In the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), donors and developing country governments commit to deepening their engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs). Better aid requires a broader understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda and a place for CSOs as development actors in their own right and as aid donors, recipients and partners.

This book is a resource for implementing the recommendations on civil society and aid effectiveness emerging from the Accra High Level Forum and its preparatory process. These recommendations address a broad community, including developing country governments, donors, and CSOs from developing and developed countries. The report summarises the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, which was set up in the run up to Accra. It draws on analytical work, multi-stakeholder consultations and case study investigations carried out in 2007 and 2008.

This book is specifically designed as a reference tool for readers wishing to explore the practicalities of specific recommendations and offers concrete examples of good practice in different parts of the world.
The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD.

OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.
Foreword

A distinguishing feature of the process leading up to the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra from 2-4 September 2008 (HLF-3), and of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) emerging from that process, was the degree of importance accorded to civil society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) were actively involved, and the AAA contains numerous references to civil society and citizen participation.

CSOs themselves were well organised, and fed their views into the process at regular intervals, on issues such as democratic ownership and alignment, gender equality, transparency, mutual accountability, predictability, and conditionality. In Accra, CSOs organised a parallel forum on aid effectiveness just before HLF-3, and 80 CSO representatives in the HLF participated in all of the Roundtables, bringing solid contributions to the discussions.

While CSOs thus spoke for themselves in expressing their views, a second, no less important, track of work was established by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) with the aim of ensuring that CSOs would be brought “into the tent” on aid effectiveness. This second track was led by the WP-EFF’s Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS). Unique in its composition, the AG-CS was a multi-stakeholder group of 12 members, balanced to ensure equal representation of four stakeholder groups: donors, developing country governments and CSOs from the North and South.

The AG-CS produced a substantial body of work, including a Concept Paper and an Issues Paper, numerous reports on national regional and international consultations, and a Case Book, which fed into the production of the two final reports included in the present volume: the AG-CS’ Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations and its companion document, the Exploration of Experience and Good Practice.

The Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations is the AG-CS’ final report to the WP-EFF and to the community at large. It was endorsed by the WP-EFF in July 2008, and served as a resource in drafting the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Copies were circulated to all participants at the Accra High Level Forum. Because the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations is a collective document representing the views of its members, it is reproduced here with only minor edits as a historical record of the consensus achieved by the AG-CS.

The Exploration of Experience and Good Practice is intended to accompany the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations by illustrating the AG-CS’ findings and recommendations with examples of experience and good practice from different parts of the world. The Good Practice paper is perforce a work in progress, because case study experience is continually growing, and the number of cases that we have been able to cover here is obviously very limited in both depth and breadth. We believe that it provides a solid point of departure, nonetheless, and hope it will help readers to appreciate what is meant operationally by the recommendations included in both the AG-CS Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations and the AAA.

Stephen Wallace
Outgoing chair of the AG-CS
Vice-President
Canadian International Development Agency

Jan Cedergren
Outgoing chair
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
Acknowledgements

The documents constituting this volume drew on national, regional, and international consultations sponsored by the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS) in the 18 months preceding the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in September 2008. Over 5 000 individuals and 3 600 organisations participated in these various consultations. Results came together in the International Forum on Civil Society and Effectiveness in Gatineau, Canada, in February 2008, and were incorporated in the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations.

The Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations is a consensus document and was jointly produced by members of the AG-CS, with Réal Lavergne, of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), as editor. The Exploration of Experience and Good Practice presented in Part II of this volume is not a consensus document in the same sense, but similarly draws on the inputs of participants in the AG-CS process.

The AG-CS would like to thank all those who contributed in one way or another to the consultations and case study work leading to the production of these documents, including Brian Tomlinson of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and CCIC Consultant John Saxby, who pulled together the results of the consultations, and all of those who submitted case study material. Special thanks are due to the authors of the Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Réal Lavergne and CIDA Consultant Jacqueline Wood, who collected and organised the material together in a coherent and useful way.

Acknowledgement is due as well to the numerous donors and civil society organisations (CSOs) who provided resources in support of the AG-CS process, beginning with CIDA, which was the largest contributor, both financially and in kind through the provision of staff time, including the services of Réal Lavergne and Jacqueline Wood. Without naming all of the other donors who supported the process, we would like to offer special thanks to a number of them who contributed over USD 100 000 each: Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Total financial resources for the AG-CS process came to about USD 3 million. Financial contributions from CSOs were more modest, but CSOs contributed in their own ways, as participants in the consultations and as authors of the case studies made available tous.

We would also like to recognise the efforts of AG-CS members and friends of the AG-CS, including some representatives of developing countries, who contributed significant amounts of time, and no small measure of leadership, to the success of this endeavour. Special recognition is due to CIDA Vice-President Stephen Wallace, for his able and dedicated chairmanship of the AG-CS.

Outside of the AG-CS, we would like to thank the following: Jan Cedergren, for his support as chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness; members of the WP-EFF, for their openness to new ideas; and members of the DAC Secretariat, including Göran Eklöf, for their invaluable role in supporting the process.
The members of the AG-CS at the time the *Synthesis* was finalised were the following:

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<td>Alternates</td>
<td>Rwanda, Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), and Women in Development Europe (WIDE).</td>
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<td>Accra Agenda for Action</td>
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Executive Summary

Part I: Synthesis of findings and recommendations

Part I of this volume reproduces the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS). These findings and recommendations are the result of analytical work, multi-stakeholder consultations and case study work. They are aimed at a broad community of stakeholders, including developing country governments, donors and civil society organisations (CSOs) from developing and developed countries.

The Synthesis proposes 21 detailed recommendations or sets of recommendations that are separately identifiable in the main text and paraphrased as bullet points below. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) echoes all of these recommendations in a general way in various places, and from this perspective, the AAA and the AG-CS Synthesis can be seen as complementary documents, with the AAA pointing in a general direction, and the Synthesis providing more detailed recommendations intended for implementation post-Accra. We provide a rough crosswalk between the AG-CS Recommendations and references in the AAA in what follows. Annex A provides a marked-up version of the AAA highlighting the various references to civil society or citizen participation.

The AG-CS was created in January 2007 in reaction to growing interest among CSOs to engage with donors and developing country governments on issues of aid effectiveness. Created to advise the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, the AG-CS brought together donors, developing country governments, and CSOs from both developed and developing countries. The aim was to seize the opportunity of the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in September 2008 (HLF-3) to engage civil society in the international aid effectiveness debate and consensus-building process.

The role of the AG-CS was not to substitute its voice for that of CSOs, who can speak for themselves, but rather to secure a seat for them at the table. An additional objective was to develop a broader understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda that includes a place for CSOs as development actors in their own right and as aid donors, channels and recipients.

Recognition and voice

The Paris Declaration of March 2005 rightly flagged CSOs as potential participants in the identification of priorities and the monitoring of development programmes. However, it did not recognise CSOs as development actors in their own right, with their own priorities, programmes and partnership arrangements. It thus failed to take into account the rich diversity of players in a democratic society and failed to recognise the full range of roles played by CSOs as development actors and change agents.
CSOs are quantitatively important, both in general and in terms of their importance as aid donors, channels and recipients. They are often particularly effective at reaching the poor and socially excluded, providing humanitarian assistance, mobilising community efforts, speaking up for human rights and gender equality, and helping to empower particular constituencies. CSOs are also often major service providers, drawing strength from their diversity and capacity for innovation. In these various capacities, CSOs complement government and the private sector.

CSOs help to enrich policy discussions by bringing different, sometimes challenging, perspectives to policy dialogue and public accountability. Involving CSOs in policy dialogue thus helps to ensure the inclusion of different stakeholder perspectives in national development strategies and programmes.

CSOs from developed countries are also a complementary source of aid funds and resources. The OECD-DAC Secretariat estimates that CSOs provided USD 20-25 billion of their own resources to developing country partners in 2006, compared to official flows of about USD 104 billion. They are also channels and recipients of aid. Flows to and through CSOs are estimated to account for approximately 10% of official aid flows. It follows that aid effectiveness is not only the business of donors and governments. It is also the business of CSOs.

The AG-CS found that CSOs have much to contribute, and that they are prepared to engage as active and constructive partners with governments and donors. The AG-CS Synthesis puts forward three sets of recommendations relating to the recognition and voice of civil society:

- While the Paris Declaration already recognised the role of CSOs as democratic actors, the Synthesis recommended that the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) go further than this by recognising the importance and diversity of CSOs as development and humanitarian actors in their own right, and the various ways that CSOs contribute to development (Synthesis Recommendation 1; this recommendation was taken up in the AAA, as reflected in paragraphs 8, 9, 16, 13a and 20).

- The Synthesis recommends that regular and systematic space be provided for the voice of civil society to be heard at all stages of the development process, from policy and programme development through to programme implementation and accountability for results (Recommendation 2; AAA paragraphs 8 and 13a).

- At the same time, measures should be taken by all parties to maximise the value of CSO contributions to such dialogue. Such measures should include efforts by civil society to organise itself in the most efficient and representative way possible, and the provision of support for civil society and government to strengthen their capacity to engage in constructive policy dialogue (Recommendation 3; AAA paragraph 13b).

**Civil society and the Paris Declaration**

The AG-CS’ second set of recommendations pertains to the interpretation of the Paris Declaration aid effectiveness principles themselves. Although of obvious importance, these principles were not explained in any degree of detail in the Paris Declaration. The emphasis in the Declaration was on the application of these principles, and more
The AG-CS Synthesis recommends the following:

- **At a general level**, the Synthesis recommends a return to basics in interpreting and applying the principles so that their relevance to CSOs becomes more evident (Recommendation 4; AAA paragraphs 9, 16 and 20a).

- **In particular**, the interpretation of ownership should be broadened to reflect the depth and breadth of ownership that is required for sustainability – not just ownership by central government agencies, but also by parliaments, local governments, communities, and CSOs. Ownership so interpreted applies to all aspects of programme development and implementation. When applied to government programmes, it should be understood as democratic ownership of those programmes (Recommendations 5 and 6a; AAA paragraphs 8, 13, 20a and 25).

- **Similarly**, the notion of alignment should be broadly interpreted to include alignment by all external development actors to the priorities and strategies of local counterparts, and the use of all country-based institutional structures, including those of developing country CSOs (Recommendation 7; AAA paragraphs 9, 16 and 20a).

- **With regard to the principles of co-ordination and harmonisation**, CSOs are concerned that an excessively rigid application of these principles to CSOs could stifle initiative, hamper innovation, or divert energies from other pursuits. This suggests a balanced application of these principles that would certainly involve the promotion of more collaborative, comprehensive, and inclusive approaches but would also respect the need for diversity, division of labour and innovation (Recommendation 8; AAA paragraphs 9, 16 and 20a).

- **A balanced approach to co-ordination and harmonisation of this sort should include** the following elements (Recommendation 9a; AAA paragraphs 9, 13a, 16 and 20a):
  - recognition by all actors of the complementary roles played by governments and CSOs and the implications of this for the co-ordination and harmonisation of efforts;
  - greater efforts by governments and donors to support the participation of CSOs in government-led programmes (as independent actors or contractually, where appropriate), and greater efforts by CSOs to engage in these programmes;
  - greater efforts by CSOs to co-ordinate and harmonise their activities with those of other CSOs and of governments;
  - recognition that the strengthening of civil society is itself an objective worth pursuing in a more comprehensive way; and
  - recognition that responsive funding formulas continue to have an important role to play for tapping into the energy and innovative ideas of citizens and CSOs as agents of change and development.

The principles of managing for results and accountability are well accepted by CSOs as standards against which their own performance should be assessed. CSOs also draw upon these principles in their role as advocates for donors and governments to demonstrate greater accountability for development results. CSOs involved in AG-CS consultations expressed a desire to ensure that these principles should be used for measuring meaningful change and promoting accountability to intended beneficiaries. This requires
a shift away from current practices that emphasise quantitative indicators and upward accountability to donors.

- The Synthesis recommends that stakeholders adopt a more qualitative and participatory approach to results, making more room for indicators of social change – such as improvements in gender equality or the improvement of human rights and democratic practice – and for mechanisms of accountability to the intended beneficiaries of aid and development programmes (Recommendation 10a; AAA paragraphs 9, 13a, 16 and 20a).
- Development partners are encouraged to adopt the highest standards of openness, transparency and access to information, including sex-disaggregated data (Recommendation 11a; AAA paragraphs 20a and 24).

**CSO effectiveness**

The third section of this report enquires into the sorts of measures that the multi-stakeholder community needs to take to ensure that CSOs are as effective as possible at what they do, both as development actors and as aid actors more specifically. Although CSOs are responsible and accountable to their constituencies for their own behaviour, their effectiveness also depends on the actions and policies of governments, official donors, and other CSOs. The stakeholder community should promote CSO effectiveness as a joint responsibility.

- Stakeholders should take stock of the enabling environment for civil society in different countries and work to create an enhanced operating environment for CSOs. Elements worthy of attention include: the regulatory and legislative environment; the openness of government and donors to engaging with CSOs; the transparency and accountability with which information is shared; and the CSO community’s own collective mechanisms for self-monitoring, accountability and collaboration (Recommendation 12; AAA paragraph 20).
- CSO effectiveness is also affected by the availability of funding and by the conditions and modalities that accompany such funding. This holds, whether we are talking about official donor funding or funding by Northern and International CSOs in support of CSOs in developing countries. In their capacities as donors or recipients, all development actors – donors, governments and CSOs – should collaborate to implement and enrich the Paris Principles of aid effectiveness, along the lines proposed in this Synthesis report (Recommendation 13; AAA paragraph 20).
- The current approach to funding of CSO activities is heavily skewed towards project funding, which is most often channelled through Northern-based CSOs and North-South partnerships. While collaboration with Northern CSO partners will continue to be valued, there is a need to carefully explore new approaches involving mechanisms such as core or programme-based support for CSOs based in developing countries, and more comprehensive efforts to support and strengthen civil society as a whole in the South (Recommendations 14 to 16; AAA paragraph 20).
- CSO effectiveness depends, finally, upon the quality of partnerships among CSOs in networks, alliances, umbrella organisations, or ad hoc partnerships in which CSOs collaborate to better achieve their objectives. CSOs should be supported in their efforts to better co-ordinate their efforts, and Northern and Southern CSOs should work together to define their respective areas of comparative advantage to encourage
Southern CSOs to thrive and strengthen their place in society over time (Recommendation 17a; AAA paragraph 20).

**Forward agenda for multi-stakeholder dialogue**

Much has been achieved, but much remains to be done to promote concrete actions on civil society and aid effectiveness. The work conducted in the run-up to HLF-3 was only the start of a longer-term process of engaging with CSOs on aid effectiveness.

In this regard, the Synthesis welcomes the June 2008 launch of an ambitious CSO-led global initiative of dialogue and consensus building to establish principles and guidelines for CSO development effectiveness. This process will extend and deepen the work initiated by the AG-CS and will include the involvement of all stakeholder groups.

With this in mind, the Synthesis recommends the following:

- Sustained multi-stakeholder processes should be undertaken at the country level wherever possible with the aim of taking collective action in priority areas as appropriate in different country contexts (Recommendation 18; AAA paragraph 20).
- Stakeholders should pilot good practice in relation to the recommendations put forward in this report, and track progress on these practices to inform ongoing learning and dialogue (Recommendation 19; AAA paragraph 20).
- Ministers in Accra should endorse and support the CSO-led process mentioned above in the AAA and that donors and developing country governments collaborate with CSOs on this initiative (Recommendation 20; AAA paragraph 20).

Finally, CSOs and CSO effectiveness should be an integral part of any future processes and agreements on development and aid, post-Accra (Recommendation 21; AAA paragraph 20).

**Part II: Exploration of experience and good practice**

The Exploration of Experience and Good Practice paper (Good Practice Paper for short), presented in Part II of this volume, is intended as a reference document to support the forward agenda on civil society and aid effectiveness post-Accra. Its purpose is threefold:

- to illustrate the AG-CS findings and recommendations with examples of good practice taken from real world experience;
- to provide a sense of how these can play out in practice; and
- to supplement these with a reference to existing guidelines, where possible.

The paper is based on case studies submitted to the AG-CS for consideration, supplemented by case material drawn from the literature and the Internet. The paper lists 76 such cases in the bibliography. Most of these are available on the AG-CS’ extranet site. Out of those 76 cases, 26 are developed in more detail in a complementary document, the AG-CS’ Case Book.

This paper follows the outline of the AG-CS Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations. For ease of reference, the AG-CS recommendations are replicated or slightly paraphrased in a shaded box at the beginning of each section. Cases featured in one section are often relevant in other sections, but we have slotted each case where it speaks most directly to one of the AG-CS recommendations.
What to look for

The following summarises the contents of Part II by category of finding and recommendation.

Roles

What are some examples of the diverse and distinct roles played by civil society?

The paper provides examples of CSOs playing a number of different roles including:

- the creation of space for civic engagement through democratisation, social mobilisation, advocacy, public education, and research;
- service delivery, self-help, and innovation;
- humanitarian assistance; and
- the roles that they play as aid donors, channels, and recipients.

Illustrations on recognition and voice

What does it mean for donors and governments to officially “recognise” CSOs as development actors in their own right? (Recommendation 1)

The paper shows how donors or governments have recognised CSOs in policy statements or in their day-to-day practice of collaboration with CSOs. Examples of policy-level recognition of the importance and distinct nature of civil society can be found in policy statements at all levels, from local to international.

What are some practical examples of regular, systematic spaces for effective CSO participation in policy dialogue? (Recommendations 2 and 3)

The paper points to numerous examples of spaces that have been provided for CSO participation in policy dialogue, drawing principally from experience at the international level.* Based on these cases and on lessons learned from the literature, it suggests some practical guidance for ensuring that such spaces are conducive to effective dialogue.

Illustrations on Civil Society and the Paris Declaration

Are there examples of certain groups adopting an enriched understanding of the Paris principles as recommended by the AG-CS? (Recommendation 4)

The AG-CS itself has adopted an enriched understanding of the Paris principles of aid effectiveness, as have some of the CSOs represented in the text boxes. This enriched perspective was also evident in the work on crosscutting issues in the run-up to HLF-3, and in some of the Roundtables in Accra. The AAA itself reflects an enriched understanding compared to that in the Paris Declaration.

