effectiveness debates concerning the state to state cooperation (Paris Declaration and AAA) have led to a shift of focus in the ownership of development. However, this has not yet encompassed the CSO cooperation as a specific channel of cooperation based on its right of initiative, on the contrary, **government driven and controlled policies have been reinforced to the detriment of the CSO right of initiative**.

2. CHANGING THE CO-OPERATION PARADIGM:

2.1. “CSO’s as independent development actors in their own right” (AAA)
The recognition through the AAA of the CSO as actors for development in their own right has brought forward the need to reassess the scope and methods of the donor models of support. Rather that the prescriptive approach by governments, fixing unilaterally the objectives and means of the cooperation, co-operation should be based on a permanent and structured dialogue with the diversity of specific groups of actors.

2.2. Applying the Paris Declaration (PD) to the cooperation with NON state actors.
Applying the principles of the PD, it is essential to overcome the technocratic, -“one-fits all” -, grants driven CSO aid delivery mechanisms from the past and put into place an effective and more harmonised system of results oriented and mutual accountable support modalities that is based on **CSO OWNERSHIP, ALIGNMENT on NEEDS, PRIORITIES and “SYSTEMS” of the different, specific CSO actors**.

3. PRINCIPLES AND ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CSO COOPERATION

3.1. A rights-based approach and enabling environment.
An actor based approach recognises the diversity, autonomy and initiative of CSOs as actors for development in their own right and stresses the CSO ownership of development strategies. CSOs contribution to development cooperation should be rights-based and supported by an enabling environment for CSO and trade unions as part of democratic governance and democratic ownership of development.
Governments (donors and recipients) should respect the autonomy of the CSO channel and apply as a principle, a policy of non-interference into CSO matters as is recognised by ILO C87 and 98 concerning trade union freedom and right of negotiation.

3.2. Structured (political) Dialogue as organising element of cooperation

The organising principle for the rights based cooperation should be the STRUCTURED DIALOGUE. This means that both programming and policy dialogue with CSOs should be rooted in the dialogue with the CSO, individually and collectively. This Structured Dialogue should be rights based, be permanent, multi-stakeholder-led and sufficiently resourced.

3.3. Multilateral and inclusive actor-based networking

International member based networks should be recognised as effective channels of cooperation allowing to reach out to in-country social development actors that cannot be reached effectively through government controlled or government driven channels. It does reinforce the CSO ownership of the cooperation and responds to an important aspect of the right of assembly and organizing that is the right to international affiliation and cooperation as an integral part of the CSO identity.

4. MODALITIES FOR SUPPORTING AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE AND ACTOR-BASED DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

4.1. A comprehensive approach: integrating the multiple contributions and dimensions of CSOs in one coherent actor-based framework.

Programming dialogues on integrated actor-driven programming frameworks and horizontal (in-country) as well as vertical (transnational) integration should allow responding more coherently to the operational challenges of the actor driven programmes and increase the effectiveness and sustainability of the local actors’ capacity and contribution to development.

4.2. A long term and contractual engagement based on dialogue, predictability, mutual accountability and governance feasibility.

With dialogue as organising principle for CSO development effectiveness, new support mechanisms based on recognised autonomy of resource-management should allow improved predictability, coherence, empowerment of representative actors, actor-adjusted PME methods and mutual/shared commitment towards results and impact.

5. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE AND JUST DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Poverty alleviation needs to address the structural causes of impoverishment and exclusion. We should address the systemic failure of and aid based system and place development effectiveness as an overarching objective in the centre of a renewed policy approach and a new international development architecture based on respect for human rights, gender equality, decent work and environmental sustainability.

6. DEMANDS
1 Adjusting and improving the cooperation system

The current system of EU/governmental engagement with CSO has proven to be problematic in terms of its quality, quantity and its lack of strategy and of assessment of results/outcomes/impact. It demonstrates the structural neglect of the added value of the CSO channel for development cooperation.

