

# An Overview of Women's Work and Employment in Brazil

## Decisions for Life MDG3 Project Country Report No. 12

University of Amsterdam /  
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS)  
[www.uva.nl/aias](http://www.uva.nl/aias)

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Amsterdam, Netherlands, December 2009

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## Management summary

This report provides information on Brazil on behalf of the implementation of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.

*History (2.1.1).* Brazil, developed as an agricultural nation, in the 1930s started to industrialize and urbanise. A military regime, lasting from 1964-'85, initially sparked an "economic miracle", but ended up with huge inflation and foreign debts, as well as social unrest. The transition to democracy was long and painful. The country definitely stabilized and developed an internationalist approach under the administrations of president Lula (2002-2010).

*Governance (2.1.2).* A major governance challenge is that day-to-day life is marked by considerable violence. The position of women in politics is weak. Nevertheless, the country has a vibrant women's movement. The rewritten 1988 Constitution of Brazil and the 2003 Family Code ended legal discrimination of women, but violence against women is persistent and widespread.

*Prospects (2.1.3).* The global economic crisis has had limited effects on Brazil's economy. For the time being the recovery has been remarkably strong. Leading economists perceive Brazil as the country that will likely see its competitiveness most favourably affected by the crisis. The position of women also seems not to be seriously hit by the crisis.

*Communication (2.2).* Over three of each four Brazilians are cell phone users. The country's Internet infrastructure and marketing are well developed, and Internet coverage actually is over 35%. Radio and TV have high coverage, but newspaper circulation is low.

*The sectoral labour market structure (2.3).* In the 2000s, especially between 2001-2004, female employment continued to grow more rapidly than male. Also, formal employment grew quicker than informal labour. In 2007, employees made up 70% of the labour force. The official unemployment rate fluctuates between 8-9%, but female unemployment remains about 5% points higher than males. Unemployment of female 15-29-year-olds is with 18-19% considerable.

*Legislation (2.4.1).* Brazil has ratified the core ILO Labour Conventions except No. 87, on the freedom of association, leading to criticism of ITUC and ILO. The CLT of 1943 still forms the basis of labour legislation.

*Labour relations and wage-setting (2.4.2).* In the 2000s, union strength has remained stable. For 2007, union density was counted at 17.7% of the working population, and women's density rate may be estimated at 15-16%. Since 2002, a number of social dialogue institutions and processes have been set up.

*The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1).* The Lula government has substantially increased the statutory minimum wage, lifting the real value with about 45%. Negative employment effects can hardly be traced, whereas the increases have contributed to a less uneven income distribution.

*Poverty (2.5.2).* For 2006, it has been estimated that 18.3% of the Brazilian population lived below the poverty line of USD 2 a day. Both income inequality and poverty in Brazil remain high, but they have been declining in recent years. Quite recently income inequality may even have fallen spectacularly. In

spite of signs of smaller urban-rural differences, like in school enrollment rates, rural poverty remains deep and widespread.

*Population and fertility (2.6.1).* Current population growth rate is estimated at 1.2% per year, and is still slowing down. With 2.2 children per woman, the total fertility rate is rather low; birth control is widespread. The decline of the adolescent fertility rate seems to have ended; about one quarter of female 18-19-year-olds is mother. Brazil is highly urbanised, with 85% of the population living in urban areas.

*Health (2.6.2).* In 2007, about 730,000 Brazilians or nearly 0.4% lived with HIV. Since 1998 the death rate from AIDS has steadily declined: an achievement attributed to the country's treatment policies. The country's health disparities are still considerable.

*Women's labour market share (2.6.3).* The overall labour participation rate of the 15-64 of age is 72%, but only 63% for women. The 2007 women's share in the labour force was largest in households (98%), education (78%), and health and social work (77%). The female share was considerable in finance (49%), but relatively low in commerce (40%), other business (33%), and public administration (38%). There were female majorities among professionals as well as clerks (both 59%), service and sales workers (58%), but also in elementary occupations (55%).

*Agriculture (2.6.4).* The majority of farms is very small, and many produce at subsistence level. Under the prevailing conditions it is unlikely that many young women living in urban areas and trying to make a career can rely on a "fall-back scenario" in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

*Mining and manufacturing (2.6.5).* In 2007 the single largest industry employing women was apparel. Female employment in more sophisticated manufacturing is relatively small, also in export industries.

*Commerce (2.6.6).* The large majority of commerce employees is employed in small companies with less than 500 employees, over half operating in the informal economy. Between 1995-2007 employment in commerce doubled, and prospects for further growth are good.

*Services (2.6.7).* Continued employment growth may be expected in tourism; the financial sector, and real estate and other business. This growth may offer good employment opportunities for women working at the three highest occupational levels and as clerks.

*Government (2.6.8).* Past decisions on expansion of the public service and appointing higher-ranked public officers seem to have favoured men. Adoption of equal opportunities legislation will contribute to the entry of many (young) women in public service.

*Literacy (2.7.1).* The adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write – was in 2007 exactly 90%, with the female rate a fraction higher. The youth (15-24-year-olds) literacy rate was nearly 98%, with the rate of girls 1.5% point higher.

*Education of girls and young women (2.7.2).* Combined gross enrollment in education was in 2006 overall 87%. Net enrollment in primary education of the 6-14-year-olds was in 2007 97%, with enrollment for girls a fraction higher than for boys. Though the enrollment rate for the 15-19-year-olds increased to 80% in 2005, school attendance is much lower. For girls, young motherhood, poverty and poor quality of public education are factors influencing school attendance negatively. In 2006, 8% of the 18-year-olds was enrolled in tertiary education, increasing to 15% among the 22-year-olds. Female participation in tertiary education exceeds male participation by far.

*Female skill levels (2.7.3).* The average level of education completed of women is considerably higher than that of men. At the two lowest skill levels 47% of all male workers could be found against 37% of

all females. At the highest (tertiary) level women had a clear advantage, with a 12% share against 7% for men. The average female skill rating is 3.04, against a male average of 2.73. As for Brazil, about 4.3 million girls and young women can be estimated to belong to the DECISION FOR LIFE target group, of which about 3 million in paid employment and the others as self-employed or contributing family workers.

*Wages (2.8.1).* Though slightly decreasing, the gender pay gap is still quite large. Based on *WageIndicator* data, for 2007-08 the average gender pay gap in Brazil was calculated at 38.5%, in spite of the average higher skill level of the female labour force. The gender pay gap was about the same in the private and public sectors. Discriminatory practices in wage formation continue to have a major impact on women's pay.

*Working conditions (2.8.2).* In 2005, 36% of all employees usually worked over 44 hours. Average working weeks are rather long. In 2007, usual working hours of women were notably long in manufacturing (average 42.3 hours weekly), wholesale and retail (43.2 hours), and restaurants and hotels (43.7 hours).

# 1. Introduction: The Decisions for Life project

The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of society: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.

DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): "Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women". DECISIONS FOR LIFE more specifically focuses on MDG3.5: "Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market", which is one of the four MDG3 priority areas identified in Ministry's MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from October 2008 until June 2011 (See <http://www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life>).

DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of Amsterdam/AIAS.

This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be posted at the project website. In this country report on Brazil the sequence of the sections differs from the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activity 1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate product, the DecentWorkCheck for Brazil. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies' regulations, will take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses (Chapter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator.

**Table 1** Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam

Nr	Inventories
1.01	Inventories of national legislation
1.02	Inventories of companies' regulations
1.03	Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a	Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b	Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventories

## 2. Gender analysis regarding work and employment

### 2.1. Introduction: the general picture

#### 2.1.1. History

The history of colonization started for Brazil in 1500. Though first discovered by Spanish seamen, in 1530 the Portuguese king John III initiated a program of systematic colonization. About three million African enslaved individuals were imported to overcome the shortage of labourers, especially when the indigeneous slaves on the plantations died of over-work. In spite of a period of Spanish rule and repeated but in the end fruitful attacks of the Dutch in the 17 century, Portuguese rule remained established; the discovery of gold and diamond deposits and, later, the development of coffee- and sugar-growing industries attracted many European migrants. In 1822, under pressure of Brazilian republic sentiment, the Portuguese regent of Brazil, Dom Pedro, proclaimed the country's independence. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, under the long reign of Pedro II, the country's economy boomed. Between 1853-1888, slavery was abolished. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Brazil became known as a society largely characterized by landed estates, ruled by sugar, cattle, rubber and coffee barons. After a military revolt, in 1891 the country was proclaimed a federal republic. In the 1920s, an economic crisis deepened and social unrest spread, and in 1930 a military junta brought the populist leader Getúlio Vargas into power (website emayzine; wikipedia Economy of Brazil; CIA World Factbook; Frank 1967; Hudson 1997; Renwick 2009).

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, modernization via export agriculture had turned into failure. From the early 1930s on, the Vargas administration stimulated industrialization through an authoritarian corporatist state. A network of state enterprises aimed to boost domestic production. Trade unionism was subordinated to modernization and national progress; unions lost their independence and the right to free collective bargaining. The Ministry of Labour supervised every aspect of trade unions, cumulating in the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*, the Consolidation of Labour Laws of 1943 (CLT, Decree Law No. 5452). From 1937-1943, the creation of CLT went hand in hand with the building of an interventionist and repressive state apparatus. For example, under section 623 of the CLT a collective agreement can be declared null and void if it is deemed to conflict with the government's economic and financial policy, or the wage policy in force (French 2004; Cardoso 2004; US Dept of State 2009).

Jointly with industrialization, urbanisation developed, in huge cities concentrating both wealth and social exclusion. While in 1930 40% of Brazilians lived in urban areas, in 1970 this had turned into a majority (56%) – as to keep growing, to 70% in 1980, 81% in 2000 and 85% in 2007. In the Second Republic, from 1946-1964, the Dutra, Vargas-II, and Kubitschek administrations on the one hand kept much of the social legislation from the first Vargas era, but on the other hand privileged foreign investors and deprived the majority of the people from the benefits of industrialization and economic growth. Kubitschek created a car industry and a new capital, Brasilia, but also piled up economic and social problems. Income inequality and urban slums soared, as did inflation, especially from 1961 on under the presidency of João Goulart. By then, the system of government-regulated trade unionism and clientelism reached its limits. In March 1964, a military coup prevented a move in the direction of the poor. Against a background of peasant land seizures, strikes and food riots, Goulart called for agrarian reforms, rent controls and limits to the exports of profits, a call that right-wing politicians, the military and the US government charged to be a cover for a radical nationalist --or, for that matter, communist--



take-over. Their coup d'état meant the start of the Military Republic, lasting between 1964-1985. Like later elsewhere in the Southern cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) after coups according to US recipe, trade union leaders were the first to be arrested (Frank 1967; Hudson 1997; Skidmore 2004; Klein 2007).

Technocrats and military leaders pursued an industrial revolution and the development of the vast interior regions. The years 1968-1974 witnessed the emergence of the Brazilian "economic miracle", with annual GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rates of 12%, but accompanied by growing repression and the suppression of any criticism and labour unrest with imprisonment, torture, and censorship. It came to a break with the Roman Catholic clergy, criticizing the military dictatorship's failure to improve the conditions of the poor. The army tried to gain legitimacy in 1974 as president general Geisel took some steps to the relaxation of authoritarian rule. Under pressure of notably local industrial employers, opposing the large influence of parastatal and multinational firms, and in a political vacuum the last military president, Figueiredo, promoted the *abertura* (opening) of the political system. The years of easy expansion were over: the 'miracle' ended up in high energy costs, hyperinflation, large balance-of-payments deficits, a huge foreign debt, and a heavily skewed income distribution. The military were confronted with the massive São Paulo strike movement of 1978-'80. The IMF (International Monetary Fund) imposed a painful austerity program on Brazil; contrary to the conservative diagnosis, it did not help to curb inflation, while unemployment levels rose. Finally, forced by a broad campaign for direct presidential elections, in 1985 the military rulers ceded power to civilians (website emazine; Evans 1983; Selcher 1986; Skidmore 1988, 2004; Hudson 1997).

The transition to democracy was long, and for a majority of the population painful -- first under the weak government of Sarney (1985-'89), followed by the neoliberal administration of Collor de Mello (1989-'92), elected on a anti-corruption ticket but impeached under allegations of corruption, by the Franco administration (1992-'94), growingly focusing on austerity, public spending cuts and privatisation programs, and then under the two Cardoso administrations (1995-2002). In the decade between 1985 and 1995, the Brazilian economy was restructured in neoliberal direction, largely according to the pattern of a low-skill abundant country. There was a shift towards sectors intensively using low-skilled labour; within sectors, the same shift was discernible, though those jobs were filled with relatively better educated workers. In the late 1990s, the share of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) going into services (privatised finance and utilities) grew considerably, but -helped by a renewed government orientation on import substitution -- so did FDI in car manufacturing too (Hudson 1997; Skidmore 2004; Raess 2006; Muendler 2007; Renwick 2009)(see also section 2.4.2 of this report).

The Cardoso administration conformed closely to the 'Washington Consensus', including macroeconomic stability, fiscal prudence, and privatisation of parastatal companies - the latter already initiated under the Collor government, but now focusing on state-owned enterprises responsible for the major part of Brazil's infrastructure as well as state-owned mining plants, like the large Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD). However, in deviation from this Consensus notably under the second Cardoso administration the new policies were accompanied by significant reforms to social security and assistance transfers. Moreover, Cardoso's anti-inflation program, the *Plano Real*, was successful in stabilizing prices and contributed to pro-poor growth (Hudson 1997; Skidmore 2004; Ferreira *et al* 2008; Ravallion 2009; Renwick 2009; Zeneda *et al* 2009).

In 2002, the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, PT), having developed into a mass political party, for the third time candidated Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known popularly as Lula, in the presidential elections. Lula won, and was re-elected in the 2006 election. His first administration chose a reformist line, passing new retirement, tax, labour and judicial legislation, though a limited number of reforms have been implemented so far. The second Lula administration has emphasized efforts to eradicate

hunger, through the large *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) program; has carried out social programs targeting causes of poverty, combining cash assistance for the poor with efforts to improve school attendance in the *Bolsa Família* (Family Fund) program; has initiated a major public investment program (though, controversially, partly funded by workers' accounts), the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* (Plan for Accelerated Growth, PAC), and has sought to resolve some of the most pressing land tenure problems. These programs have been rewarded and evaluated positively by international donors. Moreover, already early in his presidency Lula made global eradication of poverty and hunger a foreign policy concern. His speeches at the United Nations in 2003 and 2004 generated global attention and increased the political space for dialogue on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) within Brazil (wikipedia; UNDP 2005, 2007; Manfredini *et al* 2008).

Already under Collor and Cardoso, but more outspoken under Lula, Brazilian foreign and trade policies reflect an internationalist approach. The Lula administration has projected Brazil as a leader in Latin America. It champions the rights of developing countries, and works consistently to strengthen Brazil's ties with other developing countries, including China, India, South Africa, and the Portuguese-speaking countries Angola and Mozambique (wikipedia; government websites). Nevertheless, more recently foreign direct investment (FDI) shows a rather erratic pattern. While the FDI inflow in 2000 reached its top with over USD 103 billion, a steep decrease resulted in an inflow of USD 18,82 billion in 2006, followed by an increase to USD 34,59 billion in 2007 and USD 45,06 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD 2009).

Although over a longer span of time, 1970-1999, Brazil showed one of the higher GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rates in Latin America (4.43% yearly), its per capita (person) growth rate of 2.2% per year in worldwide perspective was rather modest (GDP growth rates in Vargas da Cruz *et al* 2008, corrected by population growth, see section 2.6.1). In the first years of the 2000s, the achievement of the Brazilian economy even remained considerably below this long-term average. GDP per person employed was 1.3% in 2000, -1.3% in 2001, -0.9% in 2002, -0.1% in 2003, followed by a recovery, another dip and growth finally speeding up: 1.8% in 2004, 1.3% in 2005, 0.8% in 2006, 2.9% in 2007 and 3.8% in 2008 (UN MDG Indicators). Thus, the GDP growth rate per person employed for 2001-2006 averaged a humble 0.3%, growing to an average 1.8% for 2003-2008.

In the 21st century Brazil has deserved its position between the other upcoming economic powers, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China): not in showing high GDP growth rates, but in promising efforts to reduce poverty and improving education, health and living standards – though, as this report will show, much needs to be done, especially in the field of women's work and employment. Currently the 8th largest economy in the world, Brazil is transformed into an upper-middle-income country. In 2006 its GDP per capita reached USD (PPP) 8,949, ranking 76<sup>th</sup> in the world. The estimated earned income for men was USD 11,521, and for women USD 6,426 (UNDP 2008), suggesting a women to men parity rate of 0.56. This outcome points at very large gender gaps in income and pay, which as we will see are persistent in Brazil.

### 2.1.2. Governance

Brazil is a federal republic composed of 26 states and a federal district (Brasilia FD), with three tiers of government. Each state has its own government structure mirroring that at federal level, and there are over 5,000 municipal councils. Voting is universal and compulsory for all literate citizens from 18-70, and optional for those aged 16-17 and over 70, or who are illiterate. Although there were many violent episodes, Brazilian history on the whole has been remarkably peaceful. Despite its nonbelligerent

heritage at the national level, Brazilian life is marked by considerable violence on a day-to-day basis (Hudson 1997; wikipedia).

While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the federal security forces, the US Dept of State (2009) over 2008 reported that state-level security forces committed numerous human rights abuses. The following human rights problems were reported: unlawful killings, excessive force, beatings, abuse, and torture of detainees and inmates by police and prison security forces; inability to protect witnesses involved in criminal cases; harsh prison conditions; prolonged pretrial detention and inordinate delays of trials; reluctance to prosecute as well as inefficiency in prosecuting government officials for corruption; violence and discrimination against women; violence against children, including sexual abuse; trafficking in persons; discrimination against indigenous persons and minorities; failure to enforce labour laws; widespread forced labour; and child labour in the informal sector. Human rights violators often enjoyed impunity. Death squads with links to law enforcement officials carried out many killings, in some cases with police participation. In the *favelas* (shantytowns) of the major cities killings between rival drug trafficking gangs are widespread. Lynching by mobs or vigilante groups was common in some regions, especially against those accused of rape or other crimes that went unpunished in *favelas* due to the absence of state or local security agents. The Federal Police, operating under Ministry of Justice oversight, is small and primarily investigative (US Dept of State 2009). It should be added that increasingly killings and gunfights are no longer confined to large urban centres, but are on the rise in small towns in the interior of the country. Based on interviews with women in six states, an Amnesty International (2008) report gives a shocking account of women's experience of urban violence, suffering attacks and violence at the hands of criminal gangs and law enforcement officials. A number of cities has taken refuge to unorthodox measures as to avoid violence against women. For example, Rio de Janeiro has passed a bill reserving some subway cars and commuter trains for women after "hundreds of female commuters deluged the state legislature's hot line with complaints about fondlers" (cited in De Ruyter *et al* 2009, 14).