* CSO engagement at the national level is discussed under Recommendation 6a.
How does the respect and promotion of “local and democratic ownership” manifest itself in different cases involving CSOs? How could local and democratic ownership be strengthened further? (Recommendations 5 and 6a)

Many of the examples in this paper demonstrate local and democratic ownership in CSO-led initiatives. Others are examples of government-led programmes, with CSOs playing a role in policy and programme design, implementation or assessment. Other cases describe a number of initiatives to reinforce the capacity of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue.

How does the respect and promotion of alignment broadly understood manifest itself in different cases involving CSOs? (Recommendation 7)

Alignment is broadly understood in this paper to include alignment to local priorities and use of local systems, including those of developing country CSOs. Sometimes, CSOs’ priorities align with those of government, sometimes not, yet these priorities may still be locally-owned and respond to local needs. The paper provides examples of CSO alignment with local priorities, including several cases of CSOs aligning their efforts with government priorities and systems while simultaneously aligning with the priorities of beneficiaries and experimenting with innovative approaches beyond what might be included in government plans. In some cases, the complementarity of government and CSO systems is recognised, but civil society may not have the means or capacity to fully play its role.

What are some examples of government-CSO collaboration in programme-based initiatives? (Recommendations 8 and 9a)

The paper points to numerous examples of CSOs and governments playing complementary roles in programme-based initiatives. These cases illustrate how CSOs can enhance the effectiveness of government efforts by virtue of their linkages with the community and their ability to experiment with a range of approaches.

What are the features of alternative approaches to results-based management that promote learning, adaptation and empowerment? What examples can be cited of efforts by each stakeholder group to promote greater accountability to beneficiaries? (Recommendations 10a and 11a)

This section points to pockets of practice illustrating new approaches to results-based management (RBM) that emphasise behavioural change and organisational learning, and increasing concern for downward accountability to intended beneficiaries. Several examples are provided of CSO engagement in social accountability, and of CSO initiatives to promote their own accountability through increased transparency, outreach and standard-setting.

Illustrations on CSO effectiveness

Turning to the issue of CSO Effectiveness, the paper begins by highlighting the importance of understanding the CSO landscape as a prerequisite, and looks at CIVICUS’ Civil Society Index as an example of the sort of work that can be done.
What examples can be cited of good enabling environments for civil society or of efforts to improve the enabling environment? (Recommendation 12)

We then consider the enabling environment for CSO effectiveness, focusing on enabling policies and practice in developing countries. A distinction is made between two categories of variables: those having to do with the legal and judicial systems and human rights in general; and those relating to CSO-specific practice, policy and legislation. The paper provides examples of good and bad practice in each category, and draws on the literature for guidelines on enabling CSO legislation.

What are some examples of good donorship in terms of its impact on CSO effectiveness? (Recommendations 13 to 16)

The AG-CS puts forward several recommendations on good donorship, beginning with Recommendation 13, which is a general recommendation calling upon donors and CSOs to implement the enriched aid effectiveness principles identified in previous sections. Since examples corresponding to Recommendation 13 are provided in previous sections, the emphasis in this part of the book is primarily on Recommendations 14 to 16, dealing with civil society strengthening, donor mechanisms of support for civil society, and donor procedures when channelling support to and through Northern CSOs. The paper includes a section on each of these recommendations.

What are some examples of successful CSO partnerships, including various types of international and national partnership arrangements, and North-South partnerships among CSOs more specifically? (Recommendation 17a)

This section looks at two aspects of CSO partnerships: the need for donor support of partnerships involving CSO co-ordination in the form of information-sharing arrangements, networks, ad hoc coalitions or alliances, and umbrella organisations; and the need for Northern and Southern CSOs entering into partnerships to carefully define their areas of comparative advantage. The book considers the features of successful partnerships in either cases.

Where do we go from here? (Recommendations 18 to 21)

The last section of the publication is entitled “The Forward Agenda”. It points to some of the recommendations emerging from the AG-CS and from HLF-3 on how to pursue the CSO effectiveness agenda post Accra. It cites current efforts by the stakeholder community in Mali as an example of the sort of activity that can be pursued, and points to pilot initiatives being pursued by a Nordic+ group of donors in Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia. The incorporation of CSOs into the WP-EFF and the CSO-led process on CSO effectiveness are also cited as actions that are under way.
PART I

Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations
Introduction

The Paris Declaration of March 2005 was a landmark achievement that brought together a number of key principles and commitments in a coherent way. It also included a framework for mutual accountability and identified a number of indicators for tracking progress. There is general recognition that the Paris Declaration is a crucial component of a larger aid effectiveness agenda that could engage civil society actors in a more direct manner.

As development actors, civil society organisations (CSOs) share an interest in the concept of aid effectiveness as an important tool for keeping development efforts on track, for drawing attention to outcome- and impact-level results, and for drawing lessons of good practice from accumulated experience. This shared interest in aid effectiveness provides a legitimate entry point for dialogue involving all development co-operation actors, including CSOs. CSOs are important and distinctive contributors to aid and development effectiveness as a function of their independence, their advocacy and watchdog roles, their close connections to the poor and their effectiveness as channels for aid delivery.

This document summarises the main findings and recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS). They are directed to all parts of the stakeholder community, including donors, developing country governments and CSOs from developed and developing countries.

The AG-CS was created by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) in January 2007, in recognition of the important role that CSOs play both as development actors in their own right and as agents of development co-operation, in their capacities as aid donors, channels and recipients. It was brought together as an explicitly multi-stakeholder group involving parity of representation by donors, developing country governments, CSOs from the North and CSOs from the South.

Its mandate included the following:

● To look into the two overarching functions of civil society: its role as a development actor in the broad sense, and more specifically, its role in promoting accountability and demand for results.

● To facilitate a multi-stakeholder process that aims to clarify:
  ❖ the roles of civil society in relation to the Paris Declaration;
  ❖ CSO aspirations to deepen the wider national and international aid effectiveness agendas; and
  ❖ key considerations and principles that will be internationally recognised by all of the relevant parties.
To advise WP-EFF and the Steering Committee responsible for the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-3) regarding the inclusion of civil society and aid effectiveness and other issues in the agenda for HLF-3 in a manner that builds on the Paris Declaration.

In consultation with the HLF-3 Steering Committee, the WP-EFF, and CSOs, to prepare proposals on Aid Effectiveness and Civil Society for discussion as part of the Accra agenda.

Its work included the following:

- creation of an extranet site (http://web.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cs) where reports from various consultations and case study material are made available to the interested public;
- research and analysis, leading to the production of two core documents: A Concept Paper and an Issues Paper;
- an extensive consultation process, including: an international conference in Härnösand, Sweden, organised by the Swedish International Development Agency’s Civil Society Centre; national seminars and consultations in 35 countries; six multi-stakeholder regional consultations in the South; and two international CSO-only consultations in Brussels and Nairobi. By the time of the HLF-3, these consultations had involved over 4 800 participants from approximately 3 600 CSO, donor and government organisations;
- a Synthesis of Advisory Group Regional Consultations and Related Processes, which aimed to capture results from the first round of consultations to December 2007; and
- an International Forum, held in Gatineau, Canada on 3-6 February 2008, involving the participation of 203 participants from the four stakeholder groups represented in the AG-CS, from which a Final Report was produced.

The AG-CS found that there was considerable interest in engaging in this sort of dialogue and that the multi-stakeholder approach was a useful one for encouraging constructive dialogue among the participants based on shared objectives. This dialogue was enriched by the distinct perspectives that each stakeholder group brought to the issue of aid effectiveness.

This was found to be true not just in general terms, but also with respect to the issue of CSO effectiveness more specifically. It became increasingly evident that CSO effectiveness depends not only on CSOs themselves, but also on the behaviour of donors and governments. The adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach allowed all partners to explore together how they can contribute to CSO effectiveness.
Chapter 1

Recognition and Voice

What are CSOs and what makes them different? This book defines CSOs as non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. The emphasis in this book is on CSOs characterised by relationships of social solidarity with marginalised populations and concern for social justice. CSOs fill a number of significant roles as development actors and as aid donors, channels and recipients. The Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness recommends formal recognition of the importance and diversity of CSOs and proposes that CSOs be brought systematically into the development and aid policy dialogue.
Who are CSOs and what makes them different?

Although the AG-CS' title refers to “civil society” in general terms, the focus of its work was more specifically on CSOs as agents of change and development. These are the organisations with which donors and governments interact on a regular basis.

CSOs can be defined to include all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. They cover a wide range of organisations that include membership-based CSOs, cause-based CSOs and service-oriented CSOs. Examples include community-based organisations and village associations, environmental groups, women’s rights groups, farmers' associations, faith-based organisations, labour unions, co-operatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes, and the not-for-profit media.

The definition of CSOs as non-market and non-state actors points to the non-profit character of CSOs and their reliance on voluntary contributions and outside sources for resources. However, this is only part of the story. Also important to understand is that CSOs operate on the basis of shared values, beliefs, and objectives with the people they serve or represent. This responsiveness to different primary constituencies explains the extensive diversity of CSOs in terms of values, goals, activities, and structures. It also explains the particular emphasis on human rights and social justice, including women’s, children’s, and indigenous people’s rights, which many CSOs take as a starting point for their development work.

It is important not to idealise CSOs compared to other organisational forms. CSOs reflect the conditions and challenges of their respective countries. In countries with authoritarian cultural traditions, racial, minority and gender discrimination, social inequality and corruption, one will find some of these traits within CSOs themselves. The struggle for internal democratic values and transparent organisational behaviour is as much a challenge for CSOs as for others.

Also worth noting is that not all development CSOs focus on human rights. Some CSOs are deliberately exclusive, while others may focus on satisfying the needs of their members independent of the promotion of human rights.

It is difficult, therefore, to generalise about “civil society” writ large. However, in seeking to promote the involvement of development and aid effectiveness, it is possible to focus on CSOs characterised by relationships of social solidarity with marginalised populations and concerns for social justice.

Issues of CSO legitimacy and accountability frequently arose in the consultations sponsored by the AG-CS, and have been a major theme of intra-CSO discussions.

Unlike governments, CSOs do not claim to represent the general population and do not derive their legitimacy from the ballot box. However, they do have a claim to legitimacy in their own right by representing particular segments of the population whose rights...
might otherwise be marginalised or particular causes such as improved services for the poor or environmental sustainability.

CSOs derive their legitimacy from the values that inform their actions and institutional philosophy, the results they deliver, their expertise and experience, the governance and accountability mechanisms that they have in place, and the transparency of their operations. They may also be representative of particular categories of the population. Umbrella organisations or networks of organisations often have a high level of institutional credibility by virtue of the groups they represent.

**CSOs as development actors and change agents**

CSOs fill a number of significant roles. As development actors in their own right, they are fundamental to the vibrancy of democratic rule and good governance, drawing attention to issues that might otherwise be ignored by politicians, partisan political organs and governments. They thus provide a mechanism for citizens to express themselves on political, social and economic issues of concern to them, and complement other avenues for holding governments accountable to citizens through democratic participation and discourse.

CSOs play particularly important roles in situations requiring humanitarian interventions or peace building, or in failed or fragile states, where the state is not in a position to fully play its development role.

Many would argue that CSOs are particularly effective at achieving certain types of results, because of their connections with marginalised populations or segments of the population that experience systemic discrimination in development processes, such as women, indigenous peoples or landless people. This is not always true, but the existence of some CSOs that are particularly effective is a strong argument for trying to build on the dynamism, local knowledge and representational skills of those CSOs. They are important actors also in South-South co-operation.

CSOs are quantitatively and qualitatively important, although their relative importance to society varies considerably from one country to another. There are reportedly over one million CSOs in India and 200,000 in the Philippines. Their numbers are growing rapidly in many countries in Africa, Eastern and Central Asia and elsewhere.

Among the development roles that CSOs play are the following:

- mobilising grassroots communities and poor or marginalised people;
- monitoring the policies and practices of governments and donors and reinforcing the accountability of government and donor bodies through the application of local knowledge;
- engaging in research and policy dialogue;
- delivering services and programmes;
- building coalitions and networks for enhanced civil society co-ordination and impact;
- mobilising additional financial and human aid resources; and
- educating the public, and helping to shape social values of solidarity and social justice.
CSOs as aid donors, channels and recipients

CSOs include a wide range of actors. Although some Northern CSOs may be considered donors in their own right, many others are actively engaged in development and do not see themselves primarily as donors. As a group, compared to official donors, whose mandate is more uniformly centred on foreign aid, CSOs thus often resist taking “aid effectiveness” as a starting point, preferring to situate the aid effectiveness agenda within a large “development effectiveness” agenda that includes the effectiveness of non-aid resources, policies and actions. Indeed, CSOs’ effectiveness as aid donors, channels and recipients is intrinsically linked to their effectiveness as development actors and as change agents.

That said, it is important to recognise the quantitative importance of CSOs in development co-operation – as aid donors, channels, and recipients. As donors, Northern CSOs raise considerable resources for development in addition to what governments provide as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The OECD-DAC Secretariat estimates that CSOs raised USD 20-25 billion on their own in 2006, compared to official development assistance (ODA) of USD 104 billion, including debt relief. CSO effectiveness as donors is thus fundamentally important to the success of the world’s overall aid effort.

CSOs are also channels and recipients of aid, and in those capacities, it is their development effectiveness that matters most. CSOs act as channels when they play an intermediary role between official donors and other CSOs. As recipients, CSOs of all categories may be the beneficiaries of ODA to support their development activities; or they may be Southern CSOs receiving aid from Northern CSOs. These recipient CSOs include community groups, village associations, women’s rights groups… a whole range of partner CSOs in the South who are the ones to effectively deliver CSO programmes in those countries. Northern CSOs working in partnership with Southern CSOs may be simultaneously donors, channels and recipients of aid.

It is estimated that CSOs operating as recipients or channels of ODA accounted for approximately 10% of ODA flows to developing countries in 2006. CSO effectiveness is thus not just a question of good donorship. It also requires effectiveness in programme delivery and accountability for delivering results.

CSO voice

CSOs are thus important in discussions of aid and development effectiveness for two reasons:

- because of their importance as development and democratic actors in their own right – as contributors to more inclusive development processes, as advocates of the interests and human rights of their constituencies, and as a source of public policy alternatives; and
- because of the place they hold in development co-operation and humanitarian activities as aid donors, channels and recipients.

The importance of CSOs in these respects provides good reason for bringing them systematically into the development policy dialogue and more specifically into the international institutions and processes where aid effectiveness is discussed. By virtue of the important roles that they play, stakeholders have a collective interest in ensuring that CSOs themselves are as effective as they can be. In addition, CSOs can act as advocates of the public good, helping to promote accountability for results, and bringing to bear a richer,
Recommendations on recognition and voice

1. Based on the above considerations, all development actors should recognise the following:
   a) the importance and diversity of civil society and of CSOs as development and humanitarian actors in their own right;
   b) that CSOs have distinctive and legitimate contributions to make to development and aid effectiveness, and that their efforts complement the efforts of other development partners; and
   c) that a strong civil society is an asset that is worth developing as part of a society's effort to transform itself and deepen democratic practice in a way that includes accommodation and support for competing visions and dissent.

2. Regular and systematic spaces should be provided for the voice of CSOs of different persuasions and orientations to be heard at all stages of the development process (planning, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation), and that this be recognised as standard practice that needs to be actively promoted at all levels from local to international.

3. In parallel, more work should be undertaken by all stakeholders to define the conditions required for the voice of civil society to be effective and to maximise the value of their contributions to policy dialogue. Among subjects that would benefit from greater attention are the following:
   a) how CSOs can best add collective value to the policy process in different contexts, by clarifying the contributions that different categories of CSOs – from grassroots organisations to think tanks – can make at different levels and in different types of discussions;
   b) measures that CSOs can take to ensure that they accurately and accountably represent the interests of the communities and groups they claim to represent;
   c) measures to encourage the meaningful expression of the voices of women and other socially excluded groups, and dissenting points of view;
   d) how the capacity of CSOs and governments to engage in policy dialogue can be built up over time in a sustainable way;
   e) what lessons can be drawn from established multilateral forums that already recognise the role of CSOs and have established norms for CSO participation; and
   f) whether and how to create a permanent mechanism involving the OECD-DAC and the WP-EFF for continuing dialogue with CSOs on aid effectiveness beyond Accra.

deepen understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda, based on particular attention to human rights and social justice.

Such, then, is the basic case for the “voice” of CSOs. As noted above, CSO legitimacy depends on various considerations and differs in character from the political legitimacy of elected bodies. Similarly, while one can argue that CSOs are “political” in the sense that they advocate for particular groups or positions, their legitimacy depends on the non-partisan character of their engagement. CSOs differ in this respect from political parties. The legitimacy of CSOs’ voice in policy dialogue and in discussions of aid effectiveness more specifically follows from the recognition of CSOs as legitimate development actors.
A vibrant democracy requires space for alternative points of view. When CSOs are invited to engage in policy dialogue by governments or donors, the latter are inclined to invite CSOs that they consider like-minded. However, this comes at a cost if it means that different perspectives are stifled or that marginalised populations are excluded. CSOs involved in AG-CS consultations suggested the need for mechanisms that ensure a range of viewpoints, including those of women’s organisations, of rural-based organisations and of other CSOs representing the disenfranchised.

Notes
1. This figure includes an official figure of USD 14.7 billion from the OECD-DAC. However, we know from other sources that this amount is underestimated. Taking other sources into account, in particular figures for the US from The Index of Philanthropy, 2007, suggests a higher number somewhere between USD 20 billion and USD 25 billion (E-mail correspondence).
2. E-mail correspondence with the OECD-DAC Secretariat.
Chapter 2

Civil Society and the Paris Declaration

Recognition of CSOs as agents of development and change in their own right calls for a deeper understanding and application of the international aid effectiveness agenda to facilitate CSOs’ engagement in that agenda. This chapter offers recommendations for enriching each of the five Paris Declaration principles from a perspective inclusive of CSOs.
The importance of CSOs in development is widely recognised, and was acknowledged to a degree in the Paris Declaration. However, the Paris Declaration provided only limited guidance on how the roles of CSOs can be enhanced as part of international aid and development efforts. The Paris Declaration focused on the way that donors and central government agencies relate to each other and the need for a new approach to development co-operation that helps to reinforce the state rather than undermine it, as was so often the case in the past.