Identified issues are:
- The lack and/or inadequacy of “permanent and structured” policy dialogue
- Multiple biases concerning the right of initiative through concentration/harmonisation policies, administrative obligations, policy proscriptions (governmental priorities) or the inclusion of CSO in government controlled (geographical) programming (e.g. EDF)
- Lack of predictability and long term strategies
- Limited resources and capacities within donor/EU agencies, centrally and especially decentralised to deal in an adequate way with CSO related policies
- Multiple shortcomings of the call for proposals system (to address the elements above but also:)
  - The total absence of dialogue and interaction between the (EU) donor and the beneficiary on the actions supported;
  - The very low rate of “success”;
  - The competition between unequal parties/organisations & “one size fit all” system;
  - Atomised and incoherent support for actors’ integrated action plans;
  - The search for short term results and the inappropriate use of logical frameworks;

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3 See the analysis and background studies and reports commissioned by donors/governments or EU or addressed to them. Many of the conclusions address government driven policies. Very little so far has been documented from the point of view of the CSO themselves or is based on CSO led research. The Open Forum will conduct CSO led research on a number of these questions, in particular on the enabling environment. The findings and outcomes of that process are expected by 2011.


Proposal assessment and evaluation is biased by technocratic, often political and out-of-context criteria, interpretations and judgements that are typically not opposable.

- The **limits of the EU project/programme approach** in terms of sustainability of the actions and their follow up (including the provision of local resources) and their fragmentation: too many different programmes, too many individual projects, too many envelopes, too much administration; lack of oversight and lack of/very limited capacity and engagement by the donor.\(^8\)

- The currently used **Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation instruments are inadequate** in coping with the specificity of CSO-led (social) development contributions.

CSO ownership of its development cooperation is still in many ways heavily limited through government and/or donor driven and controlled policies and support systems.

2 Changing the CO-OPERATION paradigm

2.1 “CSO's as independent development actors in their own right” (AAA)

The AAA in its art 19 refers very explicitly to the added value of the **“CSO’s as independent development actors in their own right”**. Recognising civil society as “actor-in its own right”, is recognising that the emphasis of the development process lies with the constituency of the CSOs: the **organised people** who are **themselves actors of their individual and collective development**. This is a very powerful quality of civil society engagement and in many ways it does make the difference and/or complement/supports the drive of governmental development cooperation.\(^9\)

However, as reported by most of the evaluators, this intrinsic value of civil society is in most cases not taken as the basis for supporting a CSO-oriented development strategy and therefore the potential of civil society for development is often not fully supported.

Donors and governments should fully assume the autonomy and the right of initiative of the civil society partners at all levels and acting consequently. This has multiple dimensions that affect not only the political dialogue, or the instruments or the in-country strategies etc... it does affect all elements of the CSO-EU/donor/government cooperation: it requires an ACTOR based approach recognising CSO’s autonomy as a development actor.

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\(^8\) See GSDRC and ECDPM; Op.cit.

\(^9\) “Where unions are able to act freely, to promote collective bargaining, and to play a full role as social partners in dialogue about their nation’s policies and future, then we see democracy at work.” Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator, addressing the 2\(^{nd}\) ITUC Congress, Vancouver, 24/06/2010.

\(^10\) GSDRC, ECDPM, Consulting AB, ...
2.2 Applying the values of the Paris Declaration principles to the cooperation with and support models for NON-state actors.

Recent evolutions in the thinking (and to a lesser extend in the praxis) of the state to state cooperation (Paris Declaration and AAA) has lead to a shift of focus in the ownership of development. The principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results oriented managing and mutual accountability do demonstrate a shift in the paradigm of official development cooperation. However, this evolution has not yet encompassed the CSO cooperation as a specific channel of cooperation based on the right of initiative. At the contrary, state to state dynamics tend to understand and consider the CSO channel as subordinated to the state to state agreements. CSO, including trade unions are therefore requested to “adjust” to either donor-requirements or are dependent on governmental control and restrictions in recipient countries. Furthermore the competitive project based approach (call for proposals, ...), severely criticised under the Paris Declaration principles, is still the most prominent instrument used by donors/governments to deal with CSO cooperation, very often openly contradicting in its results the principles advocated for in policy statements concerning democracy and the role of civil society in development (AAA).