The position of women in politics is weak. Brazil has one of the lowest rates of women's political participation in the world. Though the law from 1996 on requires that political parties must reserve a minimum of 30% candidate slots for women (Htun 2002), in 2008 there were still only 10 women in the 81-member Senate (12.3%) and 45 women in the 513-member Chamber of Deputies (8.8%), in total the extremely low share of 9.3%. Women occupied 11.2% of elected seats at the state level and 12.6% at the municipal level (US Dept of State 2009). The political parties are disregarding the 30% rule; for example, for town council elections, the proportion of women candidates has fallen from 22.1% in 2004 to 21.9% in 2009. Various sociologists agree with the saying that "Brazilian women have made progress, in spite of the political parties" (Osava 2009). It cannot be denied that for quite some time notably the Congress has not shown much interest in social legislation on behalf of, among other things, gender equality (Htun and Power 2006, 100). Yet, it is possible that at least two high-profile women will be candidates in Brazil's 2010 presidential elections: Dilma Rousseff, of the governing Workers' Party (PT) and currently Minister for the Interior, who has been chosen by President Lula to succeed him as he cannot run for a third consecutive term, and Marina Silva, a former PT environment minister as candidate for the Green Party (PV) (Frayssinet 2009).

At federal level, the government in 2003 created the Women's Ministry, functioning as a watchdog on behalf on women's interests. Despite their quantitative weakness, the Congressional Women's Caucus, in partnership with feminist lobby groups achieved passage of numerous laws securing women's rights in the areas of violence, maternity leave, sexual harassment, and reproductive health (Htun 2003). Brazil has a vibrant women's movement. Women participate extensively in voluntary organisations (Civil

Society Organisations, CSOs) which started to flourish after the end of military rule (1984). In these days, they concentrated most on fighting illiteracy and providing help to the poor, more recently attention shifted towards combatting violence and sexual harassment and towards environmental issues (various websites). It was only in the 1980s that these organisations identified themselves as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); in 1991, the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG) was established (Campelo Koslinski and Reis 2009). Moreover, women make use of the participatory governance structure that operates in Brazil in parallel to the representative democratic system. At each of the three tiers of government, sectoral secretariats --such as for health, education, women, and environment-- are obliged to hold regular conferences to engage with CSOs in shaping and monitoring public policies. These conferences offer significant opportunities for social movements to engage with the state, composed as they are of 50% representation by the organized civil society and 50% state representatives. More than once, many thousands of women are involved in preparing proposals for legislation (Alcântara 2008).

According to the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators, Brazil in 2008 could be found in the world's "better half" concerning voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption - though on all four yardsticks the country's position deteriorated between 2003-2008. Concerning political stability and rule of law, Brazil remained in the lower half (website World Bank / governance). On the most recent Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (November 2009), Brazil improved five positions, ranking 75th out of 180 countries. Despite the improvement, Brazil received only 3.7 points out of 10. The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but according to the US Dept of State (2009) the government did not implement the law effectively.

The rewritten 1988 Constitution of Brazil ended legal subordination of women to men. It upholds the principle of equality between men and women, particularly within the family, and prohibits all forms of discrimination. It also sets forth the State's obligation to eradicate all forms of domestic violence. The government recently amended the 1916 Civil Code and the Penal Code of 1940, both of which included provisions that were sexist and discriminated against women. For example, the concept of an "honest woman" was removed and adultery was decriminalised. In reality, gender-related discrimination remains the primary source of social and economic inequality in Brazil. As we will see, women's labour market participation is increasing but segmentation and wage inequality on the basis of gender persist (OECD-SIGI website).

The Brazilian Family Code provides a moderate degree of protection for women in regard to family matters. The minimum legal age for marriage is 16 years for both women and men, on the condition of obtaining authorisation from the parents or a legal representative. Polygamy is not practiced in Brazil. Under the new 2003 Civil Code women gained full equality in marriage. The code refers to family authority rather than paternal authority and grants equal rights to the mother and father, in the interests of the couple and the children. In the event of divorce, child custody is generally granted to the mother. Officially, Brazilian women have the same ownership rights as men, but inequalities persist. Access to land is legally guaranteed to women and land can therefore be granted to a man or a woman, irrespective of marital status. However, almost all the beneficiaries of the 1996 land reform were men; women were considered to be their husbands' dependents. To remedy the situation, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform introduced a quota system that attributes one-third of the funds for financing agrarian reform to women (OECD-SIGI website). With about 12% in 2005, the level of female land ownership was still much lower than that of male ownership (Jütting and Morrisson 2009).

Until recently, Brazil's Civil Code denied the access of married women to property other than land. Men were responsible for administering joint property and also acted as their wife's "representative", which gave them the authority to administer their wife's individual property. The 2003 Civil Code gives each spouse equal rights and obligations in this area. By law, Brazilian women have access to bank loans, but those in rural areas they have more difficulty exercising this right. Loans are often granted to the head of the household, which effectively limits married women's access to bank loans (OECD-SIGI website).

Violence against women is common and represents a widespread social problem. The government recently introduced measures to improve protection of the physical integrity of Brazilian women. Under the 1940 Penal Code, the sentence imposed for violence against a woman was annulled if the offender married the victim, or if the victim married another man. These provisions were abolished with legal amendments established in 2005. Today, the majority of crimes committed within the family or the household are governed by a law adopted in 1995. A general increase in the number of convictions has been observed in recent years, but judicial decisions often reflect persistent stereotypes and are frequently prejudicial to women. In 2006, the government passed the *Maria da Penha* law that provided the first clear definition of domestic violence, offered a number of protections for women experiencing domestic violence and tripled the severity of sentences for offenders. Domestic violence affects all social and ethnic groups in Brazil (OECD-SIGI website; Amnesty International 2008).

Rape, including spousal rape, is a crime punishable by eight to 10 years' imprisonment, but men who killed, sexually assaulted, or committed other crimes against women were unlikely to be brought to trial. In 2008, a 24-hour hot line run by the federal government received 270,000 calls concerning violence against women, a 32% increase compared with 2007. Approximately 60% of the callers reported being beaten daily and 18% weekly; 64% of the callers reported being beaten by domestic partners, who in the majority of cases were under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Domestic violence remains both widespread and underreported. During 2008 there were 24,500 cases of domestic violence registered nationwide, compared with 20,050 cases in 2007. For such cases the law increases the penalty from one to three years in prison and creates special courts. The federal government stimulated the creation of these courts and promoted capacity-building courses for judges. Each state secretariat for public security operates *Delegacias da Mulher* (DEAMs), police stations dedicated exclusively to addressing crimes against women, totaling 415 countrywide (US Dept of State 2009). Yet, Amnesty International argues that a key reason for the continuing gap between what the legislation promises and what women experience is the failure to address persistent problems in the criminal justice system. This is especially true for women in the most marginalized communities: "A police force which consistently violates their rights and discriminates against their communities can command little respect or confidence from women seeking to defend their rights" (Amnesty International 2008, 35).

Over 2008, child prostitution remained a problem, with extreme poverty the primary contributor. A study released in 2006 by the University of Brasilia, SEDH, and the UNICEF found commercial sex involving children and adolescents in 927 of 5,561 municipalities. Although the law criminalizes all forms of trafficking, authorities continued to estimate that thousands of women and adolescents were trafficked annually, both domestically and internationally, for commercial sexual exploitation. Women were trafficked from all parts of the country. Internal trafficking of rural workers into forced labour schemes was a serious problem. Union leaders claimed that nearly all persons working as forced labourers had been trafficked by labour recruiters (US Dept of State 2009).

Except for gender disparities in society and in the labour market, racial disparities are also widespread. Although the law prohibits racial discrimination, darker-skinned citizens, particularly Afro-Brazilians, in 2008 continued to frequently encounter discrimination. The law specifically prohibits denial of public

or private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on race. Afro-Brazilians, representing almost half the population, were significantly underrepresented in the government, professional positions, and the middle and upper classes. Besides a sizeable racial education gap, they experienced a higher rate of unemployment and earned average wages approximately half those of a white person (US Dept of State 2009; Lovell 2006). Wherever possible our analysis has to focus on the interplay of gender and race.

### 2.1.3. Prospects

In the short run, the global credit crunch had its effects on Brazil, though its commercial banks (largely in government hands) have broadly been praised for their cautious policies. Between October 2008 and January 2009 employment, domestic demand and investment declined sharply, and over 700,000 jobs were shed. Among other things, the government responded by lowering taxes, bringing forward infrastructural works, and the provision of USD 100 billion in additional liquidity to banks. For the time being the recovery has been remarkably strong, with formal employment in January-August 2009 growing by 680,000, or 2.1%. The official unemployment rate fell to 8.0% in July 2009. The service sector was leading in this recovery, followed by manufacturing. The Brazilian Minister of Labour said the government was projecting 1 million jobs in 2009 (DIEESE website; Jeffris 2009). A World Bank research note as of July 2009 states: "The global economic crisis is exposing households in virtually all developing countries to increased risk of poverty and hardship", adding "While in the short-run, the non-poor may be the most affected by the crisis, experience from past economic and financial crises suggests that the adverse impacts are likely to spread in the medium-term to poor households." The World Bank note ranks Brazil among the 75 countries that will be moderately exposed to the crisis, showing decelerating growth. It is rated in the category of countries with medium fiscal capacity, meaning the government has some fiscal space to counteract the poverty effects of the crisis (Cord *et al* 2009). Since 2002, according to international donor organisations and rating agencies Brazil has adequately managed its external debt. For example, at the end of 2005 president Lula was able to repay an outstanding USD 15,5 billion owed to the IMF ahead of time (World Bank website). The 35% devaluation of the Brazilian real (R\$) in the autumn of 2008 eased an early recovery, though recently there are signs that it hampers export growth. Moreover, experts' warnings regard the expansion of the (already considerable) government budget, by 16% in the first nine months of 2009 (Hutchinson 2009).

The crisis even seems to offer considerable opportunities to Brazil in the world economy. In the 2009-2010 Global Competitiveness Report, Brazil is perceived by a panel of leading economists as the country that will likely see its competitiveness most favourably affected by the crisis. Consequently, the country improved 8 places since 2008, actually ending up at rank no. 56 (of 133 countries) and continuing to build on an upward trend started in 2007 and narrowing the competitiveness gap vis-à-vis fellow BRIC economies India and China. This is not to deny that continuous growth may meet substantial obstacles, as indicated by Brazil's relatively low ranking in the Global Competitiveness index on pillars like institutions (no. 93), macroeconomic stability (no. 109), health and primary education (no. 79), goods market efficiency (no. 99) and labour market efficiency (no. 80) (Sala-I-Martin *et al* 2009). At the basis of all opportunities, yet, are the country's vast and diversified mineral deposits. The recent discovery of massive deep sea (pre-salt) oil reserves, creating a wave of enthusiasm in government circles, may further strengthen Brazil's position in raw material markets and may allow funding a drastic overhaul of the country's education system. It may also be used to tighten state control over Petrobras, the oil and gas giant, under Cardoso privatised but with nearly 56% of the shares still state-owned (De Wit 2009).

In international comparison, the social prospects for Brazilian women in the current crisis may not be very negatively either. In an earlier crisis, that of Latin America in 1993-1995, the labour participation of women grew in Brazil whereas men's participation fell, and this may well happen again. It looks like a comparative advantage for Brazilian women that relatively few of them are working in low-wage export-oriented industries, where actually the risk of losing employment is large (World Bank 2009b).

## 2.2. Communication

Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. In Brazil, 41.4 million fixed telephone lines were in use in 2008, more than one on each five inhabitants (CIA World Factbook). With USD 18 per month on average in 2006 (World Bank 2009a), a residential fixed line is priced reasonably low. The general assessment is that the fixed line system is working well (CIA World Factbook). Yet, also in Brazil the future is on cellular telephone services, including the prospect of access to mobile Internet. The use of mobile cellular phones has boomed. With 150.6 million cell phones in use in 2008, mobile phone use has tripled since 2003, and density has reached 760 per 1,000 inhabitants. In 2007, there were in total 836 telephone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants, against only 311 per 1,000 on 2000 (UN Data). Notwithstanding the vastness of the country, already in 2007 the mobile cellular network covered 91% of the population. The initial advantage of the industrialized Southeast has largely been leveled out since in 2006-'07 the North and Northeast showed the largest increases in the percentage of households with access to mobile phone services (IBGE 2008). In 2007-08, the price basket for mobile service fell below that of fixed-line services, and that is a major driver in expanding telephone service to the low-income segment of the population (World Bank 2009a; CIA World Factbook).

In 2008 there were generally no government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports that the government monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in the peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail (US Dept of State 2009). Over one in three Brazilians is regularly surfing on the Internet. For 2008, the CIA World Factbook mentions a total of nearly 65 million Internet users, bringing Internet coverage at 33%, whereas the most recent (2009) estimate is 67.5 million, or 34% coverage (website InternetWorldStats).<sup>1</sup> The (international) Internet infrastructure is well developed. In 2007, 86% of all Internet subscribers were fixed broadband subscribers. By mid-2009, the country had over 9.5 million Internet hosts, and by 2008 24 secure Internet servers per 1 million people (CIA World Factbook; World Bank 2009a). Brazil is widely considered the regional leader of Internet marketing, online sales, service and support (website Internet Business Law).

As for computer use, in 2005 the government introduced the "Computers for All" programme that aims to offer every Brazilian the possibility of buying a high-end computer with access to the Internet. Through this programme, credit lines are given to low-income families to buy computers. This initiative contributed substantially to the sale of more than 10 million computers in Brazil in 2007 (website Internet Governance in Brazil). While the incidence of personal computers (PCs) in 2005 was 16 per 1,000 people (UN MDG Indicators; World Bank 2009a), in 2007 over 15 million of 56.3 Brazilian households, or 26.6%, had a PC, and 11.4 mln. or 20.2% a PC with Internet access. Though coverage rapidly increased in the poorer regions, the regional distribution is still quite uneven. In 2007 more than half of all Brazilian households with a PC lived in the Southeast, where coverage was 34.9% (and 27.4% for those with Internet access), whereas in the Northeast the shares were 13.5 and 8.2% respectively, and

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<sup>1</sup> The UN MDG Indicators website already estimated 35.2% coverage in 2007.

in the North 12.2 and 8.8% (IBGE 2008). National PC coverage in 2009 may safely be estimated to be at least 30 per 100 inhabitants.

Radio and TV broadcast stations abound in Brazil. There are more than 2,400 radio and about 180 TV stations in Brazil; the majority are commercial (website Brittanica Online Encyclopedia). TV is an extremely popular amusement and news medium in Brazil. In 2007 by far over nine of ten households (94.5%) had a television set, even a higher share than the 88% of households with radio (IBGE 2008).

By contrast, with 61 per 1,000 inhabitants in the mid-2000s<sup>2</sup>, newspaper circulation is low. There were 465 daily newspapers and 2,020 non-daily newspapers, but no national newspaper. In the past the relatively low literacy rates and high production and distribution costs have been consistently blamed for small newspaper circulation. Yet, it has also been noted that the country boasts “a very lively and energetic press” (website Press reference). The Brazilian law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and in 2008 the authorities generally respected these rights in practice. However, criminal as well as other elements, such as political party activists, subjected journalists to violence. In February 2008 the NGO, Reporters without Borders, even stated that violence and threats against reporters were constant. The National Federation of Journalists continued to report cases of violence against, and failure to respect freedom of, the press during 2008 (US Dept of State 2009). As for freedom of the press, broadcasting is an exception. All broadcasting is subject to censorship, and any station that runs counter to the government’s wishes can be closed (website Brittanica Online Encyclopedia).

### 2.3. The sectoral labour market structure

Table 2 (next page) presents an overview of the development of employment by type (status) in Brazil between 2001-2007, in shares of the labour force. In these six years, the labour force grew by over 19%. The table shows that the share of employees (those in paid employment) in the labour force increased considerably in the 2000s, by 6% points to 70% in 2007. This went at the cost of both categories, own-account workers and unpaid family workers and contributing family workers. Changes were considerable especially between 2001-2004. The female labour force grew considerably more rapid, by over 24%, thus continuing the long-term trend: between 1976-1998, the female labour force grew by 175%, the male labour force by only 62% (authors’ calculation based on Fundação 2007). The amount of employees in the female labour force increased from 20.1 million in 2001 to 25.8 million in 2007, that is also by 6% points, to 72% in 2007. The share of employers in the female labour force, though lower than among males, increased slightly, from 0.7 mln. (2.3%) in 2001 to 0.9 mln. (2.5%) in 2007. The share of own-account workers and unpaid family workers in the female labour force fell even more, by 6% to 17% in 2007. By contrast, with about 1.5% points the decrease of the share of female contributing family workers was somewhat lower. Thus, the proportion of all own-account and contributing family workers in total employment came in 2007 at 26%, divided in 24% among the female employed and 29% among the male employed (*MDG Indicator 1.7*) (all data: ILO Laborsta; IBGE 2008).

Important is the notion of formal and informal labour markets. Informality is widespread in Brazil. Informal economic activity has been estimated to account for 42% of Brazil’s output in 2002-03 (Schneider 2005). Various authors, including those of World Bank reports, attribute the increasing informality that took place in Brazil’s metropolitan labour markets to the stronger labour rights associated with the 1988 constitutional reform; others blame the high taxes on labour. Most likely it is

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<sup>2</sup> Source: website Press reference. UN Data mentions an even lower rate of 35.6 newspapers circulating per 1,000 inhabitants.



both: non-compliance with labour legislation and tax evasion seem the main reasons for informality. According to a 2003 survey, even large enterprises reported only moderate compliance with taxation. Anyway, many informal enterprises are stuck in a low-productivity trap (Kenyon and Kapaz 2005).

Yet, developments in this field are not that clear-cut. Indeed, between 1992-1999 the number of informal jobs grew by 1.5% yearly, against 1.4% growth for formal jobs, resulting in a decrease of the share of formal jobs in the labour force of 0.5% point, from 40.5% to 40.0%. To a large degree, this development was cyclical, not structural. During economic downturns, the formal sector stopped creating new jobs, but the informal sector did not (Bosch *et al* 2007). By contrast, 1999-2007 showed an increase of the number of informal jobs by 1.8% yearly, but with 5.7% the growth of formal jobs was much higher, resulting in an increase of the share of formal jobs in the labour force to 45.9%. The share of employed persons contributing to social security rose from 42.3% in 1999 to 51.1% in 2007 (Berg 2009). Thus, it seems that informality is on the way back. New incentives like government subsidies, lower business taxes and improved access to credit have made it beneficial for firms to being formal. Moreover, the number of workers registered<sup>3</sup> as a result of tightened labour inspection has grown considerably in the new century, from an average 250,000 per year in 1996-1999, via about 500,000 yearly in 2000-2003, to an average 700,000 per year between 2004-2008 (Berg 2009).