The Paris Declaration was an important achievement in this respect, and this was widely recognised in the AG-CS consultative process. However, the Paris Declaration needs to be seen as a particular step in the international strengthening of aid effectiveness that needs to be further pursued and enriched. Focusing as it does on the relationship between donors and partner governments, the Paris Declaration provides only a limited picture of development co-operation, of the various players involved, and how those players need to relate to each other in order to secure sustainable development results. CSOs consider that the Paris Declaration failed to recognise them as agents of development and change in their own right, whose priorities might not always mesh with those of governments.

By virtue of their position as independent development actors and of the commitment to aid and development effectiveness that they share with other stakeholders, CSOs have expressed views on the Paris Declaration that deserve to be heard and considered. Some of these views were reflected in the position paper produced by the International Civil Society Steering Group for the Accra High Level Forum, titled *Better Aid: A Civil Society Position Paper for the 2008 Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.*

This position paper echoed the calls of developing country governments for greater efforts to untie aid and enhance predictability and reflected widespread calls for greater attention to crosscutting issues such as human rights, social exclusion and gender equality. It also included a critique of policy conditionality as a barrier to country ownership, a call for greater transparency as a basis for policy dialogue and mutual accountability, a rebalancing of power relationships between donors and developing countries, and an appeal for independent assessments of adherence to the commitments made under the Paris Declaration.

**Enriching and implementing the Paris principles**

Two perspectives are possible when considering how CSOs relate to the Paris Declaration.

- One perspective asks whether and how CSOs can contribute to the better implementation of the Paris Declaration itself, understood as an agreement between donors and governments on the better management of Official Development Assistance.

* Available at [www.betteraid.org](http://www.betteraid.org).
The other asks whether the Paris principles of aid effectiveness can be applied to the work of CSOs and whether these are well adapted and sufficient for that purpose.

There are thus two agendas here:

- implementation of the Paris Declaration as a specific agreement on aid effectiveness between donors and developing-country governments; and
- enriching the international aid effectiveness agenda to facilitate CSO engagement in that agenda.

These agendas are both legitimate, and both important.

The AG-CS recommendations with regard to the Paris agenda and the international aid effectiveness agenda more generally are based on a broad understanding of aid effectiveness, which is taken to mean “the extent to which aid resources succeed in producing sustainable development results for poor people” (AG-CS 2008b: 7). From this perspective, the Paris Declaration should be seen as a particular agreement at a point in time, whose interpretation may be enriched, and that can be supplemented or replaced over time with new understandings and commitments. What follows are some general and specific recommendations regarding the Paris Declaration principles of aid effectiveness.

The following deals more specifically with each of the Paris Declaration principles, beginning with the ownership principle.

**Local and democratic ownership**

Although the ownership principle is key to understanding the Paris Declaration, the Declaration itself did not explore this principle in any depth. The reference was in fact to “countries” and to government leadership of a country’s poverty reduction strategy.

The fundamental importance of ownership, including government leadership of national development strategies and policies, is unquestionable, because aid will not lead to sustainable development if developing country actors are not committed to aid-supported endeavours. This is, indeed, why imposing policy conditionalities on developing countries has proven unsatisfactory and why so many development projects collapse once donors leave.

However, the sort of ownership and commitment that is required goes far beyond central government leadership of a country’s national development strategy. What is
required is ownership that that is both widespread and deep-rooted, including ownership by all who are involved in, and affected by, the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of aid-supported development programmes.

The lack of clarity of the Paris Declaration on this point has led to considerable confusion about the meaning and importance of this all-important principle. This has been exacerbated by the use of the expression “country ownership”, which suggests a consensus-based or centralised interpretation of ownership by the “country” as a whole. What is required is an understanding of ownership that is broad-based and derives its legitimacy from democratic participation.

**Recommendations on ownership**

5. A return to basics is in order regarding the ownership principle, including a change of vocabulary away from the commonly used expression “country ownership,” which is misleading. More accurate would be an expression such “local and democratic ownership,” which emphasise ownership not just by central government agencies, but also by parliaments, local governments, citizens, communities and CSOs.

6. Complementary measures and approaches should include the following:

   a) significantly broadening the range of “stakeholders” engaged in the design, implementation and assessment of development strategies, programmes, and initiatives, including parliaments, political parties, local governments and CSOs;

   b) recognising that ownership of specific initiatives and programmes may involve leadership by different actors, including national governments, decentralised government bodies, or CSOs;

   c) reinforcing different stakeholders’ capacity to exercise ownership through capacity development initiatives and support for democratic processes; and

   d) related to this, a new approach to policy conditionality in which donors emphasise their role in facilitating policy options that are democratically developed and discussed, and invest in strengthening the capacity of governments, parliament and CSOs to develop locally-owned policy solutions.

**Alignment**

On the issue of alignment, the emphasis of the Paris Declaration was on donor alignment with the priorities identified in national development strategies such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and alignment to country systems of public financial management, procurement and results management.

However, CSOs prefer to emphasise a plurality of views, and Northern CSOs often work directly with developing country CSOs. As a result, they are likely to understand alignment in terms of the priorities and strategies identified by their Southern CSO partners and constituencies, and the use of country systems involving those partners’ own systems of priority setting and programme implementation.

CSOs thus contribute to alignment in their own ways through solidarity with the priorities and needs of partners and constituencies that may contribute to development goals in ways that differ from government priorities. This requires a broader interpretation of the concept of alignment in line with that of local and democratic ownership.
Co-ordination and harmonisation

Both the Rome and Paris Declarations emphasised donor co-ordination and harmonisation. Increased co-ordination and harmonisation can be defended on various grounds, including the need to reduce dispersion and duplication of effort, the desire to reduce unnecessary transactions costs, and the need to take a more comprehensive view of development programming.

However, co-ordination and harmonisation come with costs of their own that are not as widely recognised. For CSOs, in particular, the concern is that the inappropriate application of these principles could stifle initiative, hamper innovation, or divert energies from other pursuits. There is a need for a conceptual framework that recognises the need for balance. Increasingly, the emphasis in aid effectiveness discussions seems to be shifting away from co-ordination and harmonisation as such towards a more flexible principle that assumes the need for a comprehensive perspective, while recognising the advantages of diversity and the value of focused and specialised efforts by different actors.

Recommendation on alignment

7. Alignment should be understood broadly to mean alignment with the priorities of developing country counterparts and emphasis on the use and strengthening of country systems broadly understood. This means that efforts to develop and use country systems should extend beyond the current emphasis on centralised government mechanisms, such as public financial management and procurement, and also include other parts of government, decentralised authorities and CSOs.

Recommendations on co-ordination and harmonisation

8. A balanced approach should be taken to co-ordination and harmonisation that emphasises the value of more comprehensive approaches to development programming, while also acknowledging the value of diversity and innovation.

9. The following measures are recommended to improve co-ordination and harmonisation where CSOs are concerned:
   a) recognition by all actors of the complementary roles played by governments and CSOs and the implications of this for enhanced co-ordination and harmonisation of government and CSO efforts;
   b) greater efforts by governments and donors to support the participation of CSOs in government-led sector programmes (independently or under contract), and greater efforts by CSOs themselves to engage actively in these programmes;
   c) greater efforts by CSOs to co-ordinate and harmonise their activities with those of other CSOs;
   d) recognition of civil society strengthening as an objective that is itself worth pursuing in a more comprehensive way by all development stakeholders; and
   e) recognition that responsive funding formulas continue to have an important role to play for tapping into the energy and innovative ideas of citizens and CSOs as agents of change and development.
Managing for results and accountability

The issues of managing for results and accountability are closely related, since the most important type of accountability from an aid effectiveness perspective should be accountability for results. As principles of aid effectiveness, managing for results and accountability have implications for CSOs both in their own accountability for results, and in their watchdog role in promoting accountability by governments and donors for the use of public funds. CSOs have for many years pressed donors and governments to be accountable and to demonstrate development results, and have taken distinct actions to promote their own accountability through the establishment specific accountability mechanisms and collective codes of conduct.

A number of issues emerged from the AG-CS’ consultative processes. Donors and government partners often mentioned accountability of CSOs themselves as a preoccupation. CSOs are usually accountable to donors for any funding that they receive, and to their own boards for their overall performance, but the general issue of accountability by CSOs is one that requires more attention. Of particular concern to developing country governments is the lack of information on donor funding that flows to and through CSOs and the lack of any mechanism for assessing the overall impact of CSO activity on development results in particular countries.

For their part, CSOs often criticised current tools of “managing for results” because these tend to be used more as instruments of control by donors than as instruments for measuring meaningful change in development outcomes or promoting learning and adaptation and accountability to those whose welfare is at stake. They raised questions also about what to measure, about the division of responsibilities, access to data and transparency, and the roles that CSOs can play. CSOs advocate an approach to results-based management that is based on iterative learning and adaptation, and results-monitoring mechanisms that empower the ultimate beneficiaries of aid.

There are questions also about the types of results that are most relevant to CSOs as agents of change and accountability. For instance, the emphasis of performance management frameworks under programme-based approaches tends to focus either on the reform of government processes or policies or on indicators of service delivery such as access to education or primary health care. The adoption of a more meaningful approach to results for CSOs operating as agents of change is likely to require greater attention to indicators of institutional and social change, such as improvements in gender equality and women’s empowerment, the reduction of social inequalities, the improvement of human rights and democratic practice and other qualitative indicators of social progress.

The need to measure progress in the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality is particularly evident. This will require the inclusion of gender equality targets and indicators in the design and implementation of development strategies and programmes, and systematic use of sex-disaggregated data for monitoring purposes.

The direction of accountability is a major issue, as well. The Paris Declaration establishes a shared donor/government responsibility for development results, but in practice, accountability in development co-operation tends to be upwards from recipients to donors. This undermines downward accountability towards citizens and beneficiaries, and the systems of accountability that would normally encourage such downward accountability. This suggests the need for a broad understanding of accountability that emphasises the ultimate accountability of all development partners for results benefiting
poor and marginalised populations and raises the challenge of how to fully engage the intended beneficiaries of aid in the assessment of results and holding governments, donors and CSOs to account.

There are issues, finally, about mutual accountability for aid effectiveness as envisaged in the Paris Declaration. Participants in the AG-CS consultations considered that to be effective, these processes will require greater institutional commitments to transparency and more inclusive processes. CSOs should play, and are already playing, a role to enrich processes of mutual accountability at national and global levels (e.g. in research and in monitoring the implementation the Paris Declaration at the country level). However, they find themselves hampered by lack of access to information. The AG-CS joins other work streams involved in the preparations for HLF-3 in calling for higher standards of access to information and transparency regarding aid flows and policies.

Recommendations on managing for results and accountability

10. The following recommendations are proposed with respect to results management and accountability for development:

a) the adoption of results-based approaches and results-monitoring mechanisms intended first and foremost as management tools to promote iterative learning and adaptation, while empowering the ultimate beneficiaries of development programmes;

b) the adoption of a more meaningful approach to results that includes greater attention to indicators of institutional and social changes and to sex-disaggregated data of importance to CSOs operating as agents of change;

c) an approach to accountability that emphasises a rebalancing of accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries;

d) the reinforcement of accountability systems in country for all development actors (donors, government and CSOs); and

e) a multi-stakeholder approach to monitoring and evaluation that includes the effective and timely engagement of CSOs and beneficiary populations, including representation from women’s rights organisations and other socially marginalised groups.

11. All development partners are encouraged to adopt the highest possible standards of openness, transparency and access to information.

a) Donors and international financial institutions should commit to delivering timely and meaningful information to other stakeholders on their aid flows and policies, including official aid flows to CSOs.

b) Developing country governments should work with elected representatives and CSOs on how to achieve increased transparency of both official and non-official aid flows and improved accountability for development results.
Chapter 3

CSO Effectiveness

This chapter argues that the effectiveness of CSOs is conditioned by the whole community of development actors including: developing country governments, donors, and CSOs themselves. Enhancing CSO effectiveness is therefore a collective endeavour. This chapter recommends actions to strengthen the enabling environment for civil society, improve donor models of support and strengthen CSO partnerships. It concludes with proposals for further multi-stakeholder work on CSO effectiveness and for incorporating CSOs in future processes and agreements on development and aid.
Covered above are some of the ways that CSOs can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Declaration by encouraging:

- a more democratic approach to ownership and alignment;
- a comprehensive approach to development that allows room, nonetheless, for diversity, inclusiveness and innovation; and
- a model of results and accountability that is more participatory and responsive to local constituencies.

This section covers the sorts of measures that the community of development partners needs to take to ensure that CSOs are as effective as possible at what they do. The emphasis is on “CSO effectiveness” rather than “CSO aid effectiveness”, to stress that it is the overall effectiveness of CSOs as development actors that matters.

Proposed here is an agenda for action based on three areas of collective endeavour:

- strengthening the enabling environment;
- improving models of donor support (including both official and CSO aid flows); and
- strengthening CSO partnerships.

The last subsection proposes a forward agenda for ongoing multi-stakeholder dialogue on this subject.

**An enabling environment for civil society**

For civil society to flourish requires a favourable enabling environment, which depends upon the actions and policies of all development actors – donors, governments and CSOs themselves. Currently, conditions vary enormously from country to country, amounting in some cases to what could better be called a “disabling” environment, and in other cases to what might be considered models for others to emulate.

What constitutes an enabling environment is a complex set of conditions, including:

- mechanisms to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights to expression, peaceful assembly and association, and access to information;
- CSO-specific policies such as CSO legislation and taxation regulations including charitable status provisions;
- regulations and norms to promote CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies;
- the general legal and judicial system and related mechanisms through which CSOs or their constituencies can seek legal recourse;
- the degree to which multi-stakeholder dialogue is encouraged and practiced; and
- measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility.

While governments are responsible for many of these conditions, CSOs themselves may play a role by organising themselves as peer groups to establish and promote agreed
norms and standards of accountability and good practice. Donors also exert an important influence, through the openness that they display towards CSOs, through their efforts to encourage the involvement of CSOs in policy dialogue, and by virtue of the terms and the conditions that they impose on CSO recipients.

Special attention is likely to be required to the enabling environment for CSOs in situations of fragility or conflict, where CSOs may be in particular need of protection and may often be the only viable organisations available for delivering certain types of services, or engaging in peace building and reconstruction processes.

### Recommendations on an enabling environment for civil society

12. The following recommendations are proposed:

a) stakeholders should recognise the creation of an enabling environment for a vibrant, democratic and diverse civil society as a basic requirement for CSO effectiveness;

b) the enabling conditions required for civil society to meet its potential in different countries should be systematically assessed with a view to implementing improved practices by all stakeholders groups; and

c) measures should be put in place by all development stakeholders to ensure that CSOs are transparent and accountable first and foremost to their constituencies and stakeholders, while accounting to donor and governments for the use of public funds.

### Good donorship

As noted earlier, CSOs are quantitatively important as donors, recipients, and channels of aid funds. This puts them at the centre of the debate on aid and development effectiveness from a range of perspectives. CSOs from Northern countries are likely to be engaged as aid actors in all three ways, as donors, recipients and channels of official flows. CSOs from the South are more likely to be recipients. Although they may be self-financing for a part of their activities, they often receive significant financial support from official donors, from other CSOs, or from their own governments.\(^1\)

Official donors exert an important influence on CSO effectiveness through the terms and conditions of their support for CSOs and the strategic choices they make in favour of specific CSOs, CSO networks, or umbrella organisations. Specific issues requiring attention include the following, some of which have already been identified:

- One issue is the balance that currently exists between different forms of support and whether that balance needs to be redressed. Currently, most official donor funding tends to be channelled through Northern CSOs under what can sometimes be fairly rigid terms and conditions. This raises questions about the conditions under which such support is provided, and about the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of support. Alternatives could include direct support for the projects and programmes of Southern CSOs, or more comprehensive models of support for the strengthening of civil society as a whole.

- There are issues as well about the balance to be sought between responsive models of funding and approaches that are more directive and/or more programme-based. Donors seeking to harmonise and co-ordinate their support for civil society should ask themselves what repercussions this might have on the ability of CSOs to secure funding.
for a wide range of efforts representing different approaches to human rights, social change and advocacy.

● There are questions, finally, about accountability, and the difficulties of a model in which accountability runs upwards, from recipient CSOs to donors, rather than vice versa or downwards, towards the CSOs' primary constituents.

These are complex issues that do not lend themselves to easy recommendations. More work is clearly needed, and appropriate solutions need to match the specific requirements of different contexts.

The special role of Northern or international CSOs as donors requires specific attention, as well. Where a donor-recipient relationship applies between CSOs, these relationships can be characterised by the same dependencies and power imbalances as may characterise official donor-recipient relationships. Although these dependency issues are often tempered by the social solidarity that binds CSOs to one another, CSOs acting as donors need to recognise that they have special responsibilities to develop and respect appropriate principles of aid effectiveness.

Recommendations on good donorship

13. Both official donors and CSOs in their capacity as donors, recipients and channels of aid should take measures to implement the enriched aid effectiveness principles identified in the previous section, including:

a) respect for developing country partner ownership and leadership;

b) alignment with developing country partner priorities and use of local systems;

c) greater co-ordination and harmonisation of efforts, while respecting diversity and innovation;

d) managing for results in a dynamic, iterative way; and

e) enhanced accountability, with emphasis on downward accountability, and mutual accountability in donor-recipient CSO relationships.*

14. Donors should consider the overall strengthening of civil society at the country, regional and international levels as an objective worth supporting in its own right.