It is essential to overcome the technocratic, -“one-fits all” -, grants driven CSO aid delivery mechanisms and put into place an effective and more harmonised system of results oriented and mutual accountable support modalities that is based on CSO OWNERSHIP, ALIGNMENT on NEEDS, PRIORITIES and “SYSTEMS” of the different, specific CSO actors.

3 Principles and enabling environment of the Dialogue- and Actor Based Cooperation

An actor based approach recognises the diversity, autonomy and initiative of CSOs as actors for development out of their own right and stresses the CSO ownership of development strategies. Dialogue (rights based, structured, permanent, multistakeholder-led and resourced), has therefore to be the collective as well as the individualised instrument for engagement between the EU and the different actors. It does require a systemic shift that affects the policy setting machinery, as well as the support mechanisms and programming, the implementation strategy and the methods for Monitoring and Results assessment. Recognition of the specific contribution of the different groups of actors is the prerequisite for the cooperation to be effective. The establishment of a “Local Authorities Programme” (not considering the modalities), as specific and different from the general CSO

11 See Mapping of Donors’ Conditions and Requirements for CSO funding, Final report Cecilia Karlstedt, Consulting AB (contract SIDA) 23/05/2010. But also the many restrictive criteria and conditions used by EU-delegations to “orient” local calls.
programming and support can be seen as a step into the right direction. The CSO cooperation should resolutely leave behind the “one size fits all” approach and instruments and engage in a dialogue with the different sectors of actors at central level, at regional and at in-country level (including networks of CBO’s and specific local actors).

The EU should, again in dialogue with specific actors, promote complementarities and effectiveness in the interaction of the national and international support mechanisms, taking into account the mandates, capacities, opportunities and resources on both sides (CSO and EU). The complementarity between international support models and in-country models is a guarantee for both the CSO’s independence and autonomy, and the coherence and harmonisation of programming within the international networks.

3.1 A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH and ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

That there can be no development effectiveness for CSO without an enabling environment was reaffirmed in the Principles for CSO Effectiveness, adopted at the Global Assembly of the Open Forum in Istanbul: “Guided by these Istanbul principles, CSOs are committed to take pro-active actions to improve and be fully accountable for their development practices. Equally important will be enabling policies and practices by all actors. Through actions consistent with these principles, donor and partner country governments demonstrate their Accra Agenda for Action pledge that they “share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential”. All governments have an obligation to uphold basic human rights – among others, the right to association, the right to assembly, and the freedom of expression. Together these are pre-conditions for effective development.”

Although awareness is growing on the CSO contribution to development, confusion remains in the texts and in the practices as to the exact nature of the interaction between the state and civil society. That ambiguity can be found in many ways by states, both north and south, in the prescription of “priorities” and/or “choices”, as well as other political or practical conditionalities and governance methods to CSO actions and activities. It is also reflected in the existing good practice examples of in-country civil society coordinating mechanisms with donors and government. Although they are very useful instruments for dialogue, and/or implementation, they remain voluntary and omit to recognise a rights-based approach for the CSO existence and activities.

Positive examples of rights-based CSO recognition, deriving from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of the UN qualifying the freedom of association, can be found in the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe, and in the

12 See the new and important reference made to the CSO contribution in the AAA § 13 and 20
13 See ref to conditionalities in Mapping of Donors’ Conditions and Requirements for CSO funding, Op. cit.

Also, and more far-reaching from a legal and accountability point of view, as far as trade unions and employers organisations are concerned, in the ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining. The main characteristics of these “regulations” are

- the absence of externally imposed conditions, acknowledging the freedom of organisation and action;
- the prohibition of interferences by the state with the “CSO” organisation/activities and
- an enforceable, dialogue based accountability system.