**Table 2 Labour force participation and type of employment, Brazil, 2001-2007**

		2001*)	2004*)	2007*)
Labour force participation		68%	69%	69%
Unemployed in % of labour force		9%	9%	9%
Formal labour market in % of labour force**)		44%	45%	46%
Employed in % of labour force		91%	91%	91%
of which	<i>Employees (paid employment)***)</i>	64%	65%	70%
	<i>Employers</i>	4%	4%	4%
	<i>Own-account workers (self-employed)</i>	23%	22%	20%
	<i>Contributing and unpaid family workers</i>	9%	9%	6%

Sources: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta; Henley *et al* 2008; IBGE 2008; Berg 2009

\*) persons 15 years and over

\*\*\*) yardstick: possession of signed labour card

\*\*\*\*) incl. domestic and temporary workers

Table 3 (next page) shows the division of the total Brazilian labour force in 2007 by industry and gender, in million headcounts and in shares of the total, female and male labour forces. It shows that the shares working in agriculture, 14% of women and 22% of men, have become limited, but that holds also for the shares in manufacturing, 12% and 16% respectively. Brazil has developed rapidly into a services economy. In 2007 nearly three of four women in the labour force (73%) worked in the service sector, broadly defined, from transport and communications to services in private households; this was the case for half of all males in the labour force. Overall, the share of those in services was 59%. In international perspective large were the shares of women (17%) and especially men (19%) in the

<sup>3</sup> As a rule, an employee is regularly hired by means of the inscription in his/her personal Labour Card (*Carteira de Trabalho Assinada*) and of the registration in the books of the company for purpose of payment of social taxes and social security fees. Possession of a signed Labour Card is not the only yardstick for belonging to the formal labour force; alternatives are social security membership and formal sector activity, and these alternatives only partially overlap. Yet, calculations along all three yardsticks conclude to diminishing informality between 1998-2004, for both males and females (Henley *et al* 2008).

wholesale and retail trades, as well as the share of women working in private households (16%), performing domestic chores for rich or middle-class households. In the urban Brazilians areas, such paid domestic work –enabling women in these households to secure higher wage employment-- accounts for nearly half of all paid employment of poor women (Zeneda 2008). More detailed breakdowns of female labour market shares will follow in section 2.6.3.

**Table 3 Employment by industry and gender, total labour force, Brazil, 2007**

	all		women		men	
	mln.	%	mln.	%	mln.	%
agriculture, forestry, fishing	16,6	18	5,3	14	11,3	22
mining	0,4	1	0,1	0	0,3	1
manufacturing	13,1	14	4,8	12	8,3	16
utilities	0,4	1	0,1	0	0,3	1
construction	6,1	7	0,2	1	5,9	10
transport, storage, commun.	4,4	5	0,6	2	3,8	7
wholesale and retail	16,3	18	6,4	17	9,9	19
restaurants, hotels	3,4	4	1,7	5	1,7	3
finance, insurance, real estate	6,6	7	2,6	7	4,0	7
public administr., defense	4,7	5	1,7	4	3,0	6
education	5,1	6	3,9	10	1,2	2
health, social work	3,3	4	2,5	7	0,8	2
other community services	3,7	4	2,2	6	1,5	3
private households	6,7	7	6,3	16	0,4	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>90,8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>38,4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>52,4</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

We now turn to unemployment. In 1985, a nation-wide system of unemployment benefits has been created. Currently, around 6.5 million workers, able to prove that they have a history in the formal labour market, are covered by unemployment benefit fees. In 2005, due to the amount of informal workers, only 22% of the unemployed received benefits (IBGE 2006). During the 2000s, the general level of the official unemployment rate oscillated between 8-9%, with a peak in the 2003 slump and from then on slightly falling. The robust growth of employment in the last five years competes with the growing labour supply of earlier economically inactive and the related increasing participation rate of women. Women's official unemployment rates remained, with 10.8-12.0%, consistently about 5% points or 74-80% higher than men's, meaning that already for quite some years about 3 of 5 unemployed are women.

Important for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project is, as Table 4 (next page) clearly shows, that the categories most affected by unemployment were the girls and young women aged 15-19 and 20-24. In 2007 their official unemployment rates were respectively higher than 28 and 18%. With over 13%, unemployment among females aged 25-29 was also considerable, and more than double that of their male peers. Jointly, the unemployment rate for the female 15-29-year-olds was 18.5%. These young unemployed, about 2,8 million in numbers, accounted for 60% of unemployed women and 35% of all unemployed (authors' calculations, based on ILO Laborsta).

**Table 4 Unemployment rates by gender and by age group, Brazil, 2007**

shares	total	male	female
15-19	21.5	16.9	28.1
20-24	13.7	10.2	18.2
25-29	9.4	6.1	13.3
30-34	6.4	3.6	9.0
35-39	5.8	3.6	8.4
40-44	4.8	3.3	6.5
45-49	4.5	3.2	5.7
50-54	3.7	3.4	4.1
55-59	3.0	3.1	2.9
60-64	2.7	2.8	2.4
65-69	1.4	1.9	0.5
70-74	1.9	2.0	1.7
75+	0.8	0.7	0.8
<b>Total 15+</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>10.8</b>

Source: ILO, Laborsta

Of course, these are official unemployment figures, by their very nature concentrating on the urban metropolitan areas. Closer scrutiny learns that in the 2000s the unemployment rates for these areas were consistently 33-40% above the national average, to a level of nearly 13% in 2005. The unemployment rates for the urban non-metropolitan areas were near the national average, whereas rural unemployment officially was between 2 and 3%. Yet, registered unemployment in rural areas was marginal: here, the lack of employment opportunities mainly translates in (periods of) high inactivity. The racial divide cannot remain unnoticed too. In 2005, unemployment of black (Afro-Brazilian and *mestizo*) men and women (10.3%) was nearly 30% higher than those of whites (8.1%) (Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008). In the course of the 2000s, unemployment rates both for men and women were consistently lowest for those with no education completed (ISCED levels X and 0: see Table 11). In 2007 these rates were respectively 3.6% and 5.8%. The unemployment rates of those with only primary education (ISCED level 1) more or less equaled the overall averages: in 2007 6.2% for males and 10.0% for females. With 5.9% for males and 10.6% for females, that was also true for the rates of those with at least secondary second level education (ISCED levels 3 and higher). By contrast, with 9.0% for men and even 17.0% for women the 2007 unemployment rates of employees at the middle level (completed secondary first level education, ISCED level 2) were 47-57% above the average levels for both sexes (authors' calculations, based on ILO Laborsta). Obviously, the Brazilian economy has major problems creating sufficient jobs at the middle level, notably for women.

## 2.4. National legislation and labour relations

### 2.4.1. Legislation

Brazil has ratified seven core ILO Labour Conventions 29, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182, but not Convention 87 (Freedom of association). The Lula government time and again announced its intention to reform the Brazilian Labour Code to bring it into line with international labour standards, most notably Convention 87, but the reform has not yet materialised (ITUC 2009a).

The Constitution and the Labour Code protect the right of all workers to unionise, except the military, uniformed police, fire fighters and various other state employees. However, the "unicidade" (one per

jurisdiction) system, criticized by the ITUC and other trade union bodies, continues to stipulate that there can only be one trade union per economic or occupational category in each territorial area. This geographically based single union system means that some sectoral federations are not legally recognised. Law 1990/07 recognised trade union centres as bodies representing the interests of workers in general. Horizontal structures had hitherto been prohibited since the passing of Decree No. 19770 by Vargas in 1931, to prevent workers from uniting. Thanks to the new legislation, trade union centres can now obtain legal recognition and are entitled to legally represent workers in courts, public councils and other bodies. Union centres seeking recognition must meet the following requirements: the affiliation of at least 100 unions distributed across the five regions, the affiliation of unions in at least five sectors, and the affiliation of at least five per cent of all union members nationally in the first year, rising to at least seven per cent in two years. Less than six of the 17 existing "centres" meet these criteria (ITUC 2009a).

Collective bargaining is only open to those unions that are legally registered with the Ministry of Labour. Public workers, including those not employed in the administration of the state, have no collective bargaining rights. Constitutional Amendment 45, adopted in 2004, stipulates that a consensus is required between the two parties to request judicial arbitration, thus removing the possibility of unilaterally calling on the judiciary to intervene. There are significant impediments to the development of voluntary collective bargaining in relation to wages. We already mentioned section 623 of the Consolidation of Labour Laws of 1943. The ILO has for many years been reminding the Brazilian government that this impedes the development of voluntary collective bargaining procedures and that section 623 should be repealed. Moreover, there are restrictions on collective wage bargaining in public and mixed enterprises, making real wage increases contingent upon certain criteria such as increased productivity, the distribution of dividends or the alignment of the overall remuneration of employees with current levels in the labour market. There are also restrictions on the inclusion of automatic price index-related wage increases or the introduction of amendments to agreements, which restricts the ability of the parties to freely determine the subject and content of collective negotiations (ITUC 2009a; US Dept of State 2009).

The Constitution establishes the right to strike without restriction for all workers and state officials, apart from the police, the military, and firefighters. It provides for the right to strike in the public services, but makes its exercise subject to a specific set of rules that have not yet been established, thus creating difficulties, in practice, for public servants wishing to exercise the right to strike (ITUC 2009a; US Dept of State). In recent strikes, employers and employers' associations avoided negotiating with the unions, in some cases even taking refuge to using military police force to intimidate workers. This was for example recently the case in the banking sector (ITUC 2009d).

Although child labour is prohibited, it continues to be a major problem in Brazil, particularly in household labour and in the informal sector. The minimum working age is 16 years, and apprenticeships may begin at age 14. The Employment Act bars all minors under age 18 from work that constitutes a physical strain or that occurs in nocturnal, unhealthy, dangerous, or morally harmful conditions. However, also recently authorities rarely enforced additional legal restrictions intended to protect working minors under age 18. Data from the government's Economic Research Institute showed that in 2007 there were 2.5 million children between the ages of 5 and 15 working. About half of all child labourers did not receive an income, and 90% worked in the unregistered informal sector. As for the 5-17 aged, the National Household Sample Survey for 2007 even found 10.8%, 4.8 million of 44.7 million, working. Over 60% did so in agriculture. About two thirds received less than half of the minimum wage (IBGE 2008). The ILO estimated that recently about 20% of all Brazilian 10-14-year-old girls worked as household domestics. Again, most of these workers received less than half the minimum wage while

working mostly in excess of 40 hours a week. Labour inspectors in 2008 continued to prioritize inspections in the informal sector, but they remained unable to enter private homes and farms, where much of the nation's child labour was found (US Dept of State 2009).

The articles 6 to 11 of the 1988 Constitution sum up the social rights, including labour rights. These comprise rights to severance pay (funded by the employer, at 8% of monthly salary)<sup>4</sup>, to a 13<sup>th</sup> annual salary (or Christmas bonus) equal to the monthly salary, and to an annual vacation. These rights cannot be ignored by laws, and even less by contractual agreements. Most have been integrated in the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (CLT, last amended by Law No. 11925, of 17 April 2009), still the comprehensive and detailed piece of legislation on employment in Brazil. Of particular relevance for the young female target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project are the following articles in the CLT (sources: ILO Natlex Database; ITUC 2009f):

- (salary and remuneration) Any individual rendering any kind of service, under Brazilian law, is entitled to compensation (wage or salary), which may include in addition to the monetary value in Brazilian currency, food, housing, clothing and any other benefits the company provides habitually to employees by express or tacit agreement, and may be paid monthly, fortnightly, weekly or even per piece or task, depending on the conditions established for the hiring. The wage paid to an employee may never be less than the minimum wage or than the lowest wage level (*piso salarial*) established in the collective bargaining for each professional category.
- (working hours) The regular working period may not exceed eight hours per day and 44 hours per week except where, as per collective labour agreement, additional hours worked on one day are offset by a reduction in those worked on another day, provided that the total working hours do not exceed ten hours per day. If no breaks are permitted, the working period may not exceed six hours, unless otherwise established by collective labour agreement.
- (weekly remunerated rest period) An employee is entitled to, at least, one-day's remunerated rest period, which should preferably fall on a Sunday. Payment of the weekly-remunerated rest period will already be included in the monthly salary. Between two working days there should be a minimum of 11 hours of consecutive rest.
- (overtime and compensation for overtime) Work performed beyond the time limits set under Working Hours is considered overtime. Up to two hours' overtime a day may be rendered upon written agreement between employer and employee, or collective bargaining. The minimum compensation for overtime must be at least 50% higher than the normal hourly rate. In case of "force majeure" the working time might exceed the legal and/or collectively agreed maximum limits. In that case, at least the minimum normal wages per hour should be respected.
- (vacations) After each 12-month working period, an employee is entitled to a 30 calendar days' vacation, which must be taken within the subsequent period of 12 months. In addition, the employee is entitled to receive a vacation bonus equivalent to one-third of his or her compensation.

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<sup>4</sup> Social protection beyond dismissal compensation is provided through employee membership of a social security fund or "institute", providing pension provisions, permanent disability benefits, and life insurance (survivors) benefits. Workers without social security membership only qualify for a flat rate old age pension equal to the statutory minimum wage.

- (maternity leave) Maternity leave is granted for a period of 120 days. During maternity leave, the normal salary is paid which, in turn, is reimbursed by the Social Security Agency.
- (paternity leave) Paternity leave is granted for a period of five days.
- (health hazard allowance) In the case of employment in activities considered by law to be hazardous, the employer will pay an additional monthly allowance for the hazardous conditions. Such allowance will be equivalent to 10%, 20% or 40% of the minimum wage, depending on the hazard degree. In the case of dangerous activities, such as those involving contact with explosives or flammable materials, the employer shall pay an additional payment in compensation for the risks involved at the rate of 30% of the employee's salary.

The law encompasses sexual advances in the workplace or in educational institutions and between service providers or clients. In the workplace the law applies only in hierarchical situations, where the harasser is of higher rank or position than the victim. Although the law was enforced, accusations were rare in 2008, and the extent of the problem was not documented (US Dept of State 2009).

#### 2.4.2. Labour relations and wage-setting

Though doing injustice to earlier developments, we take the CLT labour legislation of 1943 as the starting point for this section. The ruling elite, led by president Vargas, thought the need for class struggle would disappear because labour rights were handed over to the working class as a sort of gift. However, though the new legislation was ignored by employers and hardly enforced by successive governments, union leaders were able to use it as an effective tool for encouraging labour militancy. In reaction, Vargas expanded the police presence in the factories and streets, routinely repressing, imprisoning, and torturing labour activists (French 2004). In this respect, history repeated itself during the Military Republic: authoritarian regimes would apply the restrictive labour laws, and democratic governments would treat them as non-existent (Cardoso 2004, 8). Yet, also in democratic episodes Brazilian unionism were not thoroughly integrated in the corporatist machinery (like for example in Mexico), though it has also been suggested that a "large scale labour bureaucracy" with well-paid positions has been used to buy off union leaders (Ericksson, in Skidmore 2004).

During the "economic miracle" of the late 1960s and the 1970s, a surge of upward mobility of teachers, public servants, high-skilled workers and others strengthened a new upper layer of the working class, whereas at the same time blue collar workers with middle to low skill levels constituted a large lower middle class, hit by the impossibility of collective bargaining (Hudson 1997; Renwick 2009). The military dictatorship implemented a centralized wage policy, and underindexed the real minimum wage that subsequently fell. Indeed, the 1970 Census revealed an increase in income equality (Lemos 2004a). The next five years witnessed the impoverishment of large groups of low- and medium-skilled workers. The "political" strikes of metalworkers and high-qualified staff, in 1978-'80, bypassed the government union structures. In March 1979 170,000 metal workers went on strike, led by charismatic Lula, and paralysed the ABC region, the industrial heartland of the São Paulo area. These and other actions created room for collective bargaining between unions and employers. The military response to outlaw strikes led to the formation of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT, Workers' Party), in February 1980 by unionists, intellectuals, politicians, and representatives of social movements – and to continuing strike activity, with the police arresting Lula and other union leaders. Among academists and unionists progressive questions came up concerning the role and extent of women's work. In 1983, the union movement split into two: the newly-founded *Central Unica dos Trabalhadores* (Workers United Central Office, CUT), tied to the young Workers' Party, and the *Conselho Nacional da Classe Trabalhadores* (National Coordination of

the Workers' Class, CONCLAT), created in 1979, grouping old union structures and oriented towards the communist party (which to become CGT in 1987) (Cardoso 2004; Raess 2006; Manfredini *et al* 2008; Renwick 2009).

We already memorized the return to democracy. The new Constitution of 1988 detailed individual and collective rights, limited working hours to 44 per week, extended maternity leave to 120 days, and granted paternity leave. The Constitution recognized the principle of collective bargaining (not in the CLT 1943!) and forbade state intervention in union affairs, though as mentioned the "unicidade" system and some strike limitations were maintained. The event anyway was overshadowed by increasing consumer prices, again derailing into hyperinflation, and massive strikes. Between 1986-1991, the successive plans to restore government control over the economy, Cruzado I and II, the Plans Bresser and Summer, and the Collor I and II Plans had their neoliberal orientation in common, as well as their lack of results. For example, in 1989-'90 hyperinflation up to 2,750% per year hollowed purchasing power of the poor, only to be bridled to 1,200% in 1991 under the Collor II plan. The 1990 Census revealed a further growth of inequality, with a majority of the employed earning about the minimum wage. Union contestation was widespread: the years 1987-1990 saw a record number of strikes. The Cardoso era complicated matters for the union movement, especially when the neoliberal agenda was rather successfully combined with substantial social reforms. CUT, developed into the largest union centre, opposed the successive plans of the Cardoso administration, whereas *Força Sindical* (Union Force, FS), the second largest centre, tended to go along with the neoliberal reforms while trying to soften the consequences for workers (Cardoso 2004; Manfredini *et al* 2008; Renwick 2009).