15. Donors, including Northern and International CSOs, should identify and implement a range of better co-ordinated and harmonised support mechanisms including core or programme support, capacity development, a long-term perspective, responsive funding mechanisms of various sorts, and the harmonisation of contracting, funding and reporting modalities.

16. Finally, to the extent that official donors channel funds through Northern CSOs, donor procedures and regulations should be put in place that enable these CSOs to take on their responsibilities for implementing the aid effectiveness principles and recommendations proposed here.

* We limit ourselves here to recommendations based on the enriched Paris Declaration principles. However, we acknowledge the interest of CSOs themselves to engage in further work on guidelines for CSO development effectiveness. We do not wish to pre-empt the conclusions of those efforts, or to suggest that the Paris Declaration principles – even enriched – are the only ones that may be relevant to CSO effectiveness as donors, recipients and channels of aid.
CSO partnerships

The subject of CSO partnerships covers the efforts of CSOs in developing countries to organise themselves in national networks, alliances and umbrella organisations. It also covers North-South, South-South or global partnerships in which CSOs from different countries collaborate with each other in order to better achieve their objectives. CSOs are increasingly pooling their efforts, both nationally and internationally. Improving the quality of such partnerships is primarily the responsibility of CSOs themselves. However, donors and governments can encourage such ventures by providing financial and technical support.

Among the issues that have been flagged by these CSOs and others as meriting attention, other than the donorship issues raised in the previous section, are the following:

- the desirability of CSO partnerships for greater collective effectiveness and for donors to support such partnerships;
- the desirability of more equitable, longer-term partnerships between Northern, International and Southern CSOs involving a philosophy of local empowerment, partnership and participation;
- the value of North-South, South-South and triangular co-operation among CSOs; and
- the responsibility of Northern and International CSOs to advocate for inclusive policy dialogue that provides equitable and appropriate space for their developing country CSOs to participate in policy dialogue and decision-making processes.

**Recommendations on CSO partnerships**

17. The following recommendations are put forward:

1. CSOs should be supported in their efforts to co-ordinate their efforts through umbrella organisations, working groups, networks, or coalitions; and
2. Northern and Southern CSOs should work together to define their respective areas of comparative advantage and appropriate division of labour to encourage Southern CSOs to thrive and strengthen their place in society over time.

Forward agenda for multi-stakeholder dialogue

Although considerable progress has been made towards improved understanding and sharing of that understanding across multi-stakeholder groups, much remains to be done, both at the country level and internationally.

Multi-stakeholder dialogue on civil society and aid effectiveness was initiated in 35 countries prior to HLF-3. This dialogue was relatively extensive in some countries – in Mali, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania, to cite only a few – while in others it remains incipient. Such discussions need to continue with the aim of taking collective action as appropriate in different country contexts.

There is a need also for countries, donors and CSOs working on similar issues to be able to consult and learn from each other, regionally or internationally. This may happen in different ways. For example, a number of countries working on enabling legislation could form a community of learning to compare experiences.

However, mutual learning is more likely to happen in the context of a global framework of collaboration on CSO effectiveness. Noteworthy, in this regard, is an
ambitious global initiative to establish principles and guidelines for CSO development effectiveness over the next two years. This welcome initiative was launched by CSOs in Paris at the end of June 2008, following an exploratory workshop involving 80 CSO network leaders from all over the world, many of whom have been involved in the AG-CS process. Because the focus is CSO effectiveness, CSOs consider that this global initiative must be CSO-led, although they recognise the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement and encourage such engagement. Detailed modalities are being elaborated by a 25-member CSO Global Facilitating Group established by those present at the June meeting.

**Recommendations on the forward agenda for multi-stakeholder dialogue**

18. Ongoing multi-stakeholder consultations on CSO effectiveness should be initiated or extended in all countries, with the aim of developing a comprehensive and actionable perspective on how civil society and CSOs could be strengthened in their various roles as agents of development, participation and accountability.

19. All stakeholders, jointly and individually, should pilot good practices in relation to the various recommendations emerging from the work of the Advisory Group, and track progress on these practices to inform ongoing learning and dialogue.

20. Ministers in Accra should endorse and encourage the June 2008 CSO-led process of dialogue and consensus building on CSO development effectiveness principles, guidelines and good practices, which will include multi-stakeholder participation. This process should be recognised in the Accra Agenda for Action and donors and developing country governments should collaborate with CSOs to recognise and address the responsibilities shared by all development actors for enhancing CSO development effectiveness.

21. Finally, CSOs and CSO effectiveness should be an integral part of any future processes and agreements on development and aid, post-Accra.

**Notes**

1. Government funding tends to be relatively weak in developing countries, but could increase in the future as new models of government-CSO partnerships emerge.

2. These funding relationships usually involve Northern CSOs as donors and Southern CSOs as recipients. However, inter-CSO funding relationships may also involve Northern, Southern or International CSOs transferring funds to each other, for instance with regional and international women’s rights organisations as recipients and other CSOs as donors.
PART II

Exploration of Experience and Good Practice
Chapter 4

Illustrations on Recognition and Voice

This chapter illustrates how CSOs engage as development actors in four areas:

1. civic engagement;
2. service delivery, self-help and innovation;
3. humanitarian assistance; and
4. as international aid donors, channels and recipients.

Examples are provided of official recognition of CSOs in policy statements and of how regular and systematic spaces have been established for CSOs to participate in policy dialogue.
Roles played by CSOs

Civil society is inherently diverse, and CSOs fill a range of roles in social and economic development in any given country. What follows are examples of roles played by CSOs. We have grouped our illustrations into four broad categories for illustrative purposes:

- civic engagement;
- service delivery, self-help and innovation;
- humanitarian assistance; and
- CSOs as aid donors, channels and recipients.

The first two categories emphasise the roles of CSOs as independent development actors and the types of development results they pursue. The third category emphasises their roles and relationships with international aid.

Civic engagement

One of the most visible roles of civil society is the space that it provides for citizen engagement in democratic discourse and activism. We explore three dimensions of this phenomenon below: the role of civil society as a democratic force; its role in social mobilisation and advocacy; and its role in public education and research.

Democratisation

In recent decades, it was the high profile of civil society as a force for democratisation in Latin America and through the demise of Soviet-era regimes that earned civil society a place in donors’ good governance and democratisation plans.

In many Latin American countries, faith-based organisations and the Catholic Church itself were at the centre of populist movements, such as those led by liberation theologians through the 1960s and 70s, that emphasised consciousness-raising among the poor, and pushed for justice in the face of authoritarian regimes and oppressive socio-economic structures. Civil society thus became synonymous with democracy and anti-militarism in Latin America.

In Eastern Europe, likewise, it was civil society that challenged the totalitarian state. In Poland, the Solidarity trade union of shipyard workers, with the moral backing of the Catholic Church, grew as an alternative, non-communist, nation-wide network that peacefully challenged the authority of the State and launched a process of reform of the authoritarian apparatus. Solidarity’s success proved an inspiration for other countries, such as Hungary, where CSOs, academics and the media were central to the “peaceful revolution” that led to reform in that country (Miszlivet and Ertsey, 1998:74).

More recent examples of a similar sort include:

- the role played by civil society in Nepal in the massive political mobilisation of 2006 that ended King Gyanendra’s direct rule and permanently altered the political landscape of that country (Shah, 2008); and
II.4. ILLUSTRATIONS ON RECOGNITION AND VOICE

- the experience of Pakistan in 2007 and 2009, where the peaceful protests of the Supreme Court Bar Association and other pro-democracy activists made it difficult for the Pakistani leadership to carry on business as usual with anti-democratic actions such as the incarceration or dismissal of key legal and judicial professionals.

The involvement of CSOs in the electoral process in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), described in Example 1, is another recent case.

In practice: CSOs and democratisation

Example 1. CSOs and the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo went through a peaceful and transparent electoral process in which CSOs played a number of important roles, including the following:

- Congolese churches, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other associations trained 60 000 civic educators across the country to raise awareness of the stakes surrounding the election, covering subjects such as democratic principles, citizens' electoral rights, and electoral rules and regulations, using a number of supportive tools such as community radio, posters and comics;

- CSOs also played a crucial role as election observers across the country, working through a CSO Cadre de concertation de la société civile pour l’observation des élections. Their efforts helped to elicit a high level of participation, with over 25 million individuals registering to vote in the lead-up to the elections.


Social mobilisation and advocacy

More generally, civil society provides a vehicle for citizens to engage with the State by advocating for policy reforms and organising to hold the public sector accountable to its citizens. The space that civil society provides for citizens to engage more actively in public life in this way complements the work of representative bodies such as parliament and the watchdog role of the media as key elements of an effective and vibrant democracy.

Four examples are used to illustrate the social mobilisation and advocacy roles played by CSOs:

- Example 2 illustrates several cases from Africa of CSOs acting as vehicles for citizen and community involvement in education. As the example illustrates, citizen engagement in education is a widespread phenomenon in Africa, helping to mobilise parents in supporting the education process, while promoting accountability for the quality of public education.

- Example 3 provides a case from Peru. It describes CSO leadership in advancing a human rights-based approach to development. By using human rights standards and principles drawn from international covenants and declarations as a foundation for dialogue and action, the ForoSalud coalition raised awareness about the right to health, mobilised local voices, and contributed to a new vision of health policy in the country.

- Example 4 illustrates the efforts of a farmer’s union in Indonesia to defend member interests harmed as a result of corrupt practices and mismanagement. Joining forces with
a university to help formulate their grievances and identify solutions, the union made use of both dialogue and demonstrations to successfully advance the farmers’ cause.

- Example 5 illustrates an initiative of global proportions – the Global Call to Action Against Poverty – that helped to raise public awareness and mobilised millions of people to put pressure on politicians and government leaders to take action against world poverty.

Additional examples focusing on the role of CSOs in promoting public accountability can be found in the Managing for Results and Accountability section of this paper. These cases include:

- South Africa’s Budget Information Service (Example 39);
- the Just Budgets project on Gender-responsive Budgeting in Africa (Example 40);
- the Ghana HIPC Watch Initiative (Example 41); and
- an infrastructure monitoring project in the Philippines (Example 43).

**In practice: Social mobilisation and advocacy**

**Example 2. CSOs as community mobilisers in the education sector in African countries**

CSOs across Africa act as vehicles for citizen and community involvement in education. They help to mobilise citizens both locally and nationally, raising parents’ contributions at local levels, while contributing to policy dialogue and enhanced public accountability.

- In Burkina Faso, parents contribute to schooling through the payment of fees, by constructing teachers’ houses, and sharing in occasional costs like teachers’ travel. Parents Associations (Associations de parents d’élèves) exist in many areas, and women’s involvement in school has been bolstered by Mothers’ Associations (Associations des mères éducatrices). Burkina Faso’s NGO coalition on basic education works closely with the Ministry of Education.

- In Gambia, functional School Management Committees exist in most schools. The Government involves civil society in education sector dialogue, and recognises the role of CSOs in programme implementation. The Gambia Education for All Campaign Network collaborates with the Ministry of Education.

- In Kenya, School Management Committees promote increased public accountability by acting as watchdogs on procurement, publicising funds received by the school, reporting to parents at annual general meetings, and auditing primary school accounts. A CSO coalition, the Elimu Yetu Coalition, is involved in sector dialogue with the Ministry of Education.

Extracted from: Africa Network Campaign on Education for All (no date).

**Example 3. ForoSalud and CARE’s rights-based approach to health in Peru**

ForoSalud is a CSO network in Peru that has been using a rights-based approach since its creation in 2001. Forosalud brings together more than 100 national, regional and local organisations and movements and a wide and diverse range of citizens committed to the realisation of health rights.

Over the past 5 years, ForoSalud has worked in close partnership with CARE Peru’s Health Rights Programme. CARE provides financial and technical support, and is a key advocacy ally for ForoSalud. Together, they have advanced strategies for making health policies and institutions more responsive to the rights of poor and marginalised people.
and establish participatory and inclusive mechanisms for the planning, provision and evaluation of health services. Their work has contributed to a new vision of health policy emphasising health as a universal human right, against the backdrop of a health sector reform considered to be excessively focused on efficiency and cost recovery.

In 2004, ForoSalud and CARE were able to seize a series of opportunities to propel health rights onto the national agenda. These included: praise for CARE’s Health Rights Programme in official speeches and a Peruvian Ministry of Health publication; the appointment of a new Minister of Health; and a visit to Peru of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health. These events provided a set of entry points to organise a series of capacity building meetings and workshops that led to the endorsement of cross-cutting principles for a rights-based approach by the Ministry of Health.

In collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights, the network has also designed and implemented a citizen and civil society-based accountability mechanism, promoting citizen surveillance on health services and social programmes’ quality and effectiveness in the regions. Through this initiative, Quechua and Aymara women community leaders and regional offices of the human rights Ombudsman work together to monitor women’s health rights, particularly their right to good quality, appropriate maternal health services.

This exercise has yielded positive results in terms of improved attitudes and practices on the part of health service providers. It has also served to identify areas needing improvement, such as reduced hours of service and charges for medicines that should otherwise be free. Rural women leaders are now empowered to pursue such issues, in collaboration with the Ombudsman and ForoSalud.

ForoSalud has gradually established itself as a major player in the national health sector. A recent achievement was the 2008 Law on Health Service Users’ Rights and Responsibilities, which was passed by Congress. Other results are a wide range of policy proposals negotiated at national and regional levels, and the rebalancing of power relations within “invited spaces” for policy dialogue and negotiation.


Example 4. Farmers’ lobby for small holder debt relief in Indonesia

Marhendi – Serikat Tani Bengkulu was an Asian Development Bank-funded rubber cultivation project involving small landholders in Indonesia. Under the project, the government committed itself to providing high quality seedlings to the farmers for planting and care, while the farmers were required to sign a debt contract with their land certificates as collateral. Farmers were also provided with fertiliser, guidance and drainage over the seven years of the project between 2000 and 2007. The initiative was financed through a loan agreement between the government and the Asian Development Bank.

However, some issues arose during the project’s implementation that put the farmers’ livelihoods at risk. For instance, instead of being provided with high quality seedlings, the farmers received local rubber plants with false certification labels. A range of other mismanagement issues also arose; and two of the project heads were jailed in 2002.

In that same year, the farmer's union filed a complaint with the Department of Agriculture. A strategic alliance was forged including farmers, the Faculty of Agriculture of the University of Bengkulu, and the governor of the province, to elaborate recommendations backed by research and analysis. In 2006, farmers went to the capital to push the Department of Agriculture and the Minister for Finance to respond to their
requests. The farmers were eventually successful in lobbying for the government to respond to their recommendations for return of their land certificates, payback of 15 million Rupiah per family, and debt cancellation.


Example 5. The global call to action against poverty

In September 2004, a group of civil society actors including NGOs, international networks, social movements, trade unions, women’s organisations, and faith-based groups met in Johannesburg and launched the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). GCAP aimed to make 2005 the year when governments could take decisive action to deliver on their promises of the Millennium Declaration, and “make poverty history”.

GCAP is now a growing CSO alliance working together across more than 100 national platforms. What sets the CGAP alliance apart is that, in addition to being a coalition of international organisations, it also operates on national and regional levels.

In 2005, GCAP members and supporters undertook more than 38 million “actions” around the world to put pressure on politicians and world leaders who were attending crucial meetings that could, if the right decisions were made, increase the world’s commitment to overcoming poverty. On 16-17 October 2006, 23.5 million people around the world Stood Up Against Poverty, setting a Guinness World Record and sending out a powerful message to national and global political leaders.


Public education and research

Closely related to civil society’s social mobilisation and advocacy roles are the roles that it plays in public education and research. This can be done in any of several ways, including the establishment of collaborative relationships with the media, working through the education system, and engaging in independent research.

Working in collaboration with the media can be very effective. CSOs provide the media with facts and analysis, while the media give voice to CSOs’ positions and publicise their efforts. As a case in point, the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction network in Zambia is considered “a vital source of alternative, reliable, factual analysis and informed opinion” for journalists (Wood and Barnes, 2007:44). This CSO network provides digestible information to the media, and has taken journalists to visit poverty monitoring sites in rural Lusaka, facilitating journalists’ access to the voices of poor people.

A complementary strategy is to work through the public education system. The case of a CSO working through the education system is illustrated in Example 6, which explains IBON Foundation’s approach to social transformation through the education system in the Philippines.

Engagement in independent research provides yet another way that CSOs contribute to policy reform. This includes the work of non-profit research institutes, universities, colleges, and think tanks in bringing new policy and programme ideas and approaches to the fore. Example 7 draws attention to cases of think tanks from all over the world that are known to have had a considerable impact on development in those countries.
In practice: Public education and research

Example 6. IBON and transformative education

IBON Foundation Inc. is a capacity development organisation focused on knowledge building. It was established in 1978 by a group of church members and professionals to disseminate socio-economic information and analysis during the dark years of dictatorial rule in the Philippines. It was created against a backdrop of rampant human rights violations.

IBON’s flagship publication, IBON Facts and Figures, first appeared in 1978, and was applauded by progressive educators who saw its value as an instrument complementing the government’s elementary and secondary education programme in social studies, civics, and human rights education.

In 1994, IBON developed the IBON Partnership in Education for Development (IPED) in response to demands from the formal education sector for transformative education and a revitalised curriculum. More than 200 partner schools currently subscribe to IBON publications and textbooks. The IPED programme seeks to develop the capacities of students, teachers, and school administrators, for social analysis and social action.

IPED currently publishes several monthly and quarterly publications for students, as well as textbooks in subject areas such as language, history, civics, and economics. It produces audio-visual teaching aids and video documentaries, and engages in student leadership training through lectures and roundtable discussions on current social issues.

IBON is an accredited service provider with the Professional Regulatory Commission. In that capacity, it conducts teacher-training programmes and organises professional events on themes such as peace building, corruption, and governance. Teachers and educators attending these activities earn credits towards their professional advancement. IPED works with progressive educators to help schools review and formulate their vision and mission statements, curricula, and extension or outreach programmes.

IBON seeks in this way to modify and reinforce the education system as a force of social transformation and development in the Philippines.