3.2 STRUCTURED (political) DIALOGUE as organizing element of cooperation

The organising principle for the rights based cooperation should be the STRUCTURED DIALOGUE, rather than the call for proposal and the policy consultation=information “dialogues” with CSOs. This means that both programming and policy dialogue with CSOs should be rooted in the dialogue between the CSO, individually and collectively, and the other SD partners. This Structured Dialogue, unlike the current exercise, should be rights based, be permanent, multi-stakeholder-led and sufficiently resourced.

In line with EU regulations and decision making processes, a fully mandated multistakeholder Structured Dialogue on Development should be installed.

In order to allow such structured dialogue to take place, representative and responsive networks of CS have to be identified as permanent and self-organised interlocutors through a CSO advisory group, with the other SD stakeholders in the SD committee. This self-regulation by the CSO community has to be understood as an integral part of the right of initiative of civil society.

The DIALOGUE with individual recognised networks ON THE PROGRAMMING should allow for a different approach for the contractual relationship but above all, should ensure mutual understanding and engagement on the vision and mission of the action to be launched. At the same time, this allows for an integrated programming, and for a commonly supported and implemented, monitoring, evaluation and learning methodology that focuses on the sustainable change the action produces.

See as reference i.a.: Structured dialogue with youth at http://ec.europa.eu/youth/focus165_en.htm
Experience from other self-regulated CSO groups, does confirm the inclusive and representative outcomes of such exercises. (see Council of Europe Youth Structures, or BetterAid, Open Forum CSO platforms).
This transformation of the traditional project cycle into an integrated, long term impact planning approach based on structured dialogue between the actor/network and the government/donor, will ensure political ground for mutual accountability and will also allow to understand the need for the use of innovative and more responsive mechanisms to support this actions, including adjusted reporting systems.

On the POLICY DIALOGUES, the current SAG\(^\text{18}\) is considered obsolete, as it has not met the expectation\(^\text{19}\). It would therefore be appropriate to include this type of policy dialogues within the larger framework of the Structured Dialogue and identify relevant development issues to be discussed in issue-centered working groups as part of a permanent, resourced and co-chaired SD process and linked to the relevant institutional decision-making.

A successful SD involving all partners at EU level can also have a positive impact in the improvement and establishment of more appropriate international development architecture with respect to the CSO cooperation, taking further the AAA achievements.

The current parallel CSO processes, (BetterAid and Open Forum) as well as the leading role of the EU in the follow up of the AAA and the existence of an active CSO-Donor group of governments are all potential elements for improved and more effective support for CSOs in development cooperation.

**THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE HAS TO BECOME, AT ALL LEVELS, THE “ORGANISING PRINCIPLE” FOR THE COOPERATION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ON DEVELOPMENT**

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\(^{18}\) Stakeholders Advisory Group (see Glossary). Consultation group of the UE on Development Cooperation

\(^{19}\) See CoA op.cit. on the poor quality and insufficient exploitation of the potentials of the dialogues with CSO.
### STRUCTURED DIALOGUE

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<th>PROGRAMMING</th>
<th>POLICY DIALOGUE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>actor based</strong></td>
<td><strong>collective</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>principles</strong></td>
<td><strong>principles</strong></td>
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<td>shared finalities with donor</td>
<td>joint structure, co-chaired with common agenda setting</td>
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<td>joint appreciation/commitment</td>
<td>inclusive for representative networks</td>
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<td>integrated budget &amp; programme</td>
<td>SD both at European and national level</td>
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<tr>
<td>management responsibility with actor</td>
<td>rourced on co-managed budget line (objective 4?)</td>
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<td>permanent monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<th>INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS</th>
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<td><strong>DCI PROGRAMMING</strong></td>
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<td><strong>POLICY COHERENCE</strong></td>
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<td>DCI Permanent SD</td>
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<td>SD committee</td>
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<td>CSO Advisory Group</td>
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<td><strong>improved instruments and procedures</strong></td>
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### SD RELATED TO OTHER LEVEL DIALOGUES