In spite of these tensions and setbacks, in the next 15 years the number of union members increased by over 45%, from 9,09 million in 1988 to 13,31 million in 2002. However, pushed by rising female labour participation the economically active population also grew quickly, from 53,60 million in 1988 to 76,95 million in 2002. As a consequence, the union density rate (calculated over the total labour force, a usual practice in Brazil) grew just slightly, from 17.0% in 1988 to 17.3% in 2002. In the period 2002-2005, the electoral victory of the WP / Lula, low inflation, falling unemployment and expansion of social assistance programs obviously gave a boost to unionism, with union density rising to 18.4% in 2005 (Cardoso 2004, 19). By contrast, 2005 was a year of discontent, with the main union centres operating at some distance of the Lula administration, and protest movements asking for more jobs, a fairer income distribution and a minimum wage hike (Manfredini *et al* 2008). In 2007, the National Household Sample Survey counted 16.0 million trade union members in Brazil – a union density of 17.7%, some decrease related to two years before but still over the 1988-2002 average (IBGE 2008).

After 1943, trade union structures did not fundamentally alter. Both unions and employers' associations are structured regionally, or at state level in federations; the federations are at federal level aggregated in confederations. Collective bargaining is concentrated at local or regional level, where the "unicidade" system governs. Yet, this may change. As said, the existence of union centres has been legally grounded; they can directly enter into collective bargaining and agreements with employers. In fact, this was a further legalisation of the parallel structures CUT had already developed for negotiations with nationwide operating employers, such as large banks or Petrobras. In 2007, there were 5,272 unions registered and functioning, of which 78% represented employees of private companies. Over the years a substantial number of unions, between 25 and 35% of all, has not (yet) been registered with the Ministry of Labour. About 70% of all private sector unions are involved in collective bargaining, over time a rather stable share (Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008). Based on the response of 20,500 *WageIndicator* respondents in Brazil, it was found that 64% of males and 59% of females worked in an organisation

covered by a collective agreement <sup>5</sup>(ITUC 2009f). It should be noted that collective agreements are mandatory extended to all workers within a given jurisdiction (sector, area). Though this may weaken incentives to organise, for individual workers unionization means a say in the union organisation, including electing leaders, and having access to social services such as medical and dental assistance, services that Brazilian workers strongly value (Cardoso 2004; Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008).

CUT actually is the largest union centre, with 49% of all unions and around 7.4 million members, about 45% of all union members; it is the world's fifth largest union confederation (elsewhere the usual name for national union bodies). FS ranks second, with 21% of all unions and 2.1 million members. After some mergers, another five union centres are left. CUT and FS are affiliated with the ITUC, as are UGT (*União Geral dos Trabalhadores*) and CNPL (*Confederação Nacional das Profissões Liberais*). The strategic differences between CUT and FS have dwindled to some extent. The improved context for collective bargaining since 2002 obviously has taken away mutual tensions, whereas both centres participate in the second Lula administration (Cardoso 2004; Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008).

As for industries, strongholds and weak points in the country's unionization pattern show a rather familiar picture. Above average organised in 2007 were utilities (34.6%; 2005: 38.0%); education and social services (28.6%; 2005: 29.6%); public administration (25.7%; 2005: 27.3%); agriculture (surprisingly, even improving with 24.8% in 2007 against 23.5% in 2005), and transport and communication (23.8%; 2005: 25.4%). The density loss between 2005-2007 emerges as a general trend: manufacturing went down from 22.2% in 2005 to 20.3% in 2007, and commerce from 11.3% to 10.6%. Only domestic services, though very low organised, showed some increase, from 1.7% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2007. Unfortunately, a recent gender division of union membership is lacking (IBGE 2006, 2008); based on various sources we estimate the actual women's union density slightly lower than men's, at 15-16%. As the labour market improved early in 2008, again growth was seen in union membership rates. We do not have recent information regarding the effects of most recent developments on union membership. Even if these are not negative, as the ITUC (2009a) recently noted, serious problems remain in the areas of equal pay, the informal economy and respect for workers' rights, especially in the private sector. Organising informal workers remains a hard task (See for a first-hand account ITUC 2009c).

There are six nationwide employers' associations: the CNI (National Confederation of Industry), comprising 27 Federations of Industry; CNC (National Confederation of Commerce), including seven other federations; CNA (National Confederation of Agriculture and Cattle Raising of Brazil); CNF (National Federation of Financial Institutions); CNT (National Transportation Confederation), and finally CACB (Confederation of Commercial and Business Associations of Brazil), organizing mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Social dialogue between unions and employers (organisations), eventually including government (tripartism), has been traditionally absent in Brazil, with its history of authoritarian role. Most efforts under Sarney and Collor shipwrecked. In 1994-'95, sectoral chambers initiated by strong unions in the car and shipbuilding industries, could boast promising results in revitalising ailing regions and industries until they were floored by the Cardoso government. The highly active *Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador* (Workers' Support Fund, FAT), resulting from these sectoral initiatives and aiming at financing unemployment insurance, supporting SMEs and initiating re-training, was the main tripartite institution to survive. Finally, helped by the awakening of civil society, the Lula administration systematically set up social dialogue institutions and processes. Besides FAT, tripartite bodies actually include the *Fundo de Desenvolvimento Social* (Fund for Social

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<sup>5</sup> There was a bias towards union membership: out of a somewhat larger group of (22,500) WageIndicator respondents, 73% of females and 68% of males were a union member (ITUC 2009f).



Development, FSD), aiming at promoting the “solidarity economy”; (*Conselho Curador do Fundo de Garantia Por Tempo de Serviço* ((Council for Management of) Fund of Severance Fees, FGTS) dealing with investing the FGTS resources; and the *Conselho Nacional da Previdência Social* (National Council for Social Security, CNPS), establishing a decentralized pension system (Cardoso 2004, 50-2; Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008, 79-80). In a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil, tripartite commissions recently played an important role in fostering women workers’ rights (ITUC 2009e, 44).

## 2.5. Minimum wage and poverty

### 2.5.1. The statutory minimum wage

From February 1, 2009, the national statutory minimum wage (SMW) was set at R\$ 465,00 per month, R\$ 15,50 per day, or R\$ 2,11 per hour (Brazilian minimum wage websites). This SMW rate is equivalent to respectively USD 1.20 per hour, or USD 264 monthly. We calculated the common SMW rate to be about 38% of the estimated 2009 GDP per capita and 46% of the estimated average income from all sources of persons 10 years and older (sources: IBGE 2008; DIEESE website; ILO TRAVAIL Database). The former SMW was set as per March 1, 2008 at R\$ 415 per month, so the 2009 uprating meant a 12.0% nominal increase. For the year 2010, the minimum wage will be set at R\$ 506,44 per month, plus an additional R\$ 506,44 as additional 13th month (half in June, half in December -- Brazilian minimum wage websites). This implies a nominal increase of 8.9% compared to 2009.

The SMW was introduced in Brazil in 1940, as a social policy instrument to provide subsistence income for an adult worker. Subsistence was defined as diet, transport, clothing, and hygiene. The CLT in Section 58 states that the minimum daily salary should never be less than the minimum daily wages fixed per region, zone or sub-zone. The SMW was regional, with 14 different levels, before becoming national in 1984. It currently is a key indicator for earnings trends in Brazil. It determines the earnings of formal workers receiving the SMW and of those whose earnings are expressed in multiples of the SMW (called the *numeraire effect*) as well as the informal workers whose wages equal the SMW (the *lighthouse effect*). Formally the law forbade its use as a *numeraire* in 1987, but –like in other Latin American countries – multiplying remains common practice in Brazil (Lemos 2004a). Trade unions and employers (organisations) often use the SMW as a point of reference, both in preparations and analyses of wage negotiations. As for coverage of the minimum wage, it has been estimated for 2006 that about 17.8 million wage earners in Brazil –29% of all in paid employment-- earned one SMW or more but less than 2 SMW. Of this group, 7.4 million were women: 30% of all female employees (ILO 2008). In the same year, 89% of the wage floors laid down in 452 collective labour agreements were in the 1 – 2 SMW bracket, whereas in 2005 this share was still 72%: the SMW rose faster than the wage floors laid down in collective agreements. In commerce this share of low wage floors was, with 93% in 2006, highest (DIEESE database, cited in Løken and De Freitas Barbosa 2008, 62, 75-6). Moreover, the SMW serves as a reference for pensions and unemployment and other benefits. Thus, an increase in the SMW leads to increases in both benefits, but has also a strong impact on the government budget – which helps to explain that different Brazilian administrations have been hesitant to raise the SMW in real terms (Lemos 2004a; ILO 2008).

In 1988, the new constitution regarding the SMW redefined the subsistence income to include diet, housing, education, health, leisure, clothing, hygiene, transport, and retirement for an adult worker and his or her family. Yet, the real value of the SMW was first to fall by nearly 50% between 1990-1995, before it rose in 1995-2009 from year to year (except a decrease in 2003). It was not until 2005 that its real

value surpassed the 1990 level. The rapid increases of the last four years lifted the real value by 45% (authors' calculation based on Berg 2009). Obviously, especially the Lula administrations have deemed the risks for the government budget of less value than the direct social advantages of a higher SMW. Indeed, a recent study found that the raise of the SMW in real terms has had considerable redistributive effects. Saboia (2007, cited in ILO 2008) reported that between 1995-2005 the SMW increase accounted for 44% of the total reduction of the Gini coefficient --a measure for income (in)equality, see our next section-- in this period, the single most important factor in reducing income inequality.

According to the ILO (2008), the substantial raise of the SMW "does not seem to have produced any negative effects on employment growth or the level of employment of formalization in the country. To the contrary, both indicators have improved markedly." Though against conventional economic wisdom, both claims seem to be supported by earlier research. First, we already treated the increasing formalization of jobs. Second, thorough analysis proved that, at least based on 1982-2000 data, an increase in the minimum wage in Brazil strongly compresses the wage distribution but has only small negative effects on employment - if there are such effects at all. This is the case despite the large SMW increases; despite the large proportion of workers directly affected by these increases, and despite the large proportion of workers below and above the SMW (Lemos 2004a). The finding on wage compression held for both the private and public sectors, and concerning the private sector for the formal and the informal parts. The outcomes suggest that the SMW redistributes in favour of the poorer in both formal and the informal sectors, though in a different way: in favour of the very bottom of the income distribution in the formal sector, but more widely in favour of those in the bottom half of the distribution in the informal sector (Lemos 2004b, 2007).

### 2.5.2. Inequality and poverty

Both income inequality and poverty in Brazil remain high, but they have been declining in recent years. It is telling to watch the moves of the Gini coefficient, a measure that rates 0 as perfect equality and 100 as perfect inequality. The 'Gini' rose from 0.57 (or, more precisely, 0.574) in 1981 to 0.63 (0.625) in 1989, when Brazil had the second highest inequality rank in the world. After oscillating between 1989-1993, from 1993 inequality steadily fell. Initially, the decrease of inflation in 1992-1996 stimulated pro-poor growth (Zeneda *et al* 2009). Via 0.59 (0.591) in 1995, the Gini coefficient reached 0.58 (0.576) in 2005, still a high level and implying a 9<sup>th</sup> spot in world's inequality ranking (Ferreira *et al* 2008; Ravallion 2009; World Bank 2008<sup>6</sup>). A recent ILO (2008) publication even claims that between 2005-2007 the decrease of the Gini index has speeded up spectacularly, to 0.53 (0.528).<sup>7</sup> Another measure for inequality, the Theil index, roughly showed the same movement over time: growing inequality in the 1980s, followed by a slow but persistent fall in the 1990s and, as far as actually can be measured, in the 2000s (Ferreira *et al* 2007). To demonstrate "inequality", suffice it to mention that in 2002-03 the average monthly household income of the poorest 10% was Real 182, against Real 6,862 monthly for the wealthiest 10% households (ILO Laborsta, based on *Pesquisa de Orcamentos Familiares*).

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<sup>6</sup> The figures cited exclude zero incomes. Ferreira *et al* (2008) found a Gini coefficient of 0.564 for 2004, lower than the 0.576 coefficient for 2005 calculated by Ravallion (2009). ILO Laborsta present somewhat lower 'Gini's' (0.585 in 1995, 0.555 in 2005), though indicating the same downward trend.

<sup>7</sup> The Gini index on individual income from all sources calculated by the Brazilian statistical bureau fell since 2004, from 0.559 in 2004 to 0.534 in 2007. Based on household income, the trend also goes downward, but less progressively: while the corresponding 2004 Gini coefficient was 0.535, the 2007 index was 0.521 (IBGE 2008).

Poverty, like inequality increased between 1981-1993, showed a sustained decline from 1993 on.<sup>8</sup> In 2003, 21.5% of Brazilian households still lived below the (informal) national poverty line,<sup>9</sup> which is equivalent to about USD 3 a day (Ravallion 2009), and this share may have fallen by over 7% points to 14.3% in 2006 (ILO 2008). For 2006, it has been estimated that 18.3% of the Brazilian population lived below the common UN yardstick of USD 2 a day (in PPP terms). This implied a fall of 5.5% points compared to 1999. For 2007 that 5.2% of the population had to make ends meet with an income below USD 1 a day; again, quite some improvement as this last share was still 11.2% in 1999 and in 2005 7.8% (UNDP 2008; *MDG Indicator 1.1*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios* (PNAD) or National Household Sample Survey 2007). In 2007 the share of the poorest 20% in the national income was 3.0%, slightly higher than in the 15 years before but in international perspective still quite low (*MDG Indicator 1.3*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and again based on PNAD 2007).

Skidmore sums up a number of causes for Brazil's pervasive inequality: (a) a persistent labour surplus; (b) the country's continuing heavy dependence on primary product exports, implying relatively low value-added production and relatively low wages; (c) a set of deeply ingrained factors linked with the power of its elite to influence government policies: taxation and public expenditure that redistribute income from those on the bottom to the top, including the government pension system and tax incentives favouring the better-off, and (d) the systematic neglect of universal public education, with free tuition at federal universities versus underfunding of the public system of primary and secondary schools. The historical record leaves little doubt that up till recently reducing income inequality has not held high priority for Brazilians politicians (Skidmore 2004, 136-7, 145-6). Relations of clientelism and paternalism remain strong in local politics, as in everyday life; the poor mostly have few alternatives but to seek the protection of patrons (Hudson 1997).

Between 1981-1993, the expansion of the levels of formal education led to growing differentials in wages (or returns to schooling); in this period, one third of overall inequality in Brazil could be accounted for by differences in educational attainment between groups of households. These differences were fuelled by the huge growth of inflation. Like for many other countries (Easterly and Fischer 2001), there is quite some evidence that the hyper-inflation in the Brazilian case too has especially been detrimental for the poorest 20% of the population. Taming hyperinflation is likely to have made (and to make) a significant contribution in the fight against poverty (Ravallion 2009). After 1993, macroeconomic stability was restored and inflation fell to reasonable levels, whereas the long-term growth of educational attainment led to a fall in the average returns to schooling, especially in view of the lack of jobs at corresponding levels for women -- and thus to lower wage differentials.<sup>10</sup> It has also been suggested that in the course of the 1990s and in the early 2000s urban-rural inequalities and maybe also racial inequalities<sup>11</sup> have decreased, though this is more speculative as the backgrounds are rather unclear. Other factors

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<sup>8</sup> Such synchronous increases and decreases of inequality and poverty are not self-evident, as the statistical relation between the two conceptions can be rather complex. The development of the Gini coefficient does not necessarily reflect how shifts in the income distribution impact on poverty.

<sup>9</sup> Brazil does not have an official national poverty line. Many researchers have built on a set of regionally-specific poverty lines calculated by Rocha (1993). Recently an ad-hoc poverty line of R\$100 per capita per month (in September 2004 values) has gained currency, corresponding to the means-test in the country's cash assistance program, in 2003 integrating five income transfer programs, the *Bolsa Família* (Family Fund -- Ferreira *et al* 2008).

<sup>10</sup> Though this trend may also have pushed down average wages (Zeneda *et al* 2009, 9).

<sup>11</sup> This seems in contradiction with the proposition of the same authors (Ferreira *et al* 2008) that between 1993 and 2004 racial differences continued to explain 11-13% of total inequality.

remaining equal, in the 1980s the differences between urban and rural areas accounted for between 5-17% of total inequality, though in the statistical exercise at stake the rural-urban income differential after 1993 declined by about 60% (Ferreira *et al* 2008). Last but not least, as discussed the real increase in the SMW most likely was the largest contribution to less income inequality.

In spite of a possible smaller urban-rural difference, and the existence of many poor living in the *favelas* or distant housing projects in the cities of the Southeast, it cannot be denied that notably rural poverty remains deep and widespread. In 2006, about 12 million of the nearly 30 million Brazilians living in rural areas, or 41%, were below the national poverty line, against 17.5% of households in the urban areas (UN MDG Indicators; IFAD Rural Poverty portal). One third of income of the poorest 20% was non-monetary (Brazilian average: 14.3%). On average, these households had 1.5 earners, against the national average of 2.0 earners (ILO Laborsta, based on *Pesquisa de Orcamentos Familiares*). Also physical indicators point at the remaining large inequalities between the urban and rural areas. For example, while in 2006 91% of the Brazilian population had access to a safe (in UN terms improved) water source, under urban conditions this share was 97%, a huge difference with the 58% access share in rural areas – a share at the level of some of the poorest African countries like Zambia and Guinee-Bissau (WHO 2009, 30). Even wider is the urban-rural gap in access to improved sanitation still existing in 2006. Whereas the national average was 77%, the 84% access rate found in urban areas was in violent contrast with the 37% rate in Brazil's rural areas. The latter rate was even quite below the rates for African countries like Zambia or Malawi (WHO 2009, 31).

Brazil's Northeast region has the single largest concentration of rural poverty in Latin America. In this region, 58% of the total population and 67% of the rural population lives below the national poverty line. In 2003, the Northeast's per capita income was less than half of the national per capita income (DIEESE website; IFAD Rural Poverty portal; see also our section 2.6.4, on agriculture). On all human development indicators, the Northeast has the lowest scores of Brazil's five large regions. For example, in 2007 the literacy rate in the Northeast was 80.1%, against the national average of 90.0% -- though in 1992 the Northeastern rate was only 67.3%. Notwithstanding similar progress in recent years, the availability of community services in the Northeast remains much lower than notably in the Southeast and the South of the country. For example, whereas in 2007 73.9% of all households in the Northeast could rely on collecting garbage services, this percentage was 87.5% in the Southeast. Also, the use of durable household goods in the Northeast was much lower than the national average, not to mention the incidence in the Southeast. Again just one example: in 2007 12.8% of the Northeastern households had a washing machine, compared to a national average of 39.5% and an average 54.9% in the Southeast (all data: IBGE 2008).