Example 7. Think tanks and policy reform

The number of independent think tanks active worldwide has grown considerably over the past few decades for a variety of reasons, not least of which is growing recognition of the need for timely and pertinent information and analysis upon which to make policy decisions. Examples of successes include the following:

- the Korea Development Institute, which made the case for Korea’s penetration of the global economy, and for converting the country’s economy from a capital-based to a knowledge-based one;
- the Institute of Applied Economic Research in Brazil, which has done considerable work on socio-economic inequality. It recommended the decentralisation of public services, and helped design municipally-led education and health programmes. Its efforts led to the expansion of food stamp programmes and increased access to literacy programmes for the country’s poorest people;
- the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, whose research facilitated Malaysia’s transition from being an exporter of natural resources to a processing and manufacturing centre, and promoted the establishment of tax allowances and deductions, location incentives and other stimulants for direct foreign investment; and
CSOs are important providers of social and economic services, most notably in the education and health sectors. An outstanding example is provided by the health sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, depending on the country, between 30 and 70 per cent of the health infrastructure is currently operated by faith-based organisations (ARHAP 2006).

The following cites examples of the particular contributions made by CSOs:

- Often motivated by strong social values and dedicated staff, many CSOs are recognised for their ability to deliver quality services at a modest cost and their ability to reach marginalised segments of the population. BRAC’s education program, in Bangladesh, provides a classic, and frequently-cited, example of this. BRAC’s education programme brings primary schooling to disadvantaged children in isolated communities, yet, remarkably, manages to do so at a lower unit cost than government schools, while obtaining better results in government-run testing programmes (BRAC, 2002).

- Self-help is a guiding principle for many CSOs. It ensures that additional resources are mobilised for development, reduces aid dependency, and reinforces community ownership over development programmes. The case of Butoke, represented in Example 8, provides an illustration of a cost-effective programme to help impoverished communities and social groups help themselves to achieve higher levels of food security and welfare, by providing seeds and tools for village associations.

- World Vision is an example of an international NGO (INGO) that works systematically to mobilise communities for their own development. World Vision’s approach is illustrated in a case study of its ENHANCE programme to address malnutrition and preventable disease among children under five in remote part of Ghana. Working in association with community members, World Vision developed a community-based and integrated approach to managing childhood illnesses, and mobilised community members to implement a volunteer-based programme with the support of government health staff (World Vision Case Study, 2008).

- CSOs are also known for introducing innovative approaches and programmes that can be generalised once they have proven their worth. For example, it was CSOs, working in close contact with people living with HIV and AIDS in Africa and elsewhere, that developed what are now standard practices in HIV/AIDS prevention and care. These practices include anonymous testing in existing health facilities as a way to increase the numbers of people presenting themselves for testing, and peer education and counselling as a way to reach people living similar experiences.

● The field of small-scale savings and loans schemes and microfinance similarly demonstrates the creativity and innovation of CSOs. With banks not serving the needs of the poor, CSOs have been at the forefront of the growing savings and credit movement. Across the African continent, for example, an estimated 4 million borrowers and 6 million savers now benefit from the services of microfinance institutions including both private sector and non-profit organisations (Amoako, 2008:5).

In practice: Service delivery and self-help

Example 8. Grassroots development in Western Kasai*

Butoke is a grassroots CSO founded in 2004 to address problems of hunger and malnutrition in DRC’s Western Kasai province. Its largest programme is in food and nutrition, and combines a humanitarian approach to address immediate needs with a longer-term development approach. Working with village associations, Butoke emphasises the production of more nutritious crops such as soybeans and peanuts, by supplying seeds and basic tools and providing technical support around low-cost agricultural techniques such as row planting and proper spacing of seeds.

Beneficiaries tend to be primarily widows and others whose nutritional status is the most precarious, but the village associations contain a mix of members. Butoke’s approach has been successful in reaching large numbers of people at low cost, using a formula that has been replicated to scale as resources became available. From a starting point of 20 village associations composed of about 400 small farmers in 2004, Butoke’s food security programme was reaching a population of about 120,000 people by 2007.

Through other components of its development programme, Butoke was also supporting the school fees of 665 orphans, treating approximately 6,500 primary health cases per year, rehabilitating approximately 200 severely malnourished children per year, and providing counselling on responsible sexuality for approximately 5,000 people per year. These various activities have helped fill a void in an area of DRC in which the economy, the government and even the social fibre of society itself has been devastated by years of war and bad governance.

The example of service and respect for human rights and dignity that inspire Butoke as basic values in its work provide hope and inspiration for the population, who can see in this a different way of doing things. Butoke is helping to break down barriers to gender equality, and working to change attitudes towards the handicapped and downtrodden, in a society that tends to blame orphans, widows, and the handicapped for their own misfortune by treating them as bewitched people to be isolated, shunned, and often dispossessed.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Humanitarian assistance

CSOs also play a role in the delivery of humanitarian relief in response to natural disasters or socio-political unrest, and as advocates to ensure that the international community is sufficiently responsive to crises around the world. The role of CSOs in humanitarian work is recognised in the principles and good practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship established by 16 donor governments and the European Commission at a multi-stakeholder forum in June 2003 (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, 2003).
One of the best known humanitarian relief organisations in the world is the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC). ICRC is an independent, neutral organisation ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war, armed violence and natural disasters. They provide direct assistance, and are often responsible for the co-ordination of non-governmental humanitarian responses on the ground. They are also active in the protection of civilians, prisoners, and detainees, and help to restore family links of people affected by conflict (ICRC, 2008).

CSOs have developed their own humanitarian principles and standards, such as the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards (ICRC, 1994; Sphere, 2004).

CSOs with a long-term presence on the ground in affected countries have a particular role to play in ensuring that humanitarian relief efforts are complemented by longer-term development programmes. Example 9 illustrates the bridging role being played by a Zambian development NGO, Hodi, in two refugee camps hosting some 40 000 Congolese refugees.

In practice: Humanitarian assistance

Example 9. Bridging humanitarian and development work in Zambia

Hodi is a Zambian CSO created to enhance the capacity of community-based and intermediary organisations working in rural Zambia. Its work covers a variety of development and humanitarian initiatives.

Hodi is currently active in two Zambian refugee camps hosting approximately 40 000 Congolese refugees. Hodi provides community and education services in these camps, with funding from the United Nations Commission for Refugees.

Their community services cater to the social needs of refugees with a focus on the special needs of unaccompanied minors, women and children. Special attention is given to the issue of gender-based violence. They also support the management of community structures, and manage income generation and micro-credit schemes.

In the education sector, Hodi’s responsibilities are in both formal and informal education and range from pre-school to tertiary education. Hodi facilitates recruitment of teachers and acquisition of school materials, and ensures that the Congolese curriculum is followed.


CSOs as donors, channels and recipients of aid

This section attempts to quantify and illustrate the roles of CSOs in the aid system as aid donors in their own right, as channels for official development assistance (ODA), and as aid recipients. As donors, Northern CSOs contribute to development using funds and resources that they raise from private sources. As channels, they play an intermediary role, channelling ODA to other CSOs. As recipients, CSOs are provided with aid in support of their own initiatives and priorities. Both Northern and Southern CSOs may be recipients of aid. A Northern CSO working in partnership with CSOs in the South can be simultaneously a donor, channel and recipient of aid.
Estimates provided to the AG-CS by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) Secretariat suggest that developed country CSOs raise between USD 20 to USD 25 billion annually in contributions to development assistance. Indeed, some of the large INGOs contribute as much to development as some of the smaller bilateral donors. With a budget of over USD 2 billion per year, World Vision International’s aid budget exceeds that of Italy, for example. The Save the Children Alliance spends more than Finland, and several INGOs (CARE USA, Oxfam International and Catholic Relief Services) each spend more than Greece (Koch, 2008).

CSOs are also channels and recipients of official aid. Data on ODA flows to and through CSOs is notoriously sketchy due to inconsistencies in reporting to the OECD-DAC, the absence of data on flows intermediated by multilateral or government recipients of aid, and lack of data on decentralised flows from official donors directly to developing country CSOs. However, there is no doubt about the quantitative importance of this phenomenon.

For example, in the fiscal year 2004, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated 25 per cent of its total aid budget to US private voluntary organisations (CIS, 2007:14). Similar data on the share of ODA channelled to and through CSOs obtained from different donors provides the following results: Belgium, 20 per cent in 2007; CIDA, 23 per cent in 2007/08; Norway, 20 per cent in 2007; Sweden, 17 per cent in 2007 (E-mail correspondence and CIDA vendor data for 2007-08; see also Pratt, Adams and Warren, 2006). These shares would be less in certain countries, such as France and Japan. Overall, the OECD-DAC estimates that about 10 per cent of total ODA is channelled to and through CSOs (AG-CS, 2008d:9).

The extent to which developing country CSOs depend on international flows as opposed to national sources, varies considerably. Anecdotal evidence suggests that national sources are relatively important in some Asian and Latin American countries, but much less so in Africa. In Nicaragua, it is estimated that 80 per cent of the funding managed by a sub-set of 155 Nicaraguan CSOs in 2004 came from international sources. This corresponded to approximately 20 per cent of total ODA flows to the country (Alliance 2015, 2007:36).

Scattered data suggest that NGOs depend on outside sources to a considerable degree even in middle-income countries. In 2004, a study of 290 NGOs in Chile found that 69 per cent were partially funded by international organisations. Other sources of funds included national private organisations (31 per cent of NGOs) and tendering for grant funding from government (74 per cent of NGOs) (Fundación Soles, 2006:33).

Numerous cases featured elsewhere in this document illustrate different aspects of what it means for a CSO to be a donor, channel, or recipient of aid. All are discussed in other sections, depending upon the major lessons to be drawn from each, as they relate to different AG-CS recommendations.

Recognition

We turn now to the main task of this paper, which is to illustrate the various recommendations of the AG-CS’ Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations. Each section begins with a recap of the corresponding recommendation.
II.4. ILLUSTRATIONS ON RECOGNITION AND VOICE

A growing number of countries in both the developed and developing world are explicitly recognising the importance and distinct nature of CSOs in policy statements of various sorts.

Occasionally, governments and CSOs join efforts to develop a statement of shared values and propose ways of working together. Canada provides an example of such a statement at the country level: the Accord between the Government and the Voluntary Sector, elaborated in 2001. This accord articulates shared values and guiding principles including independence, interdependence, dialogue, collaboration, and accountability to the public (VSI, 2001). Follow-up activities included joint development of guidelines such as A Code of Good Practice on Policy Dialogue (2002).

Recognition of civil society is also seen at the supra-national level. For instance, the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the legal status of NGOs in Europe (2007) recognises that “the existence of many NGOs is a manifestation of the right of their members to freedom of association […] and of their host country’s adherence to principles of democratic pluralism” (CoE, 2007:1). It asserts “the essential contribution made by NGOs to the development and realisation of democracy and human rights and […] to the cultural life and social well-being of democratic societies” (ibid.).

Examples 10, 11 and 12 present several cases of official recognition of civil society as important development actors that have complementary roles to play with those of government. Example 10 on the Niger Basin Authority provides an example of recognition by an international body. Example 11 features cases at the national level from Croatia, India, and Colombia, while Example 12 adds a case from the Canadian province of Quebec. The Croatia and India cases are featured in more detail in Examples 50 and 51 in the enabling environment section of this paper.

Recommendation 1

All development actors should recognise the following:

a) the importance and diversity of CSOs as development and humanitarian actors in their own right;

b) that CSOs have distinctive and legitimate contributions to make to development and aid effectiveness, and that their efforts complement those of other development partners; and

c) that a strong civil society is an asset that worth developing as part of a society’s effort to transform itself and deepen democratic practice in a way that includes accommodation and support for competing visions and dissent.
In practice: CSO recognition

Example 10. CSOs and the Niger river Basin Authority

The Niger Basin Authority is a joint management institution covering ten West and Central African countries sharing an interest in the sustainable development of the Niger River basin. As part of the process for implementing the Authority's 2002 Shared Vision, civil society and CSOs were formally recognised as stakeholders. This involved official recognition in a Ministerial Resolution and adoption of mechanisms ensuring civil society participation in both centralised and decentralised processes.

Of course, official recognition in policy is not sufficient to ensure that recognition is borne out in practice. On the positive side, civil society’s views are now being taken into account in policies and planning, such as in the design of the Niger Basin Authority’s Water Charter. However, CSOs are still seen as adversaries rather than allies in some of the participating countries, and their contributions are viewed with suspicion.

Based on: Bazie (2008).

Example 11. Recognising civil society in national policy: Croatia,* India* and Colombia*

Croatia’s National Strategy for the Creation of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development from 2006 to 2011 emphasises respect for civil society autonomy as a foundation for state-civil society relations. It supports pluralism and freedom of action and speech, and acknowledges the role of CSOs as active participants in public policy making and implementation as well as in helping to guarantee constitutional values such as freedom, democracy, equality, peace, social justice, respect for human rights, the conservation of nature, the rule of law, and the right of private property.

India’s National Policy on the Voluntary Sector is a commitment to encourage, enable and empower an independent, creative and effective voluntary sector that is diverse in form and function, so that it can contribute to the social, cultural and economic advancement of the people of India. The policy emphasises that all laws, rules and regulations relating to voluntary organisations should safeguard their autonomy, while simultaneously ensuring their accountability.

In Colombia, the government and the G24 group of donors have come to recognise the importance of CSOs as actors in the aid and development agenda, giving them full voice and representation in various policy dialogue processes. CSOs have been given full recognition as participants in the London-Cartagena-Bogota process in which the International Co-operation Strategies for 2003-06 and 2007-10 have been developed.

* These cases are available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 12. Québec’s policy on community action

Since 2001, the Canadian province of Québec has put in place a policy called “Community Action: A fundamental contribution to citizenship and social development in Quebec”. Involving a broad-based consultative process, the policy was developed by an interdepartmental committee made up of representatives from 20 government departments and agencies and a Québec network of 16 independent community action organisations.
CSOs have different ways of carving out the space that they need to articulate their voice, including letters to officials, one-on-one meetings, making use of the media, or public demonstrations. The AG-CS recommendation advocates complementing such CSO-led efforts with the establishment of regular and systematic spaces for CSOs to engage in dialogue with policy makers as standard practice.

Illustrations of spaces for the voice of civil society are provided below, followed by some elements of practical guidance. There is considerable overlap between AG-CS Recommendation 2, on voice, and Recommendation 6a under “local and democratic ownership”, which calls for broadening the range of stakeholders engaged in national development processes. We have resolved this overlap by including in this section only those cases involving an international dimension, leaving for the section on Recommendation 6a those cases involving national development processes.

We begin with three illustrations of international bodies which have established mechanisms for policy dialogue with CSOs: the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (Example 13), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Example 14) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) (Example 15).

This is followed by an example describing a mechanism of the United Nations committee responsible for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) for accepting “alternative reports” on human rights from civil society, and how this played out in the case of Mali (Example 16). An interesting aspect of this case is that the work of CSOs in Mali to produce an alternative report led to an invitation by the Malian government to help it prepare its own official report. In this case, CSOs decided to protect their independence by agreeing only to assist the government in terms of awareness and training for state officials to support them in writing the official report. This reflects the fine line that CSOs often have to walk between their desire for...
policy influence and the need to avoid co-optation and loss of critical independence (Brown and Fox, 2001).

We conclude in Example 17 with some consideration of the AG-CS process itself as a manifestation of a multi-stakeholder process that was intended to help bring civil society more fully into the aid effectiveness discussions leading to HLF-3. The AG-CS process is considered to have been a successful initiative characterised by constructive and fruitful dialogue that enriched HLF-3. Emerging from this process are some new spaces for dialogue that will endure. Internationally, CSOs have been invited to join the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and its work streams in an official capacity, and consultations initiated at the national level are likely to continue in a number of countries. The case of multi-stakeholder consultations on civil society and aid effectiveness in Mali, discussed in the Forward Agenda section of this paper, is an example of this (Example 79).

Policy dialogue spaces that are conducive to effective CSO participation share a few key characteristics. Guidance from the literature suggests that such spaces exhibit the following features:

- They are regular and systematic, to allow all those engaged in the dialogue to have adequate advance notice to prepare their analysis and positions.
- They cover all stages of the policy process from issue identification to agenda setting, policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
- They are designed in a transparent and inclusive manner so that all stakeholders are clear on the rationale for the dialogue process and the process for selecting CSO participants.
- They begin with the establishment of shared principles including: recognition of the value of each stakeholder group’s voice, mutual respect, inclusiveness, accessibility, clarity, transparency, responsibility and accountability (VSI, 2002).
- They are accessible to and inclusive of a broad range of CSOs.
- They have internal and external feedback mechanisms on whether and how CSOs’ inputs influenced policy development.
- They are adequately resourced for both policy-makers and CSOs, and provide encouragement for outcomes reflecting a multi-stakeholder position.

Experience suggests that CSOs’ voices are most likely to be heard in one of two cases:

- when policy makers follow a collaborative approach in which CSOs and policy makers share responsibility for the dialogue process and for monitoring its outcomes; or
- when dialogue is conducted through the creation of an independent, multi-stakeholder body (Ebrahim and Herz, 2007:19).

All of the cases below satisfy one or the other of these two conditions.
In practice: Space for civil society to express its voice

Example 13. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union

Established under Articles 5 and 22 of the African Union’s Constitutive Act, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union was launched in 2005 as a vehicle for building a strong partnership between governments and all segments of African civil society. Its Statute defines it as an advisory organ of the African Union composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States [Assembly/AU/Dec.42 (III)]. Its composition is intended to include African social groups, professional groups, NGOs and cultural organisations. The Council elects one hundred and fifty CSOs from national, regional and diaspora bodies to its General Assembly.

Observers from African civil society laud the council as “a historical opportunity for the formulation of a new social contract between African Governments and their people […] a positive move and […] a way of involving ordinary citizens of Africa in decision and policy-making processes of issues that concern their daily lives” (Mutasa, no date).

Based on: African Union (no date), Mutasa (no date).