**National Dialogues with CSO in the EU Member States**
- National dialogues in-country
- with EU-delegation/donors, government, parliament and horizontal CSO coordination

**POTENTIAL INTERACTION**
- International Development architecture
- CSO Donor group of governments
- CSO platforms
- OECD/DAC – UNDCF – G20
3.3 MULTILATERAL AND INCLUSIVE ACTOR-BASED NETWORKING as a contribution to CSO in-country impact and development effectiveness

PEER TO PEER NETWORKING is for many of the new CSO partners the main modus operandi in strengthening in-country developmental impact of their cooperation. The lack of understanding of the added value and practical development impact of INTERNATIONAL CSO Networks on the one hand and on the other, the unconsidered implementation of new state-driven policies through localisation and in-country donor support systems for civil society, are a threat to the autonomy of CSO cooperation, since they tend to reduce the CSO contribution to merely service delivery\(^{20}\). In practice, in-country support for local social movements is, in many ways, most successfully operated through their own international networks, ensuring independent peer to peer support and capacity development around their societal core business\(^{21}\).

DEMOCRATIC OWNERSHIP is a constituent element of that CSO cooperation. Representative organisations, with democratic structures and decision-making organs, independent and acting out of their own right, relying local development, from the workplace to the community, with national and international, including south-south strategies, are a major asset for the development effectiveness agenda\(^{22}\). The democratic ownership agenda is inevitably linked to the freedom of association and the in-country ability of the CSO/TU to act. In fine it is about the quality of democracy as a prerequisite of development effectiveness.

That **multilateral capacity and in-country impact and effectiveness**, framing the right of initiative and rooted in a rights-base approach, **should be a priority focus for support through CSO networks.**

\(^{20}\) Support Models for CSOs at the Country Level: A Summary of a Study Commissioned by Nordic+ Donor Countries CCIC January 2008. The document whilst indentifying non specific challenges (eg the general PD criteria) is clearly inconclusive on the added value of this in-country approach.

\(^{21}\) The EU has dramatically reduced, whilst enlarging its partnership with international Social Movements/CSO networks, the multi-country share of the NSA budget in favour of in-country allocations to “civil society” by EU delegations, on top of the already important provisions for civil society under the geographical instruments, who’s effectiveness and impact remains to be assessed.

\(^{22}\) Examples of the role of social movement that have brought major shifts in development models in recent history are self-explanatory: Solidarnosc in Poland; trade unions as motor of civil society in Guinée, Nepal, ... have contributed to systemic change: others, through democratic policy processes they have been drivers of social and political change in Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, ...
4 New modalities for supporting effective and actor-based development cooperation

4.1 A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: integrated the multiple contributions and dimensions of CSOs in one coherent actor-based framework.

Many social movements/CSO, such as the trade unions, although they have specific constituencies, are involved in the multiple agenda’s that affect development in their country/worldwide based on their constituency’s main missions

- Capacity development, awareness raising, education and training
- Research and policy preparation, monitoring and evaluation
- Advocacy and institutional representation, on Human rights, Gender equality, Decent work, Migration and asylum, Education for all, Health, ... at local, national, regional and international level
- Visibility actions, information and communication
- Organisational development, democratic governance and networking, from the work floor, sector wide, national, regional to the international level.
- Programme management and follow-up....
- Service delivery of their members and their communities (housing, education, legal assistance, credit and financial services, health related services, ...).
- Service procurement for Framework contracts to recruit short-term services.