On the human development index (HDI) Brazil ranked in 2006 70<sup>th</sup> on a total of 179 countries, with a score of 0.807, in the middle-range of Latin American countries. The period 2000-2006 showed an increase in Brazil's score of 0.018%-points on the HDI, and the longer term (1980-2006) an improvement of 0.123%-points. Its relative position has fallen somewhat (compare to number 58 of 130 countries in 1990). The country's GDP per capita index was 7 places higher than its HDI index. Brazil's position in the Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI) was, with a no. 63 ranking among 157 countries, in 2006 about the same. Its GDI value was 99.6% of its HDI value (UNDP 2008). As said, the estimated earned income for men was in 2006 (PPP adjusted) USD 11,521, and for women USD 6,426 (UNDP 2008), suggesting a women to men parity rate of 0.56.

For 2008 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked Brazil 73<sup>rd</sup> of 130 countries. For the position of women in economic participation and opportunity, Brazil ranked 59<sup>st</sup>, in educational attainment and in health and survival--with other countries-- first, but concerning political

empowerment 110<sup>th</sup>. The editors noted that the country moved up one spot in the overall rankings from 74<sup>th</sup> place in 2007: while there were small gains in women's labour force participation, estimated earned income and wage gaps, the country's (low) position on the economic participation and opportunity subindex remained virtually unchanged. By contrast, thanks to the advance in enrollment in primary education of girls Brazil is now rated among the 24 countries that have fully closed gender gaps in education (Hausmann *et al* 2008, 20). Finally, the SIGI Gender Equality and Social Institutions Index ranked Brazil 24<sup>th</sup> of 102 countries in 2008. The country's lowest sub-ranking was that on physical integrity, with a no. 48 spot (OECD-SIGI website).

## 2.6. Demographics and female labour force

### 2.6.1. Population and fertility

Estimates as for July 2009 come to a population of Brazil of 198,740,000: 100,468,000 women and 98,272,000 men, or 100 women to 97.8 men. From 2000-2008, the male population has grown by approximately 11.6%, the female population by 11.2%.<sup>12</sup> A considerable but not extremely large part of the population is 0-14 years: in 2009 26.7% -- 27.6% of the male population and 25.9% of the female part (CIA World Factbook). Due to the continued decrease in fertility and mortality, this share decreased from over 38% in 1980 (Hudson 1997). On the other hand, in 2009 6.4% of the population is estimated to be 65 of age and older: 5.5% of the males and 7.3% of the females (CIA World Factbook). Ageing is considerable: in 1980 the share of those aged 65 and over was still 4.0% (Hudson 1997). For 2009, the median age was estimated at 28.6 years, 27.8 for males and 29.3 for females (CIA World Factbook).

Brazil's current population growth rate is estimated at 1.2%, slowing down the yearly growth rate between 1997- 2007 of 1.4%, and meaning a further lowering of the yearly population growth rates prevailing in the 1980s (2.5%) and the 1970s (1.9%) (WHO 2009; Hudson 1997). The UN expects population growth for 2005-2010 to result in 1.3% per year: 1.8% in the urban areas, against a fall of 1.9% yearly of the rural population (UN Data). Brazil is already highly urbanised, and as mentioned in its recent history urbanisation has gone on extremely rapid. In 2007, nearly six of seven inhabitants (85.2%) lived in urban areas, against 81% in 2000. About one-third of the population lives in the industrialized Southeast. The same holds for the nine Metropolitan Regions (MRs). The three MRs in the Southeast, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro en São Paolo, account for one fifth of Brazil's population. The largest MR is São Paolo, with close to 20 million inhabitants (UN Data; wikipedia; IBGE 2008).

The birth rate estimated for 2009 is 18.3 births per 1,000 population, the death rate 6.4 deaths per 1,000 (CIA World Factbook). The total fertility rate (TFR, the number of births a woman would have if she survived to age 50) has shown a huge decrease, and dropped from 6.3 in 1960 to 3.3 in 1986 and 2.4 in 2000 (Berquó and Cavenaghi 2005), though the decrease to below 2.0 earlier expected to happen in the 2000s (Hudson 1997) has not materialized. Both for 2005-2010 and for 2009 the TFR is estimated at 2.2 (UN Data), about the replacement level. Nevertheless, in the early 2000s studies indicated that more than half of the population was already below replacement levels and that only a small segment showed TFRs above 5 per woman (Berquó and Cavenaghi 2005). The massive fertility rate decline occurred in the absence of any official policy in favour of controlling birth rates. Though size and speed of this

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<sup>12</sup> These estimates (based on projections of the US Census Bureau) are considerable higher than Brazilian estimates building on the August 2000 Census. That Census reported a population of 169,873,000, 3.8% lower than projections of the US Census Bureau (source: CIA World Factbook).

decline were comparable with China's, the Brazilian government's stance was one of *laissez-faire*. Large-scale birth control developed bottom-up, with women taking much of the initiative. Already in the early 1990s, about two of three Brazilian women used contraceptives<sup>13</sup>, which by the time were already sold over the counter without prescription, whereas many Brazilian couples decided and decide for sterilization. Moreover, the incidence of abortion is significant. In the early 1990s, the number of abortions in Brazil corresponded to one abortion to every two live births. The practice of clandestine abortions helps to explain the relatively high maternity mortality rate (Hudson 1997) of 110 deaths per 1,000 births in 2005 (WHO 2009).

Actually, in general life chances in Brazil are quite good in comparative perspective. Infectious and contagious diseases have been largely brought under control. Life expectancy at birth has also increased substantially, from 52.7 years in 1970, via 67.1 years in 1995, to an estimated 72.0 years in 2009: 68.4 years for males and 75.7 years for females (Hudson 1997; CIA World Factbook<sup>14</sup>). For 2005-2010 life expectancy at birth is expected to grow slightly, to 68.8 years for males and 76.1 years for females (UN Data). For 2000-2005, the probability of not surviving to age 40 was estimated 10.4% of the relevant age cohort (UNDP 2008).

Child mortality is low. In 2004 the neonatal mortality rate stood at a quite low 13 per 1,000 live births. The infant mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1,000 live births) stood at 20 in 2007, considerable progress as the rate for 1990 was 49 and that for 2000 still 28 (WHO 2009). For 2009, the CIA World Factbook estimate is set slightly higher at 22.6 deaths per 1,000 live births. The under 5 mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 5 per 1,000 live births) by 2007 stood at 22, coming down from 58 in 1990 and 32 in 2000. It is estimated for 2005-2010 to become 23.6 (WHO 2009; UN Data).

For an indication of the situation of our target group, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 15-19 of age) is of special importance. For Brazil, over 2000-2007 this rate was estimated at 56, in the middle-range for developing countries (WHO 2009). In the early 2000s, the trend seemed clearly downward, with adolescent fertility rates at 64 in 2000 and 42 in 2005 (World Bank WDI), and there seemed reason for optimism. The nationwide campaigns of AIDS prevention, strategies in reproductive health policies toward adolescents, sexual education at schools, and a massive exposure in the media regarding the negative consequences of unplanned pregnancy among young people, all spoke out in favour of a decline of adolescent fertility (Berquó and Cavenaghi 2005). Yet, the 2000-2007 estimate suggests stagnation, or even bending, of the downward trend. The rather high incidence of early marriage may play a role: a 2004 United Nations report estimated that 17% of Brazilian girls between 15 and 19 years of age were married, divorced or widowed (OECD SIGI website). Moreover, birth patterns growingly focus on adolescent girls. The share of children born in 2000 with mothers aged 15-19 was 20%, indicating a long-term increase from 9% in 1980 and 14% in 1991. It is quite significant that between 1980-2000 the 15-19 age cohort was the only category with an increasing fertility rate. Among the 15-17-year-old girls, in 2000 already 8.3% were mothers, while among 18-19-year-olds this share was 24.3% (Berquó and Cavenaghi 2005).

Fertility rates and trends in the adolescent cohort, moreover, are strongly differentiated by social class. Between 1991-2000, fertility rates stayed invariably low among the better-off (defined as those 15-19 aged from families earning five or more minimum wages per capita and having nine or more years of

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<sup>13</sup> Recent figures on contraceptive prevalence are not available (cf. WHO 2009).

<sup>14</sup> WHO (2009) mentions for 2007 slightly higher averages i.e. 70 years for males and 76 years for females, and that may imply no further increase.

schooling), whereas the (already high) fertility rates in the group with the worst socio-economic conditions grew from 6.7 times those in the better-off group to 10.3 times. In both socio-economic categories, the fertility rates of non-white women remained higher than those of whites. Among non-white women, the equivalent variation in rates between highest and lowest socio-economic categories was 5.8 and 8.5 respectively (Berquó and Cavenaghi 2005, and authors' calculations based on this source). As we will show in section 2.7.2, these developments tend to have considerable effects on the school drop-out rates of girls.

### 2.6.2. Health

One of the major health risk factors for young people in Brazil, though considerably less widespread than in the African countries we covered in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports, is HIV/AIDS. AIDS was first reported in Brazil in 1980. By 2002, an estimated 650,000 individuals were living with HIV/AIDS, growing to approximately 730,000 in 2007, or 0.4% of the total population. This resulted for 2007 in an estimated HIV adult prevalence rate (of those aged 15-49) of 510 per 100,000. By 2007, about 15,000 persons had died from HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2007; CIA World Factbook; WHO 2009). So far for the bad news; there is good news too. Since 1998 the death rate from AIDS has steadily declined: an achievement attributed to the country's treatment policies. Throughout the 1990s, a range of NGOs, governmental and grass-root organizations joined as to address what was earlier perceived to be a hopeless situation. Activists and health professionals actively participated in policy making. The government was able to reduce treatment costs by reverse engineering antiretroviral drugs, and succeeded in negotiating substantial drug price reductions from pharmaceutical multinationals. By 2000, UNAIDS called the Brazilian AIDS Program the best in the developing world. Though the country's health care system continues to raise bureaucratic obstacles, the results are impressive (Biehl 2007). In 2007, the number of HIV/AIDS deaths in Brazil was calculated at 8 per 100,000, slightly above the average for the Americas. In the same year the antiretroviral therapy coverage among people with advanced HIV infection was a quite high 80% (WHO 2009).

We already came across large inequalities at various fields in Brazil; the country's health disparities are also considerable. We limit ourselves here to two issues related to birth: the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel, and the under 5 mortality rate. According to the World Health Organization (WHO 2009), the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel was 72% among lowest 20% in the income distribution, against 99% among wealthiest 20%. As for the education level of the mother, the rates were 66% births attended by skilled health personnel for mothers with the lowest level and 95% for those with the highest level. The differences across space were somewhat smaller though still considerable, with 73% in rural areas and 92% in urban areas. The respective figures as for the under 5 mortality rate were 99 per 1,000 among lowest 20% in the income distribution, against 37 among the wealthiest 20%, 136 among mothers with the lowest education level versus 53 among those with the highest level, and 111 in rural areas versus 76 in urban areas.

### 2.6.3. Women's labour market share

Of the total Brazilian population, in the ILO statistics by 2007 98,85 million persons were counted as economically active, of which 5,50 million in the ages under 15 as well as 65 and older. If we leave out both these groups in order to comply with the internationally comparable Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-Population ratio (EPOP) that only takes stock of the 15-64 of age, we can calculate the over-all LPR or EPOP at 72.3% (*MDG indicator 1.5*). This implies a position in the middle

ranks among the 14 countries in our project. With 63.0% in 2008, the overall female LPR or EPOP in Brazil is one-fifth lower than the male figure (81.8%).

Table 5 reveals the LPR's by gender and age group for 1999 and 2007 (though not fully comparable as the 1999 figures do not fully show 5-year cohorts). Labour participation by age shows the "plateau" shaped curve characteristic for Latin American countries, which rises after school-leaving age, peaks at around 30 to 35 years, holds steady until about 40 or 45 years, and then declines rather quickly (cf. Winter 1994, 7). In 2007, the four female 5-years' groups aged 25 to 44 showed labour participation rates between 70-75%, whereas the LPRs of the 20-24 and the 45-49 of age were about 67%. Between 1999-2007, the LPRs of these respective age groups have all increased, by 4 to 7% points. (By contrast, the table shows that for the males 20-39 of age the LPRs decreased in this period). For those 50 and older the LPR is falling rather regularly with age, also in 2007 though at a somewhat higher level than in 1999. For the 15-19-year old females, the LPR decreased slightly to 41.6%. In 2007, the joint LPR for the 15-29 of age was 60.7% (15,28 million employed in a population of 25,19 million): an increase of nearly 5% points compared with their joint LPR of 55.8% in 1999 (12,30 million employed in a population of 22,04 million aged 15-29). The LPR's for the 10-14 of age have decreased substantially, though the 2007 figures confirm that child labour (even counted officially!) is still widespread. According to these statistics, in 2007 it concerned 601,000 girls (1999: 963,000) and 1,206,000 boys (1999: 1,854,000)(ILO-Laborsta, and own calculations based on this source).

**Table 5 Labour participation rates by gender and by age group, Brazil, 1999 and 2007**

shares	all		women		men	
	1999	2007	1999	2007	1999	2007
10-14	16.6	10.1	11.4	6.9	21.7	13.1
15-19	52.5	50.0	42.0	41.6	62.8	58.0
20-24	76.2	77.5	63.2	67.8	89.2	87.2
25-29	79.7	82.6	65.7	72.6	94.7	93.2
30-34	81.6	84.0	68.3	73.5	95.9	95.3
35-39		83.3		72.9		94.6
40-44	78.2	82.9	64.8	72.5	92.9	94.1
45-49		78.8		67.7		91.4
50-54	65.1	71.4	49.7	58.1	81.7	86.2
55-59		61.0		46.8		77.2
60-64	32.3	47.7	19.7	32.3	48.0	65.5
65-69		32.7		21.8		45.6
70-74		23.0		14.7		33.5
75+		13.5		8.3		21.2
<b>Total 15+</b>	<b>67.6</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>80.4</b>
<i>population 15+ x mln.</i>	<i>113.1</i>	<i>141,5</i>	<i>58.6</i>	<i>73.6</i>	<i>54.5</i>	<i>67.9</i>
<i>labourforce 15+ x mln.</i>	<i>76.4</i>	<i>97.0</i>	<i>31.9</i>	<i>42.5</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>54.5</i>

Source: ILO, Laborsta

Table 6 (next page) presents an overview of the female employment shares by industry, for employees (paid employment) and for the labour force at large. In 2007, women's overall share was just over 42%, and among employees nearly 44%. These figures already indicate that the joint female share in the other employment status categories is lower. Indeed, 10,1 million women in the labour force in these



categories totaling 27,9 mln. implied a 36% share. Looking at the three categories left, this held for employers, in which category women in 2007 made up 26.5% (900,000 of 3.4 million), and for own-account workers, with 32.5% females (6,2 mln. of 19,2 mln.). Yet, women traditionally formed a majority of contributing family workers, and with 56% in this category (nearly 3,0 mln. of 5,3 mln.) this still was so in 2007 (all data from 2007 Labour Force Survey via ILO-Laborsta).

**Table 6 Female employment shares by industry, employees and total labour force, Brazil, 2007**

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
agriculture	0,54	11.5	5,27	32.5
fishing	0,01	1.4	0,06	15.2
mining	0,02	5.8	0,04	9.4
manufacturing	2,86	28.9	4,78	36.4
utilities	0,07	19.5	0,07	18.1
construction	0,13	4.3	0,19	3.1
transport, storage, communication	0,52	17.8	0,59	13.7
wholesale and retail	3,55	37.3	6,36	39.6
restaurants, hotels	1,06	53.9	1,74	51.7
finance, insurance	0,55	50.7	0,58	49.0
real estate, other business	1,58	38.1	1,98	33.0
public administration, defense	1,72	38.3	1,73	38.1
education	3,72	77.8	3,92	77.7
health, social work	2,21	78.6	2,56	76.9
other community services	0,96	49.5	2,22	60.0
private households	6,31	93.8	6,32	97.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,83</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>38,42</b>	<b>42.2</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

Table 6 shows that female employees in 2007 formed majorities in five industries, as well as all females employed did. In four industries these majorities existed both among employees and in the total labour force, most outspokenly in private households (94% and 98% respectively), followed by health and social work (79 and 77%), education (twice 78%), and at some distance restaurants and hotels (54 and 52%). Women made up a clear majority (60%) in all employed in other community services, but accounted for just below 50% of this industry's employees, implying that relatively many women worked here as self-employed or family workers (The same was the case in agriculture, fishing and manufacturing). In finance and insurance this relation was --in weakened form-- the other way round: a small female majority among employees, a large minority among all employed. Male-dominated sectors were and remained construction; transport, storage and communication, and --rather surprisingly in international comparison-- also real estate and other business (38 and 33%), wholesale and retail (37 and 40%) as well as public administration (twice 38%).

Table 7 (next page) shows that in 2007 private households as an "industry" was the largest employer of female employees, with a share of over 24%, followed by education and wholesale / retail (both 14%), and manufacturing (11%). Six of seven women in paid employment (86%) worked in services, broadly defined and including government. The two columns at the right clarify that with 73% the services share in the total female labour force is somewhat lower. In the labour force at large, the share of wholesale and retail is a fraction larger than that of private households, whereas with 14% agriculture ranks third.

The changes over time have been considerable. In 1997 over one of five women (20.2%) in the labour force still worked in agriculture, resulting in the strong decrease of over 6%points in one decade – about the same decrease the male labour force underwent. The share of women working in manufacturing remained nearly the same, whereas with 3.2%points that in wholesale and retail showed the largest relative growth (IBGE 2008).

**Table 7 Shares of industries in female employment, employees and total labour force, Brazil, 2007**

	employees		labour force	
	mln.	%	mln.	%
agriculture	0,54	2.1	5,27	13.8
fishing	0,01	0.1	0,06	0.2
mining	0,02	0.1	0,04	0.1
manufacturing	2,86	11.1	4,78	12.4
utilities	0,07	0.3	0,07	0.2
construction	0,13	0.5	0,19	0.1
transport, storage, communication	0,52	2.0	0,59	1.5
wholesale and retail	3,55	13.8	6,36	16.6
restaurants, hotels	1,06	4.1	1,74	4.5
finance, insurance	0,55	2.1	0,58	1.5
real estate, other business	1,58	6.1	1,98	5.2
public administration, defense	1,72	6.7	1,73	4.5
education	3,72	14.4	3,92	10.2
health, social work	2,21	8.6	2,56	6.7
other community services	0,96	3.7	2,22	5.8
private households	6,31	24.4	6,32	16.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,83</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>38,42</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

Table 8 presents an overview of the female employment shares by occupational group, again both for employees and for the labour force at large.