Example 14. UNDP’s Civil Society Advisory Committee to the Administrator

The UNDP Civil Society Advisory Committee to the Administrator was created in 2000 as a formal mechanism for dialogue between civil society representatives and UNDP senior management. The Advisory Committee brings together a group of 16 well-known civil society leaders from all over the world to serve as a strategic advisory body and sounding board to the UNDP Administrator and senior management on key policy and programming issues. An external assessment in 2008 concluded that the Advisory Committee has brought new, independent perspectives to the table, and a critical analysis of UNDP’s role and the implications of its policies for civil society.

UNDP also supports the creation of spaces for dialogue between national civil society actors and UN Country Teams through national civil society advisory committees. The goal of these national committees is to foster a two-way relationship: the committees provide UN Country Teams with strategic guidance on policies and programmes; and the United Nations provides the committees with a space for dialogue on national development priorities. Since 2006, Civil Society Advisory Committees have been set up in Bolivia and Kenya, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan, the Philippines, Senegal and Tanzania.


Example 15. The GAVI Alliance and civil society

The GAVI Alliance is a global partnership of both public and non-public organisations to improve health in the poorest countries by extending the reach and quality of immunisation coverage and strengthening health services, while providing long-term, predictable support. CSOs have had a seat on GAVI’s Board since its inception, and they are also represented in a number of GAVI task teams and advisory bodies. CSOs are increasingly consulted as part of the policy dialogue and when deciding on new investments.
At the country level, CSOs play key roles as advocates and service providers, and are often involved in the implementation of GAVI-funded initiatives. To support CSOs in these roles, the GAVI Board decided to invest USD 30 million in CSO support, beginning in 2008 on a pilot basis. Funds are available to strengthen co-ordination and representation of CSOs in each of the 72 countries currently eligible for GAVI support, and for civil society involvement in health system strengthening. 


**Example 16. Platform on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Mali**

The United Nations committee responsible for monitoring the ICESCR has indicated that it will accept reports submitted by civil society. These are commonly known as “alternative reports” or “parallel reports”. Since 1997, civil societies in many Latin American and Asian countries have adopted this approach. These alternative reports are a way for civil societies to be heard by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and to publicise the status of economic, social and cultural rights in a given country.

In Mali, the Platform for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was organised in 2005 to support civil society in strengthening the rule of law and democracy by producing alternative reports on economic, social and cultural rights in Mali. The Platform seeks to pressure public authorities in Mali to address people’s rights and honour their commitment to report to the international community on the implementation status of the ICESCR, which Mali ratified in 1976. This approach thus uses the leverage that the international community can provide to pressure the government in directions that are consistent with Mali’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

In response to the Platform’s alternative report on the status of economic, social and cultural rights in 2007, the Malian authorities asked the platform to help produce the state’s own official report by joining an inter-ministerial unit set up for that purpose. However, the Platform turned down this invitation, asserting its position as independent advocate. Instead, the platform agreed to assist the government in terms of awareness and training for state officials to support them in writing the official report.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

**Source:** Extracted from: “La plate-forme des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels au Mali”, case study (2008).

**Example 17. The Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness**

The AG-CS was created in January 2007 to advise the WP-EFF as part of the consultation process leading up to the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in September 2008 (HLF-3). It ended its work shortly after HLF-3.

The AG-CS brought together a balanced group of 12 members consisting of donors, developing country governments, and CSOs from developed and developing countries. As a multi-stakeholder group, the AG-CS was itself a formal space for civil society to share its views. However, it went beyond this, by working as a platform for launching further consultations involving civil society over a period of 18 months prior to HLF-3. Approximately 3 600 organisations were represented in these consultations, which involved CSOs meeting among themselves as well as multi-stakeholder dialogue.
The general consensus is that the AG-CS process was successful in securing increased CSO participation in the aid effectiveness dialogue, and that this had a positive impact on the overall quality of the dialogue, thanks to the different perspectives brought to the issues by CSOs. This led to a richer understanding of development and aid effectiveness, as reflected most notably in the Accra Agenda for Action under the themes of ownership, more inclusive partnerships and accountability for results. Also resulting from the AG-CS process was the increased attention being given to CSO effectiveness as something to be pursued both by CSOs themselves and as a responsibility shared by donors and developing country governments.

An important factor in explaining the success of the AG-CS was the combined “inside the tent”/“outside the tent” strategy adopted by CSOs. This approach allowed CSOs to have a voice in shaping the multi-stakeholder consensus, but to express their own views independently as required.


**Recommendations 3a to 3f**

More work should be undertaken by all stakeholders to define the conditions required for the voice of civil society to be effective and to maximise the value of their contributions to policy dialogue.

Recommendations 3a to 3f call for greater attention to the conditions of successful CSO engagement in policy dialogue. In fact, there already exists a considerable body of case literature on this topic. Key success factors emerging from these case studies suggest that CSO effectiveness in policy dialogue is a combination of CSOs’ own attitudes and practices as well as the attitudes and practices of those with whom CSOs seek to engage, along with other factors having to do with the political context, cultural influences and the socio-economic environment (Young, 2006).

Among the success factors identified are the following:

- clarity on where opportunities for negotiation exist and a willingness by stakeholders to adapt as goals change and understanding evolves;
- a diversity of approaches, including a combination of “inside the tent” and “outside the tent” tactics by CSOs, to cover a range of CSO positions (Khagram, 2008);
- recourse to strategic alliances that include vertical links across local, national, regional and international levels, and horizontal links between CSOs and other actors;
- adequate CSO capacity to make substantive contributions to the dialogue, based on sound analysis, the ability to develop positive and creative policy options, and the collection of evidence that includes the voices of those likely to be impacted by a policy; and
- CSO legitimacy to speak for the people they claim to serve or represent (adapted from Gaventa, 2001; Khagram, 2008).
Three cases of CSO attempts to influence policy at the international level are described below: the Jubilee 2000 campaign on debt relief (Example 18); the decades long struggle between opponents and proponents of big dams (Example 19); and the World Bank’s response to CSO efforts to influence Bank policy and projects in recent years (Example 20).

Jubilee 2000 offers an example of how a global coalition of CSOs including CSOs from the North and CSOs in many Southern countries most affected by debt managed to put the issue of debt relief onto the international policy agenda using a strategy that combined solid policy research and analysis and popularisation of their key message.

The second case considers the success that transnationally-allied critics of large dams have had, over a long period of time, in altering the dynamics of big dam building worldwide.

The case of the World Bank is an important one. It shows that the creation of space for citizen engagement per the AG-CS’ Recommendation 2 is insufficient, if it is not accompanied by a culture of downward accountability and appropriate incentive structures in the organisations that CSOs seek to influence, and sufficient political savvy and capacity to engage on the part of CSOs. This suggests the need for detailed attention to the conditions required both within civil society and within the organisations that they seek to influence, for civil society inputs to be effective. Investigation of cases other than that of the World Bank, including other development co-operation agencies and government institutions, would be of considerable interest.

In practice: Success factors affecting the effectiveness of CSO advocacy and policy dialogue

Example 18. The Global Jubilee 2000 campaign

Jubilee 2000 was a global campaign launched in the UK in the early 1990s. A decentralised, country-based, coalition of development NGOs, faith-based organisations and labour groups, the Jubilee 2000 campaign was remarkably successful in its call for debt cancellation to make more resources available for poverty reduction in debt-burdened countries. As a case in point, the Jubilee 2000 campaign in Uganda achieved results in terms of debt cancellation for that country while also carving out a role for CSOs in the dialogue on budget priorities and monitoring of government spending of the newly freed-up financial resources.

Key success factors identified by CSO activists engaged in the Jubilee 2000 campaign include:

- expertise and sophistication of policy analysis and proposals;
- use of the Internet to facilitate extensive, inexpensive and timely communications;
- popularisation of a complex issue, and use of moral claims;
- the ability to capitalise on strategic opportunities such as the approaching Millennium Summit; and
- mobilisation of media attention and popular personalities to champion the cause.

The campaign was noted for its broad base and deep reach internationally, including active membership from CSOs in developing countries.

Example 19. Transnational struggles over big dams

During the 1980s and 1990s, Government agencies, international organisations, and private sector firms slowly began to reform their policies and practices with respect to big dam building around the world. These reforms were motivated in part by the scientific and practical knowledge base built up from experience with dam building over the previous fifty years, but more importantly, they were the result of social mobilisation on a global scale against large dams.

For five decades, a growing number of transnationally-allied critics have persistently and progressively pushed governments, international organisations, and private firms to reform dam-building policies or halt dam construction projects altogether. Through the coalescence of a multitude of struggles and campaigns waged at the local, national, and international levels, transnationally-allied critics have dramatically altered the dynamics of big dam building worldwide.

Domestic civil society groups across the world, like the Movement of Dam Affected Peoples in Brazil and the Save the Narmada Movement in India, worked to block or substantially reform inequitable and unsustainable big dam projects in their own countries. They often did so by forming partnerships with like-minded international CSOs such as Survival International or Environmental Defense.

Transnational civil society critics of big dam projects have promoted the establishment of norms regarding human rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption, and have been strengthened, in turn, by the application of these norms and their institutionalisation into the procedures and structures of states, international organisations, multinational corporations and other powerful interests.

Transnationally-allied critics of big dams have not had the same impact everywhere. Civil society actors, and the range of tactics they employ, have been most effective in more democratic institutional contexts that offer greater opportunities to organise and gain access to decision-making processes and, importantly, where the ability of big dam proponents to violently repress resistance is reduced. Perhaps most importantly, the ability of the opponents of big dams to shape outcomes has been greatly enhanced when led by domestic peoples’ groups and social movements capable of generating sustained grassroots mobilisation and multi-level advocacy from the local to global levels.


Example 20. World Bank responses to civil society

Among global institutions, the World Bank has been among the most frequently targeted by CSOs for at least 30 years. In a 2007 Working Paper, Alnoor Ebrahim and Steve Herz assess the effectiveness of these efforts in terms of the World Bank’s response. They argue that civil society efforts to influence World Bank policies can be credited with a number of significant successes dating back at least to the early 1980s, including adjustments to the Bank’s environmental practices, greater transparency and greater openness to participatory processes.

The authors cite several examples of public consultation involving the World Bank, including the establishment of the World Commission on Dams, the Extractive Industries Review and the Structural Participatory Review Initiatives. CSOs have given these processes high marks for developing policy recommendations that addressed their priorities. However, CSOs have expressed their disappointment due to limited adoption of those recommendations by the Bank due to differing views about what was politically feasible. Bank officials consider that civil society groups engage in these processes with
unrealistic expectations. Lack of feedback from the Bank to inform participants of whether and how their inputs have influenced policy outcomes seems to have exacerbated frustrations by CSOs and undermined the Bank's credibility.

The authors tell a similar story regarding CSO influence at the project level, noting that the use of consultative processes has expanded considerably over the last 15 years, but that the impact of these consultations on Bank-supported projects has been limited and uneven. Several reasons are advanced for this including:

- the initiation of consultations too late in the project cycle, once the problem to be addressed had already been framed and after the proposed response had already been formulated;  
- weak participation at the monitoring and evaluation stage, when it would be required for CSOs to be able to fully play their role as watchdogs of the public interest;  
- limitations on the quality of the consultations; and  
- insufficient capacity by CSOs from affected communities to participate meaningfully in the consultations.

Although the World Bank has consistently found "a high correlation between the extent and quality of public participation and overall project quality" (Ebrahim and Herz, 2007:4), the results of this study suggest the need for greater attention to conditions within the Bank itself that constrain the quality of those consultations and the Bank's own response. The authors attribute this to “the landscape of accountability” at the World Bank, in which effective citizen participation is structurally undermined by features such as disbursement pressures, the lack of incentives for task managers to systematically make space for citizens to express their voice, and the lack of measures to promote downward accountability (Ebrahim and Herz, 2007:4-17).

The Bank continues to be the subject of criticism regarding its ability to effectively engage with civil society, and is actively exploring ways to address this. Staff forums have been organised to learn about the roles, nature and perspective of CSOs and constructive ways to engage with them, and a Bank publication titled Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organisations proposes measures such as joint training with CSOs, staff exchanges, and secondments, as ways of “building mutual understanding and more constructive relations” (World Bank, 2005:32). The Bank also produces a monthly information-sharing e-newsletter, and, together with the IMF, hosts annual meetings with CSOs to dialogue on the agency’s policies and on development issues of the day.

Based on Ebrahim and Herz (2007) and World Bank (2005).

Notes

1. Data for Canada is only available for the share of ODA managed by CIDA, which accounts for about 80% of the total. The figure excludes CIDA flows to CSOs that are channelled through local-level organisations other than CSOs. These amount roughly to another 4% of CIDA ODA.

2. NGOs are a particular category of CSOs dedicated to development co-operation, and tend to be more aid dependent than other categories of CSOs such as unions or professional associations.
Chapter 5

Illustrations on Civil Society and the Paris Declaration

This chapter looks at examples of aid effectiveness practices involving CSOs, including the following:

1. how CSOs contribute to more democratic ownership in government-led programmes, and apply the ownership principle in their own programmes;
2. alignment with priorities of CSOs and their constituents;
3. harmonisation efforts in which CSOs and governments play complementary roles;
4. CSO approaches to results management that promote iterative learning and accommodate indicators of social and institutional change; and
5. CSO initiatives to promote social accountability or their own accountability.
The AG-CS’ over-arching recommendations on the Paris Declaration are that all stakeholders should:

**Recommendation 4a**

Recognise the character of the Paris Declaration as a historic agreement between donors and developing countries at a particular point in time, to address a particular set of issues and mutual obligations.

**Recommendation 4b**

Deepen understanding and application of the Paris Declaration principles in ways that emphasise local and democratic ownership, social diversity, gender equality and accountability for achieving results of benefit to poor and marginalised populations as essential conditions of effectiveness.

This recommendation to adopt an enriched understanding of the Paris Declaration principles is one that numerous groups had already begun to apply well before the Accra HLF-3 as they strived to make sense of the Paris principles for their work. Examples include reflections on the pertinence of the Paris Declaration principles for vertical or global funds (World Bank, 2006), discussions in Dublin and London on crosscutting issues (OECD-DAC, 2008), and the work of the Global Donor Platform on Rural Development (GDPRD, 2008). Some CSOs, such as World Vision and the CSOs involved in the Uniterra programme, have used an enriched understanding of the Paris principles when assessing or demonstrating their own aid effectiveness (Phillips, 2008; Example 76).

Worthy of note is that there was considerable debate within the AG-CS about the applicability of even the enriched principles to the activities of CSOs. CSO members recognised the value and importance of the Paris principles, but left to their own, would not necessarily have adopted the same set of principles for CSOs or prioritised them in the same way. Recommendation 4 suggests that effectiveness principles are context specific: they depend upon the purposes for which they are devised and the context in which they are applied.

This idea is well illustrated in a CSO discussion paper on the determinants of civil society aid effectiveness that proposed the following guiding principles for North-South partnership relationships. As readers can attest for themselves, these are very distinct from what one finds in the Paris Declaration (Tomlinson, 2006):

- A **shared vision**, negotiated in a context of mutual support and solidarity, beyond specific programmes or projects.
- A **respect for diversity** that also clearly identifies shared roles and objectives, while negotiating differences arising from respective organisational mandates and the autonomy of each counterpart.
- **Respect and honesty** in working relationships, based on a continued commitment to understand and appreciate each others’ potential and limits.
II.5. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARIS DECLARATION

- **Transparency**, with a clear commitment to work in ways that maximise accountability to each other for the commitments and obligations undertaken together (financial and otherwise).

- A **climate of mutual trust** that is the result of both striving for equity in the practice of the relationship and the commitment of time, through multiple forms of engagement with each other.

- A **sharing of knowledge** that is built on a commitment to devote human and financial resources to appropriate forms of mutual learning.

A second illustration of how the choice of principles is context-specific comes from work that was done from a field perspective on donor support for civil society in Tanzania (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007). Described in Example 61, this exercise arrived at its own set of principles, which are consistent with those of the Paris Declaration, yet quite different, including such principles as the need to encourage diversity of funding strategies, mainstreaming support for civil society, adopting a human rights approach, engaging in a long-term commitment and encouraging innovation and learning. Clearly, even the “enriched” Paris principles can be complemented by general or operational principles covering other aspects of aid effectiveness.

**Local and democratic ownership**

**Recommendation 5**

A return to basics is in order regarding the ownership principle, including a change of vocabulary away from the commonly used expression “country ownership”, which is misleading. More accurate would be an expression such as “local and democratic ownership” which emphasises ownership not just by central government agencies, but also by parliaments, local governments, citizens, communities and CSOs.

Recommendation 5 calls for a broader understanding of the ownership principle, and suggest a change of vocabulary, away from the expression “country ownership” which the AG-CS associates with a centralised view of ownership. Common alternatives are “democratic ownership”, “local ownership”, or a combination of the two as recommended by the AG-CS. Others avoid the problem by using the word “ownership” in a stand-alone fashion.

Examples of ownership involving CSOs are of two types: those illustrating more democratic ownership in government-led programmes, and those showing how CSOs apply the ownership principle in their own programmes. These are covered respectively under Recommendations 6a and 6b. Considerably more attention was paid to the former of these two applications under the AG-CS process, because of the Paris Declaration’s emphasis on government-led poverty reduction programmes.

**Recommendation 6a**

The range of stakeholders engaged in the design, implementation and assessment of development strategies, programmes and initiatives should be significantly broadened to include parliaments, local governments, citizens, communities and CSOs.
II.5. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARIS DECLARATION

What follow are examples of more democratic ownership through CSO engagement with government in the design, implementation and assessment of such programmes and initiatives.

According to a seven-country study of African Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), processes of public engagement in PRSP development have helped to open democratic space for domestic policy dialogue (Booth, 2003). However, civil society critiques of PRSP processes suggest that further progress is needed (e.g. Christian Aid, 2001; Whaites, 2002). The World Bank has acknowledged that, “significant constraints to meaningful participation remain in many countries” (World Bank, 2005:26).