Under the current system of (EU) programming many of these aspects are taken up under different instruments or programmes, with different schedules and different types of management tools (most of the time calls for proposals, sometimes contracts). As a result of this, CSO very often end up with mutilated capacities and lack of programme coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current system of potential project based support for ITUC Actions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Based on calls for proposals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<td>Equality</td>
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<td>Decent Work</td>
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<td>HIV AIDS</td>
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<td>awareness and information</td>
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<td>coordination and networking</td>
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<td>capacity development</td>
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<td>in-country</td>
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<td>regional/international</td>
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<td>administration and management</td>
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<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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We therefore call for an *more integrated framework of action and activities, based on the policy dialogue and actor-driven coherence*. That framework should contribute to the overall objective linked to the actors’ mission, allowing for consistency and coherence in the actors’ multiple functions and internal organisation structures and decision-making. It should ensure therefore overall capacity to materialise the required change in the development patterns, in-country and globally, it is working on.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Alternative ITUC Programme support</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Based on integrated programming dialogue</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights &amp; Democracy</td>
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<td>Equality</td>
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<td>Decent Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV AIDS at the workplace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Awareness and information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination and networking including regions (Africa, America, Asia-P, Europe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity development</td>
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<td>in-country</td>
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<td>regional/international</td>
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<td>Administration and management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance and other services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning</td>
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### 4.2 A LONG TERM AND CONTRACTUAL ENGAGEMENT based on dialogue, predictability, mutual accountability and governance feasibility.

The shortfalls of the current operating system based on the call for proposals is extensively documented. Also the possible alternatives have been listed and should now be examined with a view on their practicability, their contribution and utility to the proposed outcomes of CSO development cooperation and their feasibility in terms of management, quality and equity in affectation and accountability.

The *use of new supporting mechanisms*\(^{23}\) for CSO-networks: core funding, framework programmes, etc should be promoted, with full respect of the integrity of the CSOs’ right of initiative (ownership). Long term shared engagement and accountability by donor and the

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\(^{23}\) They are not “new”, since they are already applied largely in the state-to-state cooperation, but also in many bilateral CSO cooperation (see comparative analysis of Framework Programmes with CSO by the Austrian Development Agency, 2010 and Mapping of Donors Conditions and Requirements for CSO funding; op.cit).
CSO network, permanent progress and impact assessment and simplified management tools, are constituent elements for a new CSO support instrument.

**Autonomy for CSO support** should be guaranteed from the (bilateral) state to state agreements\(^{24}\), avoiding either the donor or the partner country or both, to impose priorities, conditionalities or political preferences upon the CSOs and their actions, infringing the right of initiative and the essential autonomy of civil society\(^{25}\). The CSO ownership has to be understood as the abstention of interference by states in CSO policies and organisations whilst recognizing their right on initiative and the value of their contribution to democracy and development.

It is inappropriate to impose governmental driven strategies on CSO-networks that have, out of their own right and autonomy, and based on their own democratic decision-making, established their own geographical and thematical/sectorial priorities. It is, above all not the implementation of technical projects or programmes that will ensure sustainable change in development patterns but **the empowerment of representative actors in a lively and vibrant democracy**.

**Actor and people oriented PME methods** for assessing the CSO programmes’ contribution to development should replace the imposition of inappropriate strategies and methodologies on CSO development programmes that are based on short term outputs and on the attribution of results to (donor)support.

A long term, **comprehensive planning, allowing for vertical integration** could be an important asset for enabling more in-country effectiveness of CSOs whilst respecting fully their autonomy and right of initiative. The actor-based programming will also allow donor harmonisation on the CSO programmes through pooled/basket funding and common PME, reporting and management systems by different donors (EU, member-states, multilaterals and private).

**Use of domestic and actor-driven expertise** should insure increased effectiveness at technical, political and financial level. The lack of dialogue, and of donor commitment, has given birth to a flourishing industry of development run through the exclusive and the tailor made tender-system by consultants and often self-appointed experts, responding to donor imperatives and adjusting realities. This gravely undermines ownership and represents a huge cost to the development budgets. This is the case, as in many other fields, in areas of direct trade union concern such as labour market analysis, social dialogue etc..