**Table 8 Female employment shares by occupational group, employees and total labour force, Brazil, 2007**

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
legislators, senior officials, managers	0,90	40.6	1,62	36.1
professionals	2,83	61.4	3,55	58.6
technicians, associate professionals	2,85	50.2	3,26	46.7
clerks	4,23	58.6	4,38	58.5
service and sales workers	4,91	56.1	7,81	57.5
skilled agricultural workers	0,52	11.5	5,30	32.7
craft and related trades	0,67	10.7	1,34	20.7
plant & machine operators, assemblers	1,26	20.5	2,24	29.4
elementary occupations	7,64	59.2	8,88	55.3
armed forces	0,03	4.7	0,03	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,83</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>38,42</b>	<b>42.2</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

With 36%, the Brazilian share of female legislators, senior officials and managers was about the average for upper-middle income countries; if we focus on only employees, their over 40% share is even rather high. Though again hardly at variance with other countries at the same level of development (cf. UNDP 2008), the female shares in the occupational groups somewhat lower in the organisational hierarchy are higher: over 58% among professionals (and over 61% among professionals in paid employment, including many teachers in secondary and tertiary education), and over 46% respectively 50% among technicians and associate professionals (among which nurses and teachers in primary education). Women formed majorities in clerical, service and sales, and elementary occupations (including workers in private households), irrespective of their employment status. In three groups, skilled agricultural workers; craft and related trades, and plant & machine operators and assemblers, the female shares in the labour force at large were much larger than those among employees, pointing at considerable numbers of women working in these occupations as self-employed or family worker.

According to Table 9, in 2007 the three occupational groups ranked highest in organisational hierarchies accounted for 25.5% of female employees respectively 23% of the female labour force at large. Yet, elementary occupations, the lowest ranked group, took by far the largest single share, accounting for nearly 30% of all female employees and 23% of all females in the total labour force. Irrespective of employment status, the service and sales occupations ranked second. In the employee ranks, the clerks ranked third, as did the skilled agricultural workers among all employed females.

**Table 9 Shares of occupational groups in female employment, employees and total labour force, Brazil, 2007**

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
legislators, senior officials, managers	0,90	3.5	1,62	4.2
professionals	2,83	11.0	3,55	9.2
technicians, associate professionals	2,85	11.0	3,26	8.5
clerks	4,23	16.4	4,38	11.4
service and sales workers	4,91	19.0	7,81	20.3
skilled agricultural workers	0,52	2.0	5,30	13.8
craft and related trades	0,67	2.6	1,34	3.5
plant & machine operators, assemblers	1,26	4.9	2,24	5.8
elementary occupations	7,64	29.6	8,88	23.1
armed forces	0,03	0.1	0,03	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,83</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>38,42</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

Table 10 (next page) presents a more detailed overview of the total female labour force in Brazil for 2007, horizontally grouping the 10 occupational groups and vertically the industries. Based on the table we can calculate that over 90% of all women in the three highest ranked occupational groups worked in services (broadly defined). Education alone accounted for 37% of all women in these three groups, followed by health (14%), public administration (10%), and wholesale and retail (also 10%). With 36% of all, wholesale and retail housed a considerable share of female managers et cetera, most likely for the largest part store managers. Clerks proved to be widely and rather evenly spread across industries. As to be expected, wholesale and retail accounted for a major part (42%) of all service and sales workers, though they are widely dispersed too, with considerable shares in other community services (16%), and restaurants and hotels (14%).

**Table 10 Female employment, total labour force, by industry and occupational group, Brazil, 2007, in 1,000 headcount**

	tot	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
agriculture	5,615	4	2	1	9	31	5,564	1	4	-	-
fishing	56	-	-	-	-	1	55	-	-	-	-
mining	22	3	4	3	6	3	-	4	-	-	-
manufacturing	4,354	186	264	169	387	423	25	2,449	439	8	-
utilities	54	2	9	7	29	6	-	1	-	-	-
construction	134	16	17	11	34	19	-	38	1	-	-
transport, stor., commun.	466	33	25	43	211	106	-	46	1	-	-
wholesale and retail	5,609	511	60	149	894	3,823	-	102	54	14	-
restaurants, hotels	1,505	107	11	5	77	1,294	-	1	10	-	-
finance, insurance	476	71	35	70	251	45	-	2	1	-	-
real estate, other business	1,653	86	316	202	594	431	-	21	1	3	-
public administr., defense	1,567	123	265	328	473	327	1	12	2	-	32
education	3,579	134	1,364	1,141	325	605	-	7	3	-	-
health, social work	2,154	45	465	538	476	615	2	7	5	1	-
other community services	2,049	60	189	84	276	1,427	4	5	1	-	-
private households	6,040	-	-	8	-	-	-	1	-	6,031	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>35333</b>	<b>1381</b>	<b>3,026</b>	<b>2,759</b>	<b>4,042</b>	<b>9,156</b>	<b>5,651</b>	<b>2,698</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>6,057</b>	<b>32</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta<sup>15</sup>

Key:

1. legislators, senior officials, managers
2. professionals
3. technicians, associate professionals
4. clerks
5. service and sales workers
6. skilled agricultural workers
7. craft and related trades
8. plant & machine operators, assemblers
9. elementary occupations
10. armed forces

Below, we shortly describe developments in large sectors with special attention to the position and opportunities of women.

#### 2.6.4. Agriculture

We already noted that poverty in Brazil concentrates in rural areas. The extreme inequality of land tenure, especially in the Northeast, is a major cause of rural poverty. In 1995, still 1% of the population owned 45% of farmland, and 10% owned 80%. Subsequent decrees of the Cardoso government even weakened land claims of notably the indigenous population (website emayzine). This situation is a major explanation for the spread and successes of the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*

<sup>15</sup> Compared with Table 7, 3,09 million female workers are not classified, about equally divided over groups 1-4. The groups 5-9 are partly differently classified; this is especially the case for service and sales workers; plant & machine operators and assemblers, and craftspersons in relation to elementary occupations.

(Movement of Landless Farmworkers, MST), one of the country's most influential social movements, occupying and farming vacant land to pressure for agrarian reform but also encouraging literacy. The MST has developed a pedagogical model directed at agricultural skills, citizenship, and dignity (Cardoso 2004, 41-2).

Actually for many families agriculture is no longer a source for even a minimal income. Off-farm incomes have grown, and at least 30% of rural people are engaged in non-agricultural employment as their main occupation, like handicraft and trade. Many others continue to migrate to Brazil's urban areas. The majority of the four million Brazilian farms is very small, and many produce at subsistence level. Yet, small scale family agriculture accounts for 70% of the country's food production, suggesting that family agriculture has a strong potential of economic progress and overcoming poverty. The current federal government has implemented a Land Reform Program, in which 800,000 rural inhabitants are assisted by credit, research and extension programs, including a special credit line for women and young women (government website). Most of the effects of land reform still have to work out in practice. Actually, the poorest and most vulnerable groups consist of women, youngsters and indigeneous people. Female-headed households recently accounted for 27% of poor rural people, against 13% in 1970. The process of growth of these households can be termed the feminization of rural poverty. Either because their husbands have migrated, or because they are single parents, these women have to run both the family farm as well as their household. Moreover, child labour is most widespread in poor rural households (Hudson 1997; IFAD Rural Poverty portal; UNDP 2007). In spite of some positive developments,<sup>16</sup> it is unlikely under the prevailing conditions that many young women living in urban areas and trying to make a career can rely on a "fall-back scenario" in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

### 2.6.5. Mining and manufacturing

Mining is a major contributor to Brazilian exports and the country's GDP, but because of its high capital intensity not to employment. Brazil has huge and diversified mineral deposits, and is the world's largest producer of bauxite, gemstones, colombium, gold, iron ore, kaolin, manganese, tantalum, and tin. Major exports are iron ore, tin and aluminum. In 2006-2008, facilitated through the government's mineral development policy and geophysical air mapping by the Geological Services of Brazil, the largest (foreign) mining companies carried out extensive expansion programmes (NN 2006). The main links between mining and manufacturing are Brazil's steel and petrochemical industries.

In the 1980s, when technological innovation accelerated in the global economy, investment in Brazilian manufacturing fell and technological backwardness increased. Between 1986-2006 production growth in manufacturing was very volatile, and remained on average below 2% yearly, whereas with 1.5% yearly employment growth was less half that in services. Though in good times manufacturing growth fuelled the country's GDP growth, services was the more stable grower. Jointly, mining and manufacturing did not systematically create higher productivity jobs (Vargas da Cruz *et al* 2008). This is not to deny that in parts of manufacturing Brazil's technological achievements are impressive, like in passenger jet aircraft, space research and petrochemicals, all under (partial) state ownership. In 2007, the largest industry groups in manufacturing were, in this order, textiles, apparel and leather (2,14 mln., of which 1,250,000 women, 58%); basic metal and heavy machinery (1,75 mln. employed, of which only 198,000 women,

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<sup>16</sup> The federal government (website) advertises the creation and expansion of a large agrobusiness. Yet, it cannot be denied that at least part of this development is detrimental for the environment, and goes at the expense of the biosystem of the Amazon basin.

11%); food and beverages processing (1,54 million, of which 444,000 women, 29%); chemicals (1,33 mln., of which 321,000 women, 24%), and motor vehicles and other transport vehicles (616,000, of which 85,000 women, 14%). Textiles, apparel and leather (shoes), using local raw materials, have considerable export potential. In 2007 the single largest industry employing women was apparel, with 683,000 women (75%) on 911,000 employed (ILO Laborsta). The 2007 figures point at the continuing dominance of primary product-oriented and rather low added-value manufacturing. Automobiles are the country's most important manufactured items; Toyota, Honda, GM, Ford, Volkswagen, and Fiat own manufacturing plants in Brazil. The size of more sophisticated office and electrical machinery, radio, TV and medical equipment manufacturing was, with 390,000 employed (114,000 women, 29%), comparatively small. The few large national companies active in this sector are domestically oriented, such as Consul and Brastemp. Foreign multinationals, notably Nokia, Intel and Siemens, are the largest export-oriented producers (various websites, a.o. Brazil sourcing).

### 2.6.6. Commerce

The large majority of retail and other distribution employees (about 85%) is employed in companies with less than 500 employees. In 2007, wholesale and retail combined had no less than 708,000 outlets in Brazil. There are only few national retail chains; most chains are based in state capital, but have hardly stores in rural states. The retail sector in smaller cities is dominated by small family-owned businesses (various websites, a.o. Brazil sourcing). Between 1995 and 2007, employment in the distribution and retail sectors has doubled, and though growth slowed down, between 2002-2007 the rise was still 20% (and 26% for women -- ILO Laborsta). The prospects for further growth are good if current socio-economic trends continue like diminishing poverty as well as the growth of the middle classes, including increasing purchasing power. Yet, retail and distribution mainly offer opportunities for the low- and middle-level educated. For them, the employment prospects in wholesale, retail and related commercial activities may be more favourable than in high-tech service activities, especially if closer related to manufacturing, like parts of the IT industry. Here, employment increased until 2000 and stagnated thereafter (Vargas da Cruz *et al* 2008). In spite of these good prospects, one should also be aware that recently over half of all employment in wholesale and retail was informal, including non-registered employees and self-employed (Henley *et al* 2008; IBGE 2008).

### 2.6.7. Services

For Brazil tourism is a major source of income and employment. In the last decade, the number of tourist arrivals at national borders has been consistently over 5 million, though recently with a decreasing trend (2005: 5,36 million, 2007: 5,03 million) (UN Data). Employment in the hotel and restaurant sector --with a 3.4 million-strong labour force comparatively large-- indeed fell by 1.5% in 2007, but between 2002-2006 employment in the sector grew by 16%, and for women even by 22% (ILO Laborsta). As Table 10 shows, 86% of female employees in this branch is statistically grouped as sales staff, obviously the least skilled but presumably large group of room attendants included. The fact that Brazil will host the 2016 Olympic Games is expected to give a renewed boost to tourism, already in the years before (WTTC website). This may well open up considerable employment opportunities for women at various occupational levels, from room attendants to managerial positions.

Under the Lula administrations Brazil's financial sector is flourishing, also in international perspective. Though employment between 2002-2007 grew by 20% (women: 26%), with 1.2 million employees in 2007 the sector is still comparatively small and there seems considerable room for further growth. The

government still owns most of the financial sector, though openings for new entrants have recently attracted American investors (wikipedia). The private bank with the largest revenues, Banco Bradesco (Discount Bank), in 2007 ranked 50th worldwide and had over 82,700 employees; state-owned Banco de Brasil, its closest competitor, had a workforce over 90,300. Other large financial institutions are Banco Itau, Unibanco, both private banks, Federal Economic Register, and the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) (source: AIAS Multinationals Database). In 2007, over half of all female finance employees worked as clerks, and 37% worked at the three highest occupational levels (Table 10). The strength of the finance sector, and the fact that it remained largely outside the worldwide credit crunch, may offer good employment perspectives, also for women. As said, these perspectives may be better than those for qualified engineers and other staff aiming at employment in service industries that are closer related to manufacturing.

The other services sub-sector, with 4.8 million employees in 2007 much larger, is statistically labelled “real estate, renting and business activities.” As for these highly diversified activities, 2002-2007 also saw a strong employment growth, overall by 29% and for females even by 39% (ILO Laborsta). While 62% of female employees predominantly at middle-levels working as clerks and sales workers, here too 37% (over 600,000 females) could be found at the three highest occupational levels (Table 10). It may be expected that perspectives in most sub-sectors are good too, and that here in the coming years many employment opportunities for women will be opening up.

### 2.6.8. Government

Though often criticized because of the “swollen ranks of government officials”, with examples of “public servants” who collect paychecks but never appear to work (Skidmore 2004, 142), employment in the Brazilian public administration continued to grow by 16% between 2002-2007; at the same time female employment grew by 26%, implying a 3%point increase of the female employment share in public administration over these years (ILO Laborsta). Nevertheless, the resulting 38% share is quite low in international perspective. Like in other countries, political decisions on expansion of the public service and appointing higher-ranked public officers may have favoured in large majority men. By contrast, it should be taken into account that most females already working in public administration are well-qualified. In 2007, just over half of all female employees of public administration worked as clerks and sales staff (51%), but the relatively large share of 45% (over 700,000 females) could be found at the three highest occupational levels (Table 10). The expectation seems reasonable that adoption of equal opportunities and related legislation by public bodies themselves will contribute to the continuing entry of many (young) women in public service.

## 2.7. Education and skill levels of the female labour force

### 2.7.1. Literacy

The adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write– for Brazil in 1999-2006<sup>17</sup> was, according to the UNDP Human Development Indicators, 89.6%: rather low in the range of upper middle-income countries.<sup>18</sup> Since the 1970s the literacy rates for men and women have been

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<sup>17</sup> In fact, the rate for Brazil in 2006 (information IBGE).

<sup>18</sup> The latest longer-term adult literacy rate, for 2000-2007, is set at 90.5% (included in WHO 2009).

approximately equal (Ravallion 2009), and in 2006 too there was no negative gender gap. The male literacy rate by then was 89.4%, the female with 89.9% slightly higher (UNDP 2008).<sup>19</sup> The National Household Sample Survey 2007 found 90.0% literacy: 89.8% literates among males and 90.2% among females. This implied that in 2007 14.1 million Brazilians aged 15 and over were illiterate, 10.0% of the population of this age. Nevertheless, the long-term improvement is undisputable: the share of illiterates in 1992 was still 17.2% (IBGE 2008). By 2007 the youth (15-24-year-olds) literacy rate was with 97.8% over 8% points higher, divided in 97.1% for males and 98.6% for females, implying a women to men parity of 102% (MDG Indicator 2.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators / IBGE 2008). With 98.3%, in 2007 the highest literacy rate was observed in the group 15-17 of age (IBGE 2008).

### 2.7.2. Education of girls

Combined gross enrollment in education in Brazil was in 2006 overall 87.2%: females 89.4%, males 85.1%. Both figures indicate a rather high level of participation in education of especially girls and young women, compared to overall rates of about 50% in 1960 and 67% in 1970, and also compared to most other Latin American countries (UNDP 2008). Education is compulsory for ages seven to 14, to a minimum of nine years, and public education is free at all levels. Yet, coverage is incomplete and quality is uneven. Generally speaking, the private primary and secondary schools are for the upper and middle classes, though during the 1990s financial pressure made middle class parents shift to public schools for their children (wikipedia). The OECD (2008) recently criticized Brazil because of its low level of expenditure in education (in spite of recent increases, only about 4% of its GDP), and because of its expenditure being heavily skewed towards tertiary education students: the country allocates about six times more resources per student to tertiary education than to primary education.

Formally, Brazil is likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015. Fundamental education is divided in two stages, *Ensino Fundamental I* (years 1-5) and *Ensino Fundamental II* (years 6-9). Enrollment rates are high, and Brazil seems to be speedily catching up with the average for the OECD countries (OECD 2008). Many children are enrolled in pre-primary school facilities, including day-care facilities, increasing in 2007 to 70% of the 4-5-year olds, 69.6% of the boys of this age and 97.2% of the girls. The 2007 data showed that 99% of all children between 7 and 10 years were in pre-primary, primary or secondary education (IBGE 2008). The net enrollment in primary education of the population aged 5-to-14 was over 2000-2007 overall 94%, divided into 93% for boys and 95% for girls, bringing girls to boys parity to 102% (WHO 2009<sup>20</sup>). According to the national statistical bureau, between 1992-2007 the enrollment rate of those aged 7-to-14 grew by over 11% points, from 86.6% in 1992 to 97.6% in 2007, the latter figure divided in 97.4% for boys and 97.8% for girls, or 100.4% girls to boys parity.<sup>21</sup> Progress in school enrollment has been especially strong in the Northeast, with over 17% points growth reaching an enrollment rate in 2007 of 97.1% (IBGE 2008).

Secondary education takes three years in Brazil (wikipedia). The enrollment rates for the age cohort for which secondary education is most relevant have recently increased considerably. From 2000 to 2005, the enrollment rates among 15-19-year-olds in public and private schools increased from 75% to 80%, a

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<sup>19</sup> Compared with the 2004 literacy rates presented in the CIA World Factbook, between 2004-2006 the male rate rose 1.0%, the female rate 1.1%; 2007 saw a further rise of the male rate by 0.4% and the female rate by 0.3% (IBGE 2008).

<sup>20</sup> In fact, the rate for Brazil for 2006; the 2005 rate was 93% (OECD 2008).