One of the challenges in broadening participation in national development agenda-setting and monitoring is how to make these policy processes inclusive of a broad range of civil society actors and social movements, including representation from sub-national levels and traditionally marginalised sectors. Geography, social, cultural, economic and political factors, and different levels of organisational capacity, all have an inevitable impact on the degree to which different segments of civil society are represented in policy dialogue. CSOs have tried to overcome such constraints through the organisation of networks and coalitions, capable of harnessing and synthesising the inputs of a relatively broad range of civil society actors. Some of the cases below illustrate how networks and coalitions play this role.

We begin with a case of women’s organisations involvement in Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process (Example 21), and follow with three cases of civil society involvement in the design and implementation of government-led national sector policies and plans in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Indonesia (Examples 22 to 24). The last case illustrates decentralised efforts to engage a broad range of stakeholders in local development planning under the United Nation’s ART programme (Example 25).

The following provides a few highlights from these cases:

- The case of the Gender Thematic Group in Kenya’s PRSP process in Example 21 shows how the involvement of women’s organisations in the PRSP process added value and legitimacy to the process and broadened ownership of the PRSP.

- In Burkina Faso, despite limited CSO engagement in the initial formulation of the education sector plan, the CSO coalition Cadre de concertation en éducation de base now routinely engages with government, especially at the regional level, on education sector issues, and has been doing so with increased effectiveness (Example 22).

- In the case of Senegal’s Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act, a membership-based CSO of agriculturalists managed, through an extensive, decentralised consultation process, to bring forward a policy proposal of relevance to smallholder farmers (Example 23).

- World Vision’s Fight Tuberculosis (TB) programme in Indonesia provides an example of a CSO’s efforts to support implementation of the government’s health strategy, through awareness raising and adaptation to community level realities in a bottom-up approach to building local ownership (Example 24).

- The UNDP-led ART Initiative illustrates how international co-operation and North-South partnerships can be organised to support locally-owned priorities based on participatory processes inclusive of local governments, CSOs and other decentralised actors (Example 25).
In practice: Local and democratic ownership

Example 21. Kenya’s gender thematic group*

As part of the process to develop its PRSP, the government of Kenya took a number of steps to increase participation by previously excluded groups, including women. One of the mechanisms for achieving this was the creation of thematic groups, the first of which was the Gender Thematic Group, established in response to lobbying from women’s organisations in Kenya. The aim was to ensure that gender concerns were clearly and adequately addressed in Kenya’s PRSP and Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

The Gender Thematic Group managed to influence the PRSP both in process and content. For the first time in Kenya, gender was identified as a crosscutting issue, and concerted efforts were made to engage women and women’s organisations in the dialogue, including in Sector Working Groups, at the district level and at the community level.

Participatory poverty assessments were carried out in 10 districts, and reports of these assessments captured the voices of poor women and their experiences.

The role played by CSOs in the consultative process, including at the grassroots level, added value and legitimacy to the exercise, and contributed significantly to its eventual success and to broader ownership of the PRSP.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 22. CSO coalition for basic education in Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, CSOs were initially marginalised in policy discussions that led to the formulation of the education sector plan in 2002. Teachers’ unions, in particular, were excluded, because of their opposition to aspects of the plan. However, the capacity and effectiveness of CSOs to engage has grown over time, due to the emergence of a relatively cohesive and effective coalition of education CSOs, the Cadre de concertation des ONG/associations actives en éducation de base au Burkina Faso.

This coalition is especially active at the regional level, which is where much education decision-making now resides. Its members co-operate to speak for civil society on issues such as gender, curriculum reform and regional planning. CSO consultation at the national and regional levels in Burkina Faso is now routine, and the coalition plays a role in linking regional and national levels of decision-making. The coalition faces some challenges, such as limited capacity for monitoring national educational quality and equity issues, and a limited ability to engage a wider public on education issues, but they are increasingly able to articulate demands.

In contrast to many other civil society coalitions, the coalition in Burkina Faso has not made universal free access to primary education a central part of its mobilisation efforts. Some critics have seized on this to argue that CSOs have been co-opted through participation, and that this has had the effect of legitimising educational policies determined by the central government and a cohort of international donors. However, the role of civil society in the governance of the Burkina Faso education sector is gradually increasing as a result of formal and informal mechanisms put in place since the government’s education strategy was launched in 2002. A unique feature of the Burkina Faso education sector programme has been the formalisation of space for CSO initiatives through the establishment of a CSO-government pooled fund for non-formal education projects.

Example 23. Public consultations on Senegal’s 2004 Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act*

Senegal’s Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act was designed on the basis of a broad-based consultative process. In March 2003, the government made public a first version of the legislation, which met with considerable opposition. In response, the government put in place a consultative process to elaborate a policy engaging rural and peasant organisations, NGOs, elected officials and donors.

To help inform this process, the Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux (CNCR), a CSO of Senegalese agriculturalists, organised consultations with its members involving 3,000 agricultural producers in all regions of the country over a four-month period. Of note was the extensive, nation-wide, nature of the process, which began with village level meetings and proceeded through departmental and regional levels, to the national level.

CNCR’s goal was to develop a counter-proposal to the draft legislation. Through the resulting counter-proposal and ongoing participation in the consultation process, the CNCR and others engaged in the process were able to influence the revised legislation. Among the changes secured in the legislation were the following:

- The land tenure component of the legislation was removed, to become part of a separate consultation.
- Agricultural reform is more explicitly focused on food security.
- All rural economic activities are addressed in the legislation, not simply agriculture.
- Small-scale household economic activities, such as animal husbandry, are fully addressed.

The participatory manner in which the Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act was developed represents a first in West Africa. Other countries, Mali and Burkina Faso in particular, have followed suit.

The large-scale mobilisation and consultation in rural areas served to empower the rural population, and strengthened the legitimacy of the CNCR to speak for smallholders. The government has benefited from a participatory process that was inclusive of more than the representatives of CSOs, networks and donors.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


Example 24. World Vision’s Fight TB Programme in Indonesia

World Vision’s Fight TB Programme in Indonesia illustrates how bottom-up ownership by the community can help to enhance the success of government programmes. Tuberculosis (TB) control was a component of the government’s health strategy in Indonesia prior to World Vision’s initiative, but free TB services available through the local government health centres were not being used, due to a lack of public trust in them.

World Vision engaged with communities and found them receptive to learning about TB treatment as part of its Fight TB Programme. The organisation thus set up a system of “treatment partners”, in which two volunteers from TB-affected communities were paired, through the local Ministry of Health, with newly detected TB patients to ensure they followed treatment correctly.

Over time, with sensitisation and increasingly successful rates of treatment, community members’ confidence in the government’s TB services grew, as did their ownership of it. The result was that fewer patients with full-blown TB were in need of hospital treatment.

II.5. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARIS DECLARATION

Example 25. Defining a shared vision for local development

The UN’s ART Initiative is a multilateral co-operation initiative that brings together programmes and activities of several United Nations agencies and other donors in selected countries. The country programmes associated with ART adhere to a vision of ownership which goes beyond that of national governments to include a wide democratic and public process involving national and local governments and CSOs. This vision is also based on the recognition that local communities should be the protagonists of their own development processes, determining their goals, agendas and aspirations for the future, in active dialogue with national actors.

A key element of the initiative is the creation of an operational planning mechanism in which all social actors present in a given territory (a municipality, district or province) come together to define a shared vision of their territory and set the priorities that the programme will address locally. As part of this process, ART helps put in place a participatory methodology to analyse needs, potential resources, problems and priorities involving even the most marginalised people. Several tools are used, including community needs mapping and resource mapping.

This analysis leads to the identification of priorities for international co-operation as a complement to other public policy processes. As priorities are articulated, they are reflected in a “territorial marketing document”, which then serves as a basis for UNDP and its partners to facilitate contacts with potential development partners (other municipalities or regional governments and elected bodies, or CSOs). In this way, the developing country partner has the opportunity to learn about different ways of addressing a specific challenge they are facing, and are able to establish a wide range of partners to resolve them.


Recommendation 6b

Recognise that ownership of specific initiatives and programmes may involve leadership by different actors, including national governments, decentralised government bodies, or CSOs.

This recommendation draws our attention to initiatives that are led by CSOs as development actors in their own right, and to the application of the ownership principle in those cases. Ownership as understood in the aid effectiveness context is fundamentally about how Northern and Southern partners relate to each other, and we can see this principle in operation in all of the cases illustrated in this document that involve Northern CSOs in a donor capacity as part of a larger partnership effort.
Examples covered later in the paper include how volunteer-sending organisations are working with their partners in the Uniterra case study (Example 76) and the way a Philippine CSO is partnered with a Northern counterpart in the MASAI-Caritas Neerlandica case (Example 78). We have chosen not to belabour such examples here, except to note that this principle is a long-standing one for CSOs.

Of course, the principle of local ownership is also relevant to Southern CSOs and their relationship with their constituents and beneficiaries. While our case studies and examples do not particularly emphasise this dimension, this aspect of local ownership is clearly observable in the work of Southern CSOs such as IBON (Example 6), Butoke (Example 8), and BRAC (featured in the Case Book).

**Recommendation 6c**  
Reinforce different stakeholders’ capacity to exercise ownership through capacity development initiatives and support for democratic processes.

**Recommendation 6d**  
Adopt a new approach to conditionality in which donors emphasise their role in facilitating policy options that are democratically developed and discussed, and invest in strengthening the capacity of governments, parliaments and CSOs to develop locally-owned policy solutions.

These recommendations call for investments in capacity strengthening for stakeholders to engage in democratic processes and develop locally-owned policy solutions. Our illustrations cover three cases of civil society capacity development. These include capacity building for CSOs to engage with government in the pursuit of human rights in Ghana (Example 26); an information programme for CSOs in Tanzania (Example 27); and macroeconomic policy capacity building in Africa (Example 28).

Readers will find additional examples of CSO capacity development efforts throughout the paper, and in particular under the title of Support for Civil Society Strengthening, in the Good Donorship section of this paper. These include the Ghana Resource Centre initiative (Example 56), PRIA’s capacity development work in India (Example 57), and CHF’s capacity development work in Guyana (Example 58). These cases are fully relevant as illustrations of Recommendation 6c, but also contain some important lessons about good donorship.

A topic alluded to in Recommendation 6c that is not covered in any of the cases here is government’s capacity to constructively engage with CSOs, and how that capacity might be reinforced. In much of the world, the relationship between government and civil society wavers between suspicion and collaboration, and is often characterised by pragmatic acceptance rather than commitment to meaningful inclusion. Reinforcing government capacity would thus need to include efforts to build trust and understanding between government and CSOs.
II.5. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARIS DECLARATION

In practice: Civil society capacity development for policy dialogue

Example 26. The Rights and Voices Initiative in Ghana

Ghana’s Rights and Voices Initiative is a five-year grant-funding programme supported by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Its objective is to strengthen the capacity and confidence of CSOs working with poor and marginalised people to engage with government on human rights issues. This is achieved by providing financial resources and capacity building support to CSOs. CSOs large and small are eligible for support, and small community-based organisations are reached through larger intermediary organisations. Topics covered include financial accountability and planning, rights-based approaches, monitoring and evaluation, people-centred advocacy and citizen-government engagement.


Example 27. Pact in Tanzania

Pact is a US NGO focused on strengthening the capacity of local organisations and leaders to influence policy to address the critical social and economic needs of vulnerable groups. Its work illustrates how capacity development efforts can be broadly targeted through the production of specialised information guides.

In Tanzania, Pact has produced a number of plain-language user-friendly resources, such as the Legislative Roadmap: A Guide for Civil Society Organisations in Tanzania. This guide was produced in collaboration with a Tanzanian partner, the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, and addresses many aspects of the policy and legislative framework in the country, such as the distinction between civil and criminal law, rights and responsibilities enshrined in the constitution, and the policy-making process.

Another example is Pact’s Media Guide: A Handbook for Tanzanian Civil Society, developed in collaboration with the Tanzania Media Women’s Association, intended to help CSOs understand and use the media better to promote their work and policy recommendations.

Extracted from: Pact (no date a), Pact Tanzania (no date). For more information visit: www.pactworld.org/cs/institutional_strengthening.

Based on: Amoako (2008) and other sources.

In practice: New approaches to conditionality

Example 28. Macroeconomic policy capacity building in Africa

AG-CS Recommendation 6d, which advocates a new approach to conditionality, is not very radical, since donors, including the World Bank and many others, have worked for years to further the capacity of developing countries to develop their own policy options through research and support for independent or government-affiliated think tanks. Initiatives of this sort in Africa have included support for the African Economic Research Consortium, the African Capacity Development Foundation, and independent research centres. The think tanks mentioned in Example 7 and many others have all received considerable support from donors.

These various efforts have created a base upon which it is possible to build, as K.Y. Amoako (2008) argues, in the African context, in the following passage:

“We are at a point where good governance and the collaboration between governments and civil society organisations can accelerate growth and reduce poverty. This transformation
Alignment

**Recommendation 7**

Alignment should be understood broadly to mean alignment with the priorities of developing country counterparts and emphasis on the use and strengthening of country systems broadly understood. Efforts to develop and use country systems should extend beyond centralised government mechanisms to other parts of government, decentralised authorities, and CSOs.

This recommendation to enrich our understanding of the alignment principle follows from those on the subject of local and democratic ownership. Alignment refers to donor and external partner respect of locally defined priorities and reliance on country systems for the management of aid-supported initiatives. Enrichment of that principle as recommended by the AG-CS means adopting a broader interpretation of locally defined priorities and of “country systems.” From this perspective, locally defined priorities include those of CSOs and their constituents; and “country systems” include all country systems required to ensure the success of aid initiatives. Although the Paris Declaration focuses on central government agencies responsible for public financial management, the concept of country systems from this perspective is a broad one that includes government and non-governmental systems of service delivery, and systems of representation and accountability, in addition to central government systems.

While the Paris Declaration identifies local ownership with government leadership as expressed in a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, the AAA is more nuanced, and recognises CSOs as independent development actors in their own right (paragraph 20). This implies that the priorities of CSOs may be distinct from those of the national government.

In some cases, CSOs may succeed in their efforts to enrich or modify government strategies. As we saw earlier, this is what happened with the gender equality message that the Gender Thematic Group brought to the PRSP dialogue in Kenya (Example 21).

In other cases, CSOs may be ahead of government, or simply have priorities of their own. CSOs working for social transformation, such as IBON Foundation (Example 6) provide a good illustration of this. Another illustration of CSOs leading the policy agenda is...
seen in the Jubilee 2000 campaign (Example 18), where country-based CSOs successfully pushed the debt cancellation message onto the policy agenda at both the national and international levels.

The Butoke case (Example 8) as detailed in the Case Book provides a clear example of an official donor and Northern partner CSOs aligning their support to the priorities of a domestic CSO, and relying on CSOs’ own management systems. Indeed, the role of Northern CSOs in this case was largely to act as a conduit for mobilising funds and support and ensuring financial accountability.

Some of the cases reviewed for this paper illustrate how CSOs can align their efforts simultaneously with government priorities and systems and with the priorities of beneficiaries, while experimenting with new approaches. The case of Progresso and CODE in Mozambique (in Example 29) is a good illustration of this. Examples 31 and 32, in the section on Co-ordination and Harmonisation, provide additional instances of this. These include the collaborative arrangements that exist between AKFC, domestic CSOs, and government in Mozambique’s rural development sector (Example 31), and sharing of responsibilities in Afghanistan’s micro-finance sector (Example 32).

Recognition of the complementarity of government and CSO systems has implications for donors, because civil society does not always receive the independent support it needs to play its role. Example 30 illustrates how the Education for All Fast Track Initiative has tried to fill this gap in its country-based approach to education by directing funds to CSOs.

**In practice: Using CSOs as part of country systems**

**Example 29. CSOs and education in Mozambique: Issues of alignment and complementarity**

This case of CSOs in the Mozambique education sector illustrates several aspects of alignment: CSO alignment with government systems and priorities, alignment with the localised needs of the beneficiary population, and alignment of a Northern CSO with the priorities and systems of a Southern CSO partner.

This case involves a partnership between Associação Progresso in Mozambique, and CODE, a Canadian organisation specialised in the promotion of quality primary education. Progresso and CODE have been working to increase the quality of education in the two Northern provinces of Mozambique for over 15 years. The activities in their joint programme, “Promotion of a Literate Environment in Mozambique”, include the provision of reading and learning materials in Portuguese and local languages, skills development for primary teachers and adult literacy teachers, and training of education officers in specialised functions such as education planning, in-service training, and the monitoring of teaching and learning.

Progresso and CODE work in close co-operation with the Mozambican Ministry of Education and Culture at the national and provincial levels. Their experience and innovative practices have influenced government policy, notably through the inclusion of a bilingual curriculum in the Government of Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan. Their programme activities are aligned with the government’s sector strategy, but the project is funded through a bilateral agreement between CODE and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
Progresso and CODE work with communities and government to design and implement interventions that correspond to the identified needs and the institutional priorities and capacities of the government. However, they do so in a way that is more flexible than government structures alone can manage, adapting to local needs, realities and socio-cultural characteristics, while drawing on their own knowledge, skills and experience.

The division of labour between Progresso and CODE takes into account the comparative advantages of each partner. CODE brings international expertise to the project, reinforced by its long-term presence in Mozambique, and is responsible for the management of the contract with CIDA. This allows Progresso to focus on relations with its Mozambican partners, while retaining primary responsibility for activities in the field.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

**Example 30. Education for all and support for national CSO coalitions**

The importance of CSO engagement in education has been increasingly recognised in global agreements such as the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action. However the emphasis of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative, a donor initiative established in 2000, was to facilitate joint funding of government’s education sector plans. This left certain gaps, which the Fast Track Initiative is now trying to address through direct support of CSO coalitions in developing countries, so that CSOs may better contribute to the preparation and implementation of sector plans.

In late 2008, the Fast Track Initiative’s Education Programme Development Fund approved the principle of a three-year, USD 22 million project, the main objective of which is to support national education coalitions of CSOs to more fully engage as partners in the pursuit of Education For All goals. Funds will be allocated to the Global Campaign for Education, a coalition of INGOs overseeing the project, which will on-grant funds to be managed by three regional CSO coalitions. The project will support national civil society coalitions in approximately 63 countries, and will cover co-ordination and strategic initiatives by CSOs, and capacity development in areas such as policy analysis and research.