\(^{24}\) This is, amongst other elements, one of the most important raisons for the failure in the civil society chapter of the Cotonou agreement: besides good practices based purely on good will of certain partner governments, there is NO RIGHTS BASED ground for civil society to be recognised and included as partners in their own right by partner governments (and the EU-delegations).

\(^{25}\) See EESC Rex/296 On DCI of the EU: the role of organised civil society and social partners. Iuliano, June 2010
The use of integrated programming will also allow, together with the political and programming dialogue to establish **mutual commitment towards results and evaluation**. It could also substantially reduce the number of programme and their complex administration as well as the oversight of the contribution and interaction of the multiple actors in the development strategies and actions. More dialogue, with fewer actors (through horizontal or vertical networks and actor alignments); less, but integrated programmes; and alignment of donors and harmonisation of proceedings, will simplify greatly the implementation strategy and the costs for management and oversight.

However, as explained above, the key issue is to put the policy before the money, to **CONSTRUCT THE SYSTEM ON POLICY DIALOGUE AND MUTUAL ENGAGEMENT FIRST**, rather than primarily optimising the affectation of resources.

### 5 The overall policy framework should be conducive for promoting a sustainable and just development model.

Governments and the EU should seek to integrate the decent work agenda (MDG 1b) systematically and as a matter of urgency, into macroeconomic policies and development cooperation strategies at national level. This constitutes an indispensable means of addressing the challenges of eradicating poverty and sharing the benefits of growth equitably within society. Human Rights, Gender Equality, Decent work as well as environmental sustainability should be promoted as basic elements of the EU development strategy.

The International Development Architecture has to be reformed in order to be representative and legitimised by developing countries as well as donors; it should be inclusive and recognise participation of CSOs as development actors in their own right; accountable, allowing for standard based result oriented accountability systems and simplified, addressing the challenges of the future instead of building on the heritages development conflicts and failures of the past.

The 2nd ITUC Congress in Vancouver in June 2010 adopted an informed policy resolution highlighting the contribution of the trade union movement in the quest of a new, sustainable development model based on social justice27.

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27 [http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/2CO_04_A_development_platform_for_the_21st_century_03-10-d.pdf](http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/2CO_04_A_development_platform_for_the_21st_century_03-10-d.pdf)
6 Demands

**Dialogue**
1. Install the structured dialogue as the permanent instrument for CSO participation in both programming and policy dialogues, co-chaired and with co-managed resources.
2. Support the constitution of a self-governed CSO advisory group as part of the SD setup.
3. Recognise the self-regulating right and capacity of the CSO community as basis for the structured dialogue.
4. Integrate the Stakeholders Advisory Group (SAG) into the SD structure on policy dialogues.

**Enabling Environment**
5. Ensure CSO’s rights of initiative at all levels and revise government driven geographical, sectorial and thematic programming in order to ensure autonomy and rights based support for CSOs (“independent” CSO funding, also in geographical instruments).
6. Endorse the Istanbul CSO Effectiveness Principles

**Actor Based Donor Support Model**
7. Install programme dialogues with individual CSO networks in order to assess needs and ensure shared engagement and accountability.
8. Revise and integrate the instruments ensuring inclusiveness of action plans and actor based coherence (including technical assistance and service contracts).
9. Promote core funding for and framework agreements with global networks (including enlarged subcontracting), reducing the number of actors (programmes) in order to ensure effectiveness in management and impact assessment, as a necessary and complementary tool for in-country CSO support.
10. Acknowledge the need for diversified instruments and value of CSO ownership, donor alignment, harmonisation and cooperation/division of labour, in order to meet the diversity of needs of the different actors and respect their right of initiative.
11. Adjust the short term output based PME methods to allow better and more adequate actor based progress and change measurement and impact assessment.
12. Promote in-country rights based structural dialogue mechanisms and horizontal integration.

Based on the expressed needs, **all stakeholders should ensure**, as a prerequisite and condition sine qua non, **to substantially increase the CSO funding**.