<sup>21</sup> The net enrollment rate for the 6-14-year olds was in 2007 97.0%: 96.8% for boys and 97.2% for girls.



rate higher than in a number of OECD countries including the UK and the US (UN MDG website; OECD 2008). Yet, actual school attendance is much lower, and the rates of grade repetition are high. Partly this may have to do with the quality of education. The OECD (2008) notes that, with an average 32 students, class size in secondary education is quite large. Over-age school attendance is rather common, and many children older than 10 years are still in primary school: in 2006 about 40% of the 11-year-olds and 20% of the 12-year-olds. While at age 14 the attendance rate was still 94%, the rate dropped steadily to 74% for the 17-year-olds and 53% for the 18-year-olds (website Huebler 2008). For the last few years, a gender division of secondary education enrollment is lacking. For 2004, the net enrollment rate for males was set at 74.2 for males and 81.4 for females, bringing women to parity at 110% (UNICEF 2008).

Though recent statistics are lacking, drop-out rates of girls from public schools seem considerable. We already came across the high and increasing adolescent fertility rates, especially among the poorest. One of the most cited negative consequences is low school attendance. It has been argued that the Brazilian educational system has no special programs for young women who become pregnant; therefore, if a pregnant student chooses not to abort, the most probable outcome is that she will quit, this likelihood being higher among the poorer classes. In 2000, total enrollment rates in school of girls varied from over 95% of the population between ages 10-14 to nearly 50% of the 18-19-year-olds. By contrast, the enrollment rate of young mothers was 18-22% in all age groups. Controlled for other factors, a childless girl was eight times more likely to be enrolled at school than a young mother with at least one child. Berquó and Cavenaghi (2005, 13), after presenting this and other evidence, develop a plausible relation with the poor quality of public education in Brazil, which, "associated with limited job opportunities might induce a great number of young women to start families as the most attractive choice of their lives." The findings of Cardoso and Verner (2006) confirm that early parenthood has a strong impact driving teenagers out of school; they stress that extreme poverty is also lowering school attendance, and that reducing the costs of school, such as transportation, could improve the record of school attendance.

Secondary education is mandatory for those wishing to pursue higher education. In addition, students must pass the *vestibular*, a public open entrance examination; competition is fierce for places in public universities, since these universities are totally free of charge (wikipedia). In the early 2000s, access to tertiary education in Brazil was still relatively unequal: across a large number of countries Brazil had the lowest Education Equity Index (EEI<sup>22</sup>). By then, the country had the lowest accessibility of tertiary education of the countries compared (Murakami and Blom 2008). In the course of the 2000s, tertiary education participation has grown rapidly. In 2006, 8% of the 18-year-olds was enrolled in tertiary education, increasing to 15% among the 22-year-olds and then declining with age (IBGE 2006). Female participation in regular tertiary education continued to exceed male participation by far. In 2007, 68% of all enrolled in tertiary education were women, bringing women to men parity in tertiary level enrollment at 206% (UN Data website).

From the population aged 20-29 of age, in 2006 21% were still in education. Among the population aged 30 and over, relatively many were –full-time and part-time– enrolled in public and private institutions: 8.1% of those aged 30-39 and 2.4% of those 40 and older. These shares are well above the OECD averages. Most of these learners were attending primary and secondary school, a result of a system that

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<sup>22</sup> The EEI is the ratio of the percentage of university students whose fathers have a tertiary education degree, measuring the socio-economic status (SES) of the student population, and the percentage of men aged 45-64 who have a tertiary education degree, measuring the SES of the general population. Brazil's EEI was 12% (Murakami and Blom 2008).

offers school drop-outs an opportunity to continue their education later in life. Besides, adult literacy programs actually reach a relatively small part of the population –between 0.5 and 1% of those aged 30-75 – but after all they contribute to the current level of literacy in Brazil (website Huebler 2008; OECD 2008).

### 2.7.3. Female skill levels

Based on Census data on São Paulo’s urban labour market, Lovell (2006) carried out a highly interesting study on the distribution of completed years of education by gender and by race. From 1960 to 2000, school completion rates increased largely. Both white and Afro-Brazilian women achieved consistently higher levels of education than men. The share of Afro-Brazilian women who had completed nine or more years of schooling rose from 2% in 1960 to 37% in 2000. Similar increases for Afro-Brazilian men were from 1 to 29%. Likewise, the share of white women who had completed nine or more years of schooling increased from 18 to 61% over these four decades, while a similar increase for white men ranged from 1 to 50%. Yet, racial inequality persisted for both sexes. By 2000, only 6% of employed Afro-Brazilian women and 4% of employed Afro-Brazilian men had completed 12 or more years of schooling, compared to 23% and 18% respectively for employed white women and men. Lovell concluded that in 2000 racial inequality was higher among women than men, largely due to Afro-Brazilian women’s underrepresentation in the highest levels of the education system.

Table 11 presents the division of the economically active population of Brazil at large by gender and educational attainment, based on the 2007 Labour Force Survey and following the ISCED division. Unfortunately divisions by gender and race were not available. For both sexes the table displays a rather segmented labour force though, again, the average level of education of women is considerably higher than that of men.<sup>23</sup> At the two lowest levels, including those with no completed education and only primary education, 47% of all male workers could be found against 37% of all females. Nearly 34% of women were at the secondary level, second stage level, against 27% of men. And at top (tertiary) level women again had a clear advantage, with a nearly 12% share against 7% for men, bringing women to men parity here at 164%. If we attach a 1 to 5 ranking to the five (combined) levels, starting with 1 for ISCED X-0, the average female rating is 3.04, against a male average of 2.73.

**Table 11 Total economically active population by highest level of education completed and by gender, Brazil, 2007**

	all		women		men	
	x mln	%	x mln	%	mln	%
no education completed (ISCED X-0)	18,83	19.1	6,83	15.9	12,00	21.6
primary level (ISCED 1)	23,42	23.8	9,14	21.3	14,28	25.6
secondary level, first stage (ISCED 2)	17,59	17.8	7,36	17.1	10,23	18.4
secondary level, second stage (ISCED 3)	29,71	30.1	14,57	33.9	15,14	27.2
tertiary level (ISCED 5-6)	9,04	9.2	5,05	11.8	3,99	7.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>98,59</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>42,95</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>55,64</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: authors’ calculations based on ILO, Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

Tables 12A and 12B reveal the division of the economically active population by educational attainment for both genders by age group. In the last column we included ratings as elucidated above. The ratings

<sup>23</sup> Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the economically active, *not* the skills demanded in the workplace. We did not find Brazilian statistics concerning the latter.

clarify that except for the oldest 5-years' category, women in 2007 in all age groups had a higher educational level than men. The female advantages was, with over 0.30%points, quite large in the categories between 15 and 39 of age. Whereas in the all six female categories between 25 and 54 of age 14-16% had an education completed higher than ISCED 3 level, such shares were in the male groups 25-64 of age only 8-11%. In the female groups 15-29 of age, jointly 7% had an education completed higher than ISCED 3 level, and 55% an education completed at minimum ISCED 3 level. In 2007 the three cohorts of female 15-29-year-olds also had the highest average years of education and showed the largest differences in this respect with their respective male peer groups: on average 8.4 years of education for the 15-19 of age (men: 7.7); 9.7 years for the 20-24 of age (men: 8.9), and 9.3 years for the 25-29 of age (men: 8.6) (authors' calculation on IBGE 2008).

**Table 12A Employment of men by age group and highest level of education completed, Brazil, 2007**

ISCED	X-0	1	2	3	>3	total	rating	
shares						x mln.		
10-14	41	57	2	0	0	100	1,21	1.61
15-19	8	33	42	17	0	100	5,11	2.68
20-24	8	19	25	45	3	100	7,33	3.16
25-29	13	21	18	40	8	100	7,31	3.09
30-34	17	26	17	31	9	100	6,70	2.89
35-39	19	28	18	27	8	100	6,17	2.77
40-44	22	26	17	26	9	100	6,03	2.74
45-49	27	25	15	23	10	100	4,99	2.64
50-54	31	26	12	20	11	100	4,08	2.54
55-59	40	27	9	14	10	100	2,93	2.27
60-64	50	24	7	10	9	100	1,87	2.04
>64	62	20	4	7	7	100	2,02	1.77
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>55,75</b>	<b>2.70*)</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

**Table 12B Employment of women by age group and highest level of education completed, Brazil, 2007**

ISCED	X-0	1	2	3	>3	total	rating	
shares						x mln.		
10-14	25	69	6	0	0	100	0,60	1.81
15-19	3	20	47	30	0	100	3,50	3.04
20-24	4	12	19	59	6	100	5,75	3.51
25-29	6	16	16	47	15	100	6,03	3.49
30-34	11	22	16	36	15	100	5,60	3.22
35-39	13	24	17	32	14	100	5,15	3.10
40-44	16	24	15	28	16	100	5,01	3.01
45-49	22	25	12	25	16	100	4,17	2.88
50-54	29	25	11	21	15	100	3,07	2.71
55-59	40	25	8	15	12	100	2,02	2.34
60-64	51	23	8	11	8	100	1,07	2.05
>64	62	22	5	6	5	100	1,14	1.70
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>43,09</b>	<b>3.05*)</b>

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

\*) ratings differ from those in text because of rounding

We are now able to produce an estimate of the size of our target group for Brazil, the girls and young women aged 15-29, working in urban areas in commercial services -- that is, wholesale and retail as well as commercial services more narrowly defined, like finance, insurance, and restaurants and hotels (tourism). The total size of the female labour force aged 15-29 in Brazil was in 2007 15,28 million. Of this group, about 85% or 13 million lived and worked in urban areas. Of this 13 million, approximately one in three or 4.3 million girls and young women can be estimated to belong to our target group as they worked in commercial services. We can also estimate that about 3 million of them worked in paid employment, and the others as self-employed or contributing family workers. Some 2 to 2.5 million (depending on the economic conditions) girls and young women will enter into commercial services employment in the next five years.

## 2.8. Wages and working conditions of the target group

### 2.8.1. Wages

Although the law prohibits discrimination based on gender in employment and wages, significant wage disparities between men and women remain. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Labour and Employment (MTE), over 2008 women were often paid less than men in the same functions (US Dept of State 2009). Some decades ago, the Brazilian gender pay gap was extreme, even for Latin American standards. For example, over 1981-1990 female wages in the country's larger metropolitan areas were 55% of men's, implying a gender pay gap<sup>24</sup> of 45%. Neither did gender differences in education levels ("human capital endowments") help explain that gap, as already by then women's average education level was higher than men's, nor did gender differences in labour force composition by sector. Clearly, discrimination was at hand (Winter 1994). More recent studies confirm the major role discrimination is playing in gender pay gaps in Brazil. A World Bank sponsored study found that in 1989 discrimination accounted for 81-89% of earnings differentials between wives and husbands. Moreover, this study concluded to larger gender earnings differentials in the formal sector than in the informal one (Tiefenthaler 1992). Lovell traced for São Paulo that among women wage discrimination had even increased between 1960 and 2000. By 2000 the proportion of wage differentials to be attributed to discrimination was 63% for Afro-Brazilian women (1960: 53%) and 115% for white women (1960: 80%). Surprisingly, white women were the most discriminated against of all groups. She concludes: "Forty years of economic growth in São Paulo has neither erased the relative gap between whites and Afro-Brazilians nor has it favoured women's equal pay" (Lovell 2006, 81). Lovell's study did not confirm other studies' findings that gender pay gaps in Brazil decreased over time, whereas racial gaps did not. Yet, the "unexplained component" in gender pay gaps tended to increase, pointing most likely at the continuous large influence of discriminatory practices in female wage formation (For an overview: Marques Garcia *et al* 2009).

Recent data suggests that nationwide progress in closing the gender pay gap is only modest. Based on *WageIndicator* data, for 2007-08 the average gender pay gap in Brazil was calculated at 38.5%, still in international perspective a very high figure (ITUC 2009b, 2009f). The data shows a lower gap for the youngest category of workers, be it on average 23%. For those aged 25-44, the gap was 31-32%, increasing to 35-37% for the 45-64 of age. Gender pay gaps were about the same in the private and

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<sup>24</sup> We use the international standard formula for the gender pay (or wage) gap:  $((\text{wage men} - \text{wage women}) : \text{wage men}) \times 100$ .

public sectors. The gap was smaller for the minority (9% of the respondents) working part-time, compared with the full-timers. Across broad industry categories, the largest gaps were those in commercial services (average 34%), followed by trade, transport and hospitality, agriculture, manufacturing and building, and public sector, health care and education, all three with gaps over 30%. Finally, the gender pay gap in Brazil proved to be on average slightly (1%point) smaller for trade union members compared with non-members, whereas there was no significant difference between those covered by a collective agreement and those who were not (ITUC 2009b, 18, 23, 26, 29, 31). Recently a female unionist from the Brazilian textile and garment sector testified how tough fighting wage discrimination can be in practice: “The minimum wage (...) is 700 reais in the textile and garment sector in my region. On average, women workers in the sector earn around 800 reais and the men earn around 1000 reais. This pay gap between men and women also applies for the same task requiring the same skills. Our union is fighting against this injustice. When we speak to employers, they are not able to justify it; they use unconvincing arguments such as "men are able to carry heavier loads". We go to court to denounce these wage gaps, but systematically lose: the judges, who are usually men, find small justifications such as slight differences in working hours or the tasks performed. I think it's more of a cultural problem than anything else” (ITUC 2009c).

### 2.8.2. Working conditions

Like in all developing countries, even at rather high stages of development, attention on working conditions understandably focuses on occupational health and safety. The Brazilian legislation gives to the Ministry of Labour the authority to standardize and enforce prevention of accidents and occupational diseases. The Ministry's Secretariat of Safety and Health at Work (SSST) is the standard-setting unit, and each state has Regional Offices of Labour (DRTs) with technical staff for on-site inspection. Prevention yet seems to be underdeveloped. The 1988 Constitution gave the Ministry of Health joint responsibilities in the field of occupational health. This Ministry has very little tradition in preventive action to work hazards, as this was for over five decades the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour. Reported rates of work accidents are comparatively high in mining and notably in construction (Bedrikow *et al* 1997; Facci 2001; various websites).

As Brazilian statistics provide rather good evidence on working hours, we concentrate here on this major issue in working conditions. Table 13 (next page) gives an overview of the average working week (usual hours) by industry, for 2002 and 2007. Notwithstanding a trend towards shortening working hours, the average hours in most industries are still long, especially compared with Western European working hours. Part-time work is rather rare. In the *WageIndicator* survey, a substantial share of over 28,600 Brazilian respondents stated to usually work more hours than agreed in their contract: 29% of the females and 35% of the males. For nearly half of all females (45%, against 38% of males) such overtime was not compensated at all; if compensated, that mostly happened through time-off in lieu for overtime hours (25% of females, 20% of males) or through overtime paid as normal hours plus overtime premium. The latter arrangement regarded only 21% of females, against 31% of males (ITUC 2009f). In 2005, 36% of all employees usually worked over 44 hours (IBGE 2006).

In spite of the long hours experienced, Table 13 shows that between 2002-2007 the working week was shortened overall by 0.9 hours or 2.1%, though more for males (2.7%) than for females (1.3%). Shortening was above average or at least average in industries with long hours, like in agriculture, fishing, construction and transport et cetera, but not in mining. Except fishing (with small numbers of females), the averages for females were and remained lower, but over 2002-2007 gender differences percent-wise were diminishing. The average working weeks of women were notably long in

manufacturing (42.3 hours), wholesale and retail (43.2 hours), and restaurants and hotels (43.7 hours). Remarkably, in finance and insurance; public administration and education, the average working weeks of women were (slightly) extended in the period under scrutiny.

**Table 13 Average working week (hours usually worked, employees) by industry and gender, Brazil, 2002 and 2007**

	total		men		women	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
agriculture	46.0	43.8	46.6	44.2	41.5	40.5
fishing	53.0	47.5	53.1	47.4	45.3	50.0
mining	44.7	44.9	44.8	45.3	43.3	41.5
manufacturing	44.2	43.6	44.9	44.1	42.5	42.3
utilities	42.0	41.4	42.6	42.1	39.1	38.2
construction	44.8	43.7	45.0	43.9	39.4	39.0
transport, storage, communication	47.2	45.9	48.2	47.0	41.3	40.7
wholesale and retail	45.5	44.6	46.6	45.4	43.7	43.2
restaurants, hotels	45.4	44.1	45.7	44.7	45.1	43.7
finance, insurance	39.3	39.3	40.6	40.4	37.9	38.1
real estate, other business	42.4	41.6	44.1	43.3	39.4	38.9
public administration, defense	39.6	38.9	41.4	40.5	36.2	36.3
education	32.5	33.0	35.5	35.4	31.8	32.3
health, social work	39.1	38.8	40.3	39.7	38.8	38.6
other community services	40.3	39.3	41.3	39.8	39.1	38.8
private households	39.0	36.8	45.0	43.5	38.5	36.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>41.3</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>38.3</b>

Source: ILO Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2007)

### 3. Basic information for WageIndicator Questionnaire

#### 3.1. Introduction

Preparations for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, grouped in this Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses. This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain information on Brazil's educational categories and ISCED levels (3.2), regions (3.3), ethnic groups (3.4.1) and languages (3.4.2).