National CSO coalitions will be assisted to create National Civil Society Education Funds to sustain their efforts in the long term. Future funding options for these Funds could include foundations, the private sector, international NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. Bilateral and multilateral donors that support national governments’ education plans through SWAps or budgetary support will be encouraged to commit additional funding.


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**Co-ordination and harmonisation**

**Recommendation 8**

A balanced approach should be taken to co-ordination and harmonisation that emphasises the value of more comprehensive approaches to development programming, while also acknowledging the value of diversity and innovation.

This over-arching recommendation is multi-faceted with five specific sub-recommendations as follows:
II.5. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARIS DECLARATION

The emphasis of this section is primarily on Recommendations 9a and 9b. Recommendations 9c to 9e overlap with Recommendations 13 and 14 in the CSO Effectiveness section, and will be dealt with in that section.

Central to these recommendations is the potential complementarity of government and CSO programmes in particular sectors. We saw a case of CSO-government complementarity in the last section, in the case of the Progresso/CODE initiative in Mozambique’s education sector (Example 29). In Example 31, we look at another case from Mozambique – the work of AKFC in agriculture and rural development, which also complements the government’s efforts.

Both the Progresso/CODE and AKFC initiatives are CIDA funded. This reflects an explicit CIDA strategy in Mozambique to invest in “a balanced combination of contributions to pooled funds with other donors, and support to decentralised projects that target the most vulnerable” (CIDA, 2004 in AKFC, 2007:2). This approach allows CIDA to support CSO-led initiatives that complement government-led programme-based approaches (PBAs), but are more closely aligned with localised needs and realities.

We have seen other examples of CSOs complementing government-led PBAs in other sections. In Burkina Faso, we saw how a CSO coalition helps to bridge regional and national decision-making processes (Example 22). In Indonesia, we saw how World Vision’s Fight TB Programme complements that of the government, using a volunteer-based approach at the community level (Example 24). World Vision has played a similar role in extending health and nutrition initiatives to remote areas of Ghana in collaboration with government health staff.

Recommendation 9a
All actors should recognise the complementary roles played by governments and CSOs and the implications of this for enhanced co-ordination and harmonisation of government and CSO efforts.

Recommendation 9b
Greater efforts should be made by governments and donors to support the participation of CSOs in government-led sector programmes (independently or under contract), and greater efforts by CSOs themselves to engage in these programmes.

Recommendation 9c
CSOs should make greater efforts to co-ordinate and harmonise their activities with those of other CSOs.

Recommendation 9d
Recognise civil society strengthening as an objective that is itself worth pursuing in a more comprehensive way by all development stakeholders.

Recommendation 9e
Recognise that responsive funding formulas continue to have an important role to play for tapping into the energy and innovative ideas of citizens and CSOs as agents of change and development.
The Microfinance Investment Support Facility in Afghanistan (MISFA) (Example 32) offers another case of CSO-government complementarity. MISFA was established under the Government of Afghanistan's Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development as a vehicle through which the government and donors channel technical assistance and funding to build up microfinance at the lower end of the financial sector, in collaboration with civil society and private sector microfinance service delivery institutions.

We conclude this section with an example illustrating what can happen when the CSO and government efforts are not sufficiently co-ordinated: the case of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique, where a lack of government efforts to harness the potential of CSOs working in this sector resulted in lost opportunities to achieve more effective government programmes of HIV prevention (Example 33).

**In practice: Complementarity between government and CSOs**

**Example 31. Aga Khan Foundation Canada’s Coastal Rural Support Programme in Mozambique**

In the late 90s, AKFC launched its Coastal Rural Support Programme, in collaboration with the government, in the northern region of Mozambique. Initial funding for this effort was provided by CIDA’s Canadian Partnership Branch. Based on strong results and support from Mozambique officials, this first initiative grew into a six-year AKFC programme funded by CIDA’s bilateral desk for Mozambique and other donors.

The Coastal Rural Support Programme takes a long-term, multi-sectoral approach intended to address the many dimensions and causes of acute rural poverty at the household and community levels in the region. It has fostered an array of innovative measures, such as community-managed early childhood development, and block farming aimed at improving farming practices and preventing animal attacks. AKFC works actively to distil lessons from the programme and disseminate these to other stakeholders.

The programme contributes to the government’s poverty reduction strategy and to relevant sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in various ways by:

- building government capacity at provincial and district levels;
- supporting government’s efforts to enhance service delivery;
- developing the capacity of grassroots civil society structures;
- supporting linkages between local CSOs and local government; and
- supporting government programme and policy reforms.

The programme is aligned with government priorities and allows government to extend the reach and depth of its work in ways that are aligned with the needs and realities of local communities. The programme thus harnesses the best of government and civil society initiative to enhance their joint effectiveness.

Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


**Example 32. Pooled funding for microfinance in Afghanistan**

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan is a multi-stakeholder national programme launched by the Government of Afghanistan in June 2003. MISFA is now one of the world’s largest microfinance programmes, and is incorporated as a
government-owned company. However, this company does not deliver microfinance services. It operates as a wholesaler, enabling donors to pool their resources to build up the microfinance sector in Afghanistan, in collaboration with international, regional, and local civil society and private sector microfinance service-delivery institutions.

MISFA now has over 400,000 active clients (70 per cent of whom are women), in 23 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Research results indicate that the microfinance sector in Afghanistan has led to increased business activity and improved socio-economic status for its clients.

The programme’s success can be attributed to many factors. These include:

- strong leadership by the government in the beginning, evolving to arms’ length involvement;
- high quality staff;
- a pooled donor funding mechanism that offers capacity building support and funding for microfinance institutions;
- close alignment with local and national priorities; and
- growing local Afghan involvement.


**Example 33. Lost opportunities in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Mozambique**

SALAMA, a local public health NGO in Mozambique addressing HIV and AIDS, has developed a national reputation for innovative awareness-raising programmes on HIV and AIDS in neighbourhoods and schools using theatre, skits, debates, films, radio programmes and talks at schools or during halftime at soccer games. SALAMA also runs a homecare programme that trains local people as volunteer caregivers to build the capacity of families to look after chronically-ill family members.

Unfortunately, SALAMA and other similar NGOs with extensive local knowledge have not been included in a meaningful way in the country’s national health programming. The national health sector strategy gives government a virtual monopoly in implementing critical activities including HIV testing, distribution of condoms in rural areas, and anti-retroviral treatment. As a result, the space for CSOs to creatively explore and experiment outside of national policy frameworks has been considerably reduced.

This marginalisation of Mozambican public-health NGOs with specialised local knowledge and experience has represented a lost opportunity on a number of fronts. For instance, government, donors and INGOs alike have been slow to fully appreciate a key cause of HIV transmission, the practice of maintaining a small number of simultaneous, long-term partners. This has resulted in less effective government and INGO programmes and campaigns, because of the way that they associate the transmission of HIV with reckless behaviour such as drinking and prostitution. These campaigns have complicated the work of local NGOs whose messaging is based on a more subtle understanding of the moral rules of the game in Mozambique.

This case study argues that donors and governments would get greater traction in the AIDS struggle by harmonising, co-ordinating and aligning their efforts with more locally-designed and controlled programmes run by indigenous NGOs such as SALAMA.

Managing for results and accountability

The AG-CS makes seven specific recommendations on results management and accountability that can be divided into three groups: results management models (Recommendations 10a, 9b and 10b); systems of accountability, emphasising accountability to beneficiaries (Recommendations 10c to 10e); and standards of openness, transparency and access to information regarding aid flows (Recommendations 11a and 11b). We divide those into two groups for purposes of presentation here, dealing separately with Recommendations 10a and 10b.

**Recommendation 10a**

Adopt results-based approaches and results-monitoring mechanisms intended first and foremost as management tools to promote iterative learning and adaptation, while empowering the ultimate beneficiaries of development programmes.

**Recommendation 10b**

Adopt a more meaningful approach to results that includes greater attention to indicators of institutional and social change and to sex-disaggregated data of importance to CSOs operating as agents of change.

CSOs have adopted a range of results-based approaches. Some have found ways to make conventional approaches based on the use of the logical framework methodology work for them; others have turned to alternative or complementary approaches. We look here at a number of different approaches considered well-adapted to the needs of CSOs.

The first is an approach called “outcome mapping” developed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in collaboration with partners in West Africa, India and Latin America. The emphasis of outcome mapping is on behavioural change, in recognition of the fact that development is ultimately “done by and for people” (CCIC, 2008b:5). An application of outcome mapping in Zimbabwe is featured in Example 34.

This example is followed by a description of approaches to monitoring used by the World Conservation Union in Asia, which has adopted a two-pronged approach for monitoring capacity development results. This includes one prong based on the conventional logical framework approach (LFA) to satisfy donor requirements, and another based on a more dynamic and flexible approach for organisational learning, management and planning (Example 35).

Example 36 describes two methods used by Keystone: Impact Planning and Learning System Design; and comparative constituency feedback. It is included here to help illustrate methods of results management and accountability that involve constituents and give them voice, ensuring greater downward accountability than might be the case under traditional approaches.

Another approach worth mentioning is the “most significant change method”, which emphasises testimonials of change from people directly involved in development programmes. It can be implemented without the need for advanced technical capabilities in data collection and analysis. By giving people a role in defining the changes that occur and their significance to them, this method “helps organisations to understand the
effects emerging from their activities, and how and why they are occurring” (Baser and Morgan, 2008:103).

Example 37 illustrates how IDRC has adopted an approach to monitoring and evaluation which marries attention to rigour with emphasis on the partner’s own management, accountability and learning needs.

We conclude with an illustration from Nepal which draws attention to the usefulness of systematic attention to data disaggregation as a tool for measuring change in areas such as social equality and inclusion, according to criteria such as gender, socio-economic status, or age (Example 38).

A review of these cases and of the literature suggests the following guidelines on meaningful and useful approaches to RBM (Baser and Morgan, 2008; CCIC, 2005; CIDA, 2002b; Lavergne, 2002):

- The costs of data collection need to be balanced against the benefits. This requires sensitivity to local workloads and competing priorities.
- Special attention is required to stories and indicators of qualitative results associated with institutional and social change. This requires a long-term perspective.
- Participatory, inclusive approaches have intrinsic value for promoting ownership and downward accountability, and generating information on results that are valued by participants.
- A sound approach to RBM should allow for uncertainty, iterative learning and non-linear forms of causality. These features are not easily captured by the LFA, which needs to be complemented with other forms of information, including evidence of strategic thinking that lays out how an intervention is expected to make a difference in a complex and uncertain world.
- Results-based approaches have high potential value for encouraging more rigorous attention to results, and as a capacity development tool. This requires an approach that is not excessively mechanistic and focused on upward accountability to donors.

In practice: Results-based approaches that promote learning and empowerment

Example 34. Outcome mapping in Zimbabwe

Since 2003, planning, monitoring and evaluation of a programme in Zimbabwe to integrate environmental education into teacher training has evolved from being merely an accountability exercise, into a structured, participatory, learning-oriented process. As with most development programmes, the original approach to results management was based on the LFA. However, as the programme progressed, it became clear that the LFA posed certain shortcomings and challenges:

- Accountability was directed mainly towards the donor’s head office.
- Planning, monitoring and evaluation seemed divorced from field realities because local partners did not contribute their perspectives or participate in decision-making and planning.
- The LFA did not allow for the identification and reflection of many types of results that the programme was seeking to achieve.
The framework did not address the sustainability of the programme.

It was not conducive to collective learning.

In responding to these challenges, programme partners decided to introduce a modified approach based on self-assessment and team building, to better accommodate the complexity and particularities of the programme. They turned for inspiration to a framework called “outcome mapping” developed by IDRC, which adopts a more dynamic, participatory, and holistic approach focused on behavioural change.

Implementation of this approach required considerable effort, but transformed the initiative’s approach to planning, monitoring and evaluation into something more endogenous, relevant and transformative. The approach has opened up new opportunities for examining the programme’s intended and unintended results, and actively refining implementation strategies in response to new challenges and opportunities. Outcome mapping has encouraged participants to look beyond the achievement of results, to explore how the results were achieved, and the lessons to be derived from that analysis.

Use of the LFA was not abandoned altogether, but has been retained primarily for use in meeting the programme’s upward accountability requirements, while outcome mapping is used for monitoring and evaluation at the operational level.


**Example 35. The World Conservation Union’s parallel capacity monitoring systems**

Results-based management based on the LFA has proved particularly inadequate in capacity development initiatives, where process dynamics, non-linear approaches, and qualitative results are important. To address such difficulties, the World Conservation Union in Asia manages two capacity monitoring systems in parallel.

The first of these is the monitoring system for reporting to donors, which is managed by a monitoring and learning officer. This system is seen as the cost of doing business with the international community, but is considered to be of limited interest or value for management and planning purposes.

The second, parallel system, is managed by the Executive Director, who follows it closely. It focuses on what is going right and what needs fixing, and provides spaces for learning in which power relationships are suspended. These include regular management and programme reviews, retreats to examine and self-evaluate programmes and financial achievements, and regional programme co-ordinators’ meetings. All of these subsystems feed into collective strategic thinking and into the real decision-making processes of the organisation.


**Example 36. Keystone’s approach to impact planning and learning through constituency voice**

Keystone is a specialised organisation that works with a wide range of funders, other CSOs, and social enterprises to design new ways of planning, measuring, learning, and communicating social change to foster accountability and learning. It emphasises two major techniques:

- Impact Planning and Learning System Design.
- Comparative Constituency Feedback.
The first of these, Impact Planning and Learning System Design, includes mechanisms such as the following whereby those most affected can meaningfully influence planning and measurement:

- developing a theory of change that is shared with project participants;
- identifying impact indicators of relevance to participants;
- gathering evidence of success with participants and learning from it;
- reporting of lessons learned in a way that is publicly available; and
- strategic reassessment of outcomes and approaches based on lessons learned.

Comparative Constituency Feedback involves anonymous surveys that capture the perceptions of an organisation’s work by its constituents. This process allows organisations to assess the quality of their relationships and their performance over time and to compare their performance against that of similar organisations.

Basing indicators of success on a shared theory of change helps participants to appreciate the complexity of change processes and helps to broaden local and democratic ownership of these processes, by creating a system wherein those most affected by change can meaningfully influence planning and measurement. Comparative Constituency Feedback can be used to improve decision-making, and helps to rebalance accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


**Example 37. IDRC’s approach to monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation is serious business at IDRC. A recent report by the Auditor General of Canada noted the Centre’s commitment to continuously improving the assessment of its programme’s outcomes and impacts, and remarked on the elaborate set of mechanisms it has developed for this purpose.

As a research organisation, IDRC has found it necessary to adapt its systems to accommodate the dynamic and exploratory nature of its partners’ programmes, where change processes can be slow and uncertain. Adapting to this reality, the Centre has adopted a flexible approach that does not impose any particular monitoring and evaluation approach on its partners. Though specific methods such as Outcome Mapping have been developed and are promoted, Outcome Mapping is seen as only one option of many.

IDRC emphasises three core principles with respect to monitoring and evaluation: utility, rigour and capacity development. This means that monitoring and evaluation should have a clear use and respond to a partner’s needs both in terms of accountability and learning. At the same time, the Centre works with partners to ensure the monitoring and evaluation methods to be applied pass standards of scientific rigour. Finally, building partners’ capacity is considered critical to ensure that a culture of monitoring and evaluation takes root in partners’ management systems.

In practice: Data disaggregation and social change

Example 38. Capturing social exclusion through data disaggregation in Nepal

In Nepal, a World Bank-DFID initiative on social exclusion identified six categories of data disaggregation that capture key elements of social differentiation in Nepal. DFID is now co-operating with line ministries in Nepal to apply a disaggregated framework for monitoring results in different sectors.

Features of good practice that have emerged from this exercise include:

- investment in research to identify appropriate, feasible, and relevant categories for disaggregation;
- long-term commitment on the part of funders and implementers; and
- investment in capacity development at different levels, from the high-level managers overseeing implementation to the ground-level staff gathering data.

Where disaggregation is not feasible, qualitative data, stories, and case material can be used to track people’s perceptions of change.


The AG-CS also recommends the following under Managing for Results and Accountability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 10c</th>
<th>Adopt an approach to accountability that emphasises a rebalancing of accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 10d</td>
<td>Reinforce accountability systems in country for all development actors (donors, governments, CSOs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 10e</td>
<td>Adopt a multi-stakeholder approach to monitoring and evaluation that includes the effective and timely engagement of CSOs and beneficiary populations, including representation from women’s rights organisations and other socially marginalised groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 11a</td>
<td>All stakeholders are encouraged to adopt the highest possible standards of openness, transparency and access to information: donors and international financial institutions should commit to delivering timely and meaningful information to other stakeholders on their aid flows and policies, including ODA flows to CSOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 11b</td>
<td>Developing country governments should work with elected representatives and CSOs on how to achieve increased transparency of both official and non-official aid flows and improved accountability for development results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The common thread of these recommendations is represented by Recommendation 10c, which emphasises “a rebalancing of accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries”. This is seen to require the reinforcement of accountability systems, greater openness and transparency and the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach to monitoring and evaluation.

Governments and CSOs have recently introduced a number of innovative developments in the field of “social accountability”. These aim to strengthen accountability to beneficiaries in the spirit of openness and transparency. They include participatory budgeting, gender budgeting, public expenditure tracking and citizen monitoring and evaluation of government service delivery.

The following provides five examples of CSO engagement in social accountability. The first two are cases of CSO engagement in the analysis of public budgets, under South Africa’s Budget Information Service (Example 39), and One World Action’s Just Budgets programme (Example 40). A second category of social accountability mechanisms focuses on monitoring functions after the fact, as illustrated by Ghana’s HIPC Watch Initiative (Example 41), the use of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (Example 42) and an initiative for monitoring infrastructure projects in the Philippines (Example 43).

The last two cases illustrate examples of CSO accountability, including an NGO transparency and accountability initiative in Colombia (Example 