#### 3.2. List of educational categories and ISCED levels

Below, a full list of the educational categories used in Brazil, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

**Table 14** List of educational categories in Brazil (by 1/1/2009)

pt_BR	Master label	Translation	ISCED
76240	BRA Pre escola	Pré escola	0
76241	BRA Ensino Fundamental ou 1 grau ( de 1 a 8 anos de estudo)	Ensino Fundamental ou 1º grau ( de 1 a 8 anos de estudo)	10
76245	BRA Ensino Medio ou 2 grau ( de 9 a 11 anos de estudo)	Ensino Médio ou 2º grau ( de 9 a 11 anos de estudo)	25
76250	BRA Ensino Superior ou 3 grau ( 12 anos e mais de estudo)	Ensino Superior ou 3 grau ( 12 anos e mais de estudo)	50
76251	BRA Mestrado strito sensu	Mestrado strito sensu	60
76252	BRA Doutorado strito sensu	Doutorado strito sensu	60

#### 3.3. List of regions

Below, a full list of the regions in Brazil, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

**Table 15 List of regions in Brazil (by 1/1/2009)**

pt_BR	pt_BR	Source label	Source label	Translation	Translation
763100000	763100131	BRA Acre	BRA Rio Branco	Acre	Rio Branco
763100000	763109632	BRA Acre	BRA Outra cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Acre	Outra cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763100000	763109704	BRA Acre	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Acre	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763100000	763109805	BRA Acre	BRA Zona rural	Acre	Zona rural
762100000	762100131	BRA Alagoas	BRA Maceio	Alagoas	Maceió
762100000	762109402	BRA Alagoas	BRA Os subúrbios de Maceio	Alagoas	Os subúrbios de Maceió
762100000	762109531	BRA Alagoas	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Alagoas	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762100000	762109632	BRA Alagoas	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Alagoas	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762100000	762109704	BRA Alagoas	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Alagoas	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762100000	762109805	BRA Alagoas	BRA Zona rural	Alagoas	Zona rural
763200000	763200131	BRA Amapa	BRA Macapa	Amapá	Macapá
763200000	763209531	BRA Amapa	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Amapá	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
763200000	763209632	BRA Amapa	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Amapá	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763200000	763209704	BRA Amapa	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Amapá	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763200000	763209805	BRA Amapa	BRA Zona rural	Amapá	Zona rural
763300000	763300101	BRA Amazonas	BRA Manaus	Amazonas	Manaus
763300000	763300202	BRA Amazonas	BRA Os subúrbios de Manaus	Amazonas	Os subúrbios de Manaus
763300000	763300332	BRA Amazonas	BRA Coari	Amazonas	Coari
763300000	763300432	BRA Amazonas	BRA Itacoatiara	Amazonas	Itacoatiara
763300000	763300532	BRA Amazonas	BRA Manacapuru	Amazonas	Manacapuru
763300000	763300631	BRA Amazonas	BRA Parintins	Amazonas	Parintins
763300000	763300732	BRA Amazonas	BRA Sao Gabriel da Cachoeira	Amazonas	São Gabriel da Cachoeira
763300000	763300832	BRA Amazonas	BRA Tefe	Amazonas	Tefé
763300000	763309632	BRA Amazonas	BRA Outra cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Amazonas	Outra cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763300000	763309704	BRA Amazonas	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Amazonas	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763300000	763309805	BRA Amazonas	BRA Zona rural	Amazonas	Zona rural
762200000	762200107	BRA Bahia	BRA Salvador	Bahia	Salvador
762200000	762200202	BRA Bahia	BRA Os subúrbios de Salvador	Bahia	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Salvador



762200000	762200331	BRA Bahia	BRA Feira de Santana	Bahia	Feira de Santana
762200000	762200431	BRA Bahia	BRA Vitoria da Conquista	Bahia	Vitória da Conquista
762200000	762209531	BRA Bahia	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Bahia	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762200000	762209632	BRA Bahia	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Bahia	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762200000	762209704	BRA Bahia	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Bahia	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762200000	762209805	BRA Bahia	BRA Zona rural	Bahia	Zona rural
762300000	762300107	BRA Ceara	BRA Fortaleza	Ceará	Fortaleza
762300000	762300202	BRA Ceara	BRA Os subúrbios de Fortaleza	Ceará	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Fortaleza
762300000	762300331	BRA Ceara	BRA Caucaia	Ceará	Caucaia
762300000	762309531	BRA Ceara	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Ceará	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762300000	762309632	BRA Ceara	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Ceará	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762300000	762309704	BRA Ceara	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Ceará	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762300000	762309805	BRA Ceara	BRA Zona rural	Ceará	Zona rural
761100000	761100107	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Brasilia	Distrito Federal	Brasília
761100000	761109402	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Os subúrbios de Brasilia	Distrito Federal	Os subúrbios de Brasília
761100000	761109531	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Distrito Federal	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
761100000	761109632	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Distrito Federal	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
761100000	761109704	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Distrito Federal	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
761100000	761109805	BRA Distrito Federal	BRA Zona rural	Distrito Federal	Zona rural
764100000	764100131	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Cariacica	Espírito Santo	Cariacica
764100000	764100231	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Serra	Espírito Santo	Serra
764100000	764100331	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Vila Velha	Espírito Santo	Vila Velha
764100000	764100431	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Vitoria	Espírito Santo	Vitória
764100000	764109531	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Espírito Santo	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
764100000	764109632	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Espírito Santo	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
764100000	764109704	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Espírito Santo	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
764100000	764109805	BRA Espírito Santo	BRA Zona rural	Espírito Santo	Zona rural
761200000	761200101	BRA Goias	BRA Goiania	Goías	Goiânia
761200000	761200202	BRA Goias	BRA Os subúrbios de Goiania	Goías	Os subúrbios de Goiânia

761200000	761200331	BRA Goiás	BRA Anapolis	Goiás	Anápolis
761200000	761200431	BRA Goiás	BRA Aparecida de Goiania	Goiás	Aparecida de Goiânia
761200000	761209531	BRA Goiás	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Goiás	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
761200000	761209632	BRA Goiás	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Goiás	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
761200000	761209704	BRA Goiás	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Goiás	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
761200000	761209805	BRA Goiás	BRA Zona rural	Goiás	Zona rural
762400000	762400131	BRA Maranhao	BRA Sao Luis	Maranhão	São Luís
762400000	762409531	BRA Maranhao	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Maranhão	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762400000	762409632	BRA Maranhao	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Maranhão	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762400000	762409704	BRA Maranhao	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Maranhão	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762400000	762409805	BRA Maranhao	BRA Zona rural	Maranhão	Zona rural
761300000	761300131	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Cuiaba	Mato Grosso	Cuiabá
761300000	761300231	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Varzea Grande	Mato Grosso	Várzea Grande
761300000	761309531	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Mato Grosso	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
761300000	761309632	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Mato Grosso	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
761300000	761309704	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Mato Grosso	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
761300000	761309805	BRA Mato Grosso	BRA Zona rural	Mato Grosso	Zona rural
761400000	761400131	BRA Mato Grosso do Sul	BRA Campo Grande	Mato Grosso do Sul	Campo Grande
761400000	761409531	BRA Mato Grosso do Sul	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Mato Grosso do Sul	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
761400000	761409632	BRA Mato Grosso do Sul	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Mato Grosso do Sul	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
761400000	761409704	BRA Mato Grosso do Sul	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Mato Grosso do Sul	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
761400000	761409805	BRA Mato Grosso do Sul	BRA Zona rural	Mato Grosso do Sul	Zona rural
764200000	764200107	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Belo Horizonte	Minas Gerais	Belo Horizonte
764200000	764200202	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Os subúrbios de Belo Horizonte	Minas Gerais	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Belo Horizonte

764200000	764200331	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Betim	Minas Gerais	Betim
764200000	764200431	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Contagem	Minas Gerais	Contagem
764200000	764200531	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Governador Valadares	Minas Gerais	Governador Valadares
764200000	764200631	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Juiz de Fora	Minas Gerais	Juiz de Fora
764200000	764200731	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Montes Claros	Minas Gerais	Montes Claros
764200000	764200831	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Ribeirao das Neves	Minas Gerais	Ribeirão das Neves
764200000	764200931	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Uberaba	Minas Gerais	Uberaba
764200000	764201031	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Uberlandia	Minas Gerais	Uberlândia
764200000	764209531	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Minas Gerais	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
764200000	764209632	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Minas Gerais	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
764200000	764209704	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Minas Gerais	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
764200000	764209805	BRA Minas Gerais	BRA Zona rural	Minas Gerais	Zona rural
763400000	763400131	BRA Para	BRA Ananindeua	Pará	Ananindeua
763400000	763400101	BRA Para	BRA Belem	Pará	Belém
763400000	763400202	BRA Para	BRA Os subúrbios de Belem	Pará	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Belém
763400000	763400331	BRA Para	BRA Santarem	Pará	Santarém
763400000	763409531	BRA Para	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Pará	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
763400000	763409632	BRA Para	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Pará	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763400000	763409704	BRA Para	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Pará	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763400000	763409805	BRA Para	BRA Zona rural	Pará	Zona rural
762500000	762500131	BRA Paraíba	BRA Campina Grande	Paraíba	Campina Grande
762500000	762500231	BRA Paraíba	BRA Joao Pessoa	Paraíba	João Pessoa
762500000	762509531	BRA Paraíba	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Paraíba	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762500000	762509632	BRA Paraíba	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Paraíba	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762500000	762509704	BRA Paraíba	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Paraíba	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762500000	762509805	BRA Paraíba	BRA Zona rural	Paraíba	Zona rural
765100000	765100101	BRA Parana	BRA Curitiba	Paraná	Curitiba
765100000	765100202	BRA Parana	BRA Os subúrbios de Curitiba	Paraná	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Curitiba
765100000	765100331	BRA Parana	BRA Cascavel	Paraná	Cascavel

765100000	765100431	BRA Parana	BRA Foz do Iguacu	Paraná	Foz do Iguaçu
765100000	765100531	BRA Parana	BRA Londrina	Paraná	Londrina
765100000	765100631	BRA Parana	BRA Maringa	Paraná	Maringá
765100000	765100731	BRA Parana	BRA Ponta Grossa	Paraná	Ponta Grossa
765100000	765100831	BRA Parana	BRA Sao Jose dos Pinhais	Paraná	São José dos Pinhais
765100000	765109531	BRA Parana	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Paraná	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
765100000	765109632	BRA Parana	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Paraná	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
765100000	765109704	BRA Parana	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Paraná	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
765100000	765109805	BRA Parana	BRA Zona rural	Paraná	Zona rural
762600000	762600101	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Recife	Pernambuco	Recife
762600000	762600131	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Caruaru	Pernambuco	Caruaru
762600000	762600231	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Jaboatao dos Guararapes	Pernambuco	Jaboatão dos Guararapes
762600000	762600331	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Olinda	Pernambuco	Olinda
762600000	762600431	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Paulista	Pernambuco	Paulista
762600000	762600531	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Petrolina	Pernambuco	Petrolina
762600000	762609531	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Pernambuco	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762600000	762609632	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Pernambuco	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762600000	762609704	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Pernambuco	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762600000	762609805	BRA Pernambuco	BRA Zona rural	Pernambuco	Zona rural
762700000	762700131	BRA Piauí	BRA Teresina	Piauí	Teresina
762700000	762709531	BRA Piauí	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Piauí	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762700000	762709632	BRA Piauí	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Piauí	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762700000	762709704	BRA Piauí	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Piauí	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762700000	762709805	BRA Piauí	BRA Zona rural	Piauí	Zona rural
764300000	764300107	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Rio de Janeiro	Rio de Janeiro	Rio de Janeiro
764300000	764300202	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Os suburbios de Rio de Janeiro	Rio de Janeiro	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro
764300000	764300331	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Belford Roxo	Rio de Janeiro	Belford Roxo
764300000	764300431	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Campos dos Goitacazes	Rio de Janeiro	Campos dos Goitacazes
764300000	764300531	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Duque de Caxias	Rio de Janeiro	Duque de Caxias

764300000	764300631	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Niteroi	Rio de Janeiro	Niterói
764300000	764300731	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Nova Iguaçu	Rio de Janeiro	Nova Iguaçu
764300000	764300831	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Petropolis	Rio de Janeiro	Petrópolis
764300000	764300931	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Sao Goncalo	Rio de Janeiro	São Gonçalo
764300000	764301031	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Sao Joao de Meriti	Rio de Janeiro	São João de Meriti
764300000	764301131	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Volta Redonda	Rio de Janeiro	Volta Redonda
764300000	764309531	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Rio de Janeiro	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
764300000	764309632	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Rio de Janeiro	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
764300000	764309704	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Rio de Janeiro	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
764300000	764309805	BRA Rio de Janeiro	BRA Zona rural	Rio de Janeiro	Zona rural
762800000	762800131	BRA Rio Grande do Norte	BRA Natal	Rio Grande do Norte	Natal
762800000	762809531	BRA Rio Grande do Norte	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Rio Grande do Norte	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
762800000	762809632	BRA Rio Grande do Norte	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Rio Grande do Norte	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762800000	762809704	BRA Rio Grande do Norte	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Rio Grande do Norte	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762800000	762809805	BRA Rio Grande do Norte	BRA Zona rural	Rio Grande do Norte	Zona rural
765200000	765200101	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Porto Alegre	Rio Grande do Sul	Porto Alegre
765200000	765200202	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Os subúrbios de Porto Alegre	Rio Grande do Sul	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de Porto Alegre
765200000	765200331	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Canoas	Rio Grande do Sul	Canoas
765200000	765200431	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Caxias do Sul	Rio Grande do Sul	Caxias do Sul
765200000	765200531	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Gravataí	Rio Grande do Sul	Gravataí
765200000	765200631	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Novo Hamburgo	Rio Grande do Sul	Novo Hamburgo
765200000	765200731	BRA Rio Grande do	BRA Pelotas	Rio Grande do Sul	Pelotas

		Sul			
765200000	765200831	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Santa Maria	Rio Grande do Sul	Santa Maria
765200000	765200931	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Viamao	Rio Grande do Sul	Viamão
765200000	765209531	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Rio Grande do Sul	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
765200000	765209632	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Rio Grande do Sul	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
765200000	765209704	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Rio Grande do Sul	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
765200000	765209805	BRA Rio Grande do Sul	BRA Zona rural	Rio Grande do Sul	Zona rural
763500000	763500131	BRA Rondonia	BRA Porto Velho	Rondônia	Porto Velho
763500000	763509531	BRA Rondonia	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Rondônia	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
763500000	763509632	BRA Rondonia	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Rondônia	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763500000	763509704	BRA Rondonia	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Rondônia	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763500000	763509805	BRA Rondonia	BRA Zona rural	Rondônia	Zona rural
763600000	763600131	BRA Roraima	BRA Boa Vista	Roraima	Boa Vista
763600000	763609531	BRA Roraima	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Roraima	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
763600000	763609632	BRA Roraima	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Roraima	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763600000	763609704	BRA Roraima	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Roraima	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763600000	763609805	BRA Roraima	BRA Zona rural	Roraima	Zona rural
765300000	765300131	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Blumenau	Santa Catarina	Blumenau
765300000	765300231	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Florianopolis	Santa Catarina	Florianópolis
765300000	765300331	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Joinville	Santa Catarina	Joinville
765300000	765309531	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Santa Catarina	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
765300000	765309632	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Santa Catarina	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
765300000	765309704	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Santa Catarina	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
765300000	765309805	BRA Santa Catarina	BRA Zona rural	Santa Catarina	Zona rural
764400000	764400107	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Sao Paulo	São Paulo	São Paulo

764400000	764400202	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Os subúrbios de Sao Paulo	São Paulo	Outras cidades da Região Metropolitana de São Paulo
764400000	764400331	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Barueri	São Paulo	Barueri
764400000	764400431	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Bauru	São Paulo	Bauru
764400000	764400501	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Campinas	São Paulo	Campinas
764400000	764400631	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Carapicuíba	São Paulo	Carapicuíba
764400000	764400731	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Diadema	São Paulo	Diadema
764400000	764400831	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Franca	São Paulo	Franca
764400000	764400931	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Guarujá	São Paulo	Guarujá
764400000	764401001	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Guarulhos	São Paulo	Guarulhos
764400000	764401131	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Itaquaquecetuba	São Paulo	Itaquaquecetuba
764400000	764401231	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Jundiaí	São Paulo	Jundiaí
764400000	764401331	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Limeira	São Paulo	Limeira
764400000	764401431	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Mauá	São Paulo	Mauá
764400000	764401531	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Mogi das Cruzes	São Paulo	Mogi das Cruzes
764400000	764401631	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Osasco	São Paulo	Osasco
764400000	764401731	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Piracicaba	São Paulo	Piracicaba
764400000	764401831	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Ribeirão Preto	São Paulo	Ribeirão Preto
764400000	764401931	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Santo André	São Paulo	Santo André
764400000	764402031	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Santos	São Paulo	Santos
764400000	764402131	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA São Bernardo do Campo	São Paulo	São Bernardo do Campo
764400000	764402231	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA São José do Rio Preto	São Paulo	São José do Rio Preto
764400000	764402331	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA São José dos Campos	São Paulo	São José dos Campos
764400000	764402431	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA São Vicente	São Paulo	São Vicente
764400000	764402531	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Sorocaba	São Paulo	Sorocaba
764400000	764402631	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Suzano	São Paulo	Suzano
764400000	764402731	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Taubaté	São Paulo	Taubaté
764400000	764409531	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	São Paulo	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
764400000	764409632	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	São Paulo	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
764400000	764409704	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	São Paulo	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
764400000	764409805	BRA Sao Paulo	BRA Zona rural	São Paulo	Zona rural
762900000	762900131	BRA Sergipe	BRA Aracaju	Sergipe	Aracaju
762900000	762909531	BRA Sergipe	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Sergipe	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais

762900000	762909632	BRA Sergipe	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Sergipe	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
762900000	762909704	BRA Sergipe	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Sergipe	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
762900000	762909805	BRA Sergipe	BRA Zona rural	Sergipe	Zona rural
763700000	763700131	BRA Tocantins	BRA Palmas	Tocantins	Palmas
763700000	763709531	BRA Tocantins	BRA Outra cidade 100,000 e mais	Tocantins	Outra cidade 100,000 e mais
763700000	763709632	BRA Tocantins	BRA Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000	Tocantins	Uma pequena cidade 10,000 - 100,000
763700000	763709704	BRA Tocantins	BRA Uma aldeia menos de 10,000	Tocantins	Uma aldeia menos de 10,000
763700000	763709805	BRA Tocantins	BRA Zona rural	Tocantins	Zona rural



### 3.4. List of ethnic groups and languages

#### 3.4.1. Ethnic groups

Below, a list of the ethnic groups distinguished in Brazil and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

**Table 16** List of ethnic groups in Brazil (by 1/1/2009)

pt_BR	Master label	Translation
76001	BRA White	Branco
76002	BRA Black	Negro / Afrodescendente
76003	BRA Indigenous	Indígena
76004	BRA Mixed-raced	Mestiço / Pardo
76005	BRA Asian	Asiático / Asiático brasileiro
76999	BRA Other race	Outro

#### 3.4.2. Languages

Below, a list of the languages mostly used in Brazil and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

**Table 17** List of languages in Brazil (by 1/1/2009)

pt_BR	Master label	Translation
76001	BRA Portuguese	Português
76002	BRA Spanish	Espanhol
76003	BRA German	Alemão
76004	BRA Italian	Italiano
76005	BRA Japanese	Japonês
76006	BRA English	Inglês
76007	BRA Indian language	Indian idioma
76998	BRA Local dialect	Dialeto
76999	BRA Other language	Outros

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## 5. What is WageIndicator?

WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupations, taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, region and alike.

Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Minimum Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites have content about wages, working conditions, labor standards and related topics. Each country has at least one website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites for target groups, for example women or youth. The project website is [www.wageindicator.org](http://www.wageindicator.org).

Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors. The websites are consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual performance talks or wage negotiations. They are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing occupational choices, or by employers in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating wages with their employees.

In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, benefits, working

conditions, employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted at all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-specific issues, where needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For occupations with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The Salary Checks are updated annually.

The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on women's wages. In 2001 the first WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, and in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among which the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites are being launched in more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More information about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at [www.wageindicator.org](http://www.wageindicator.org).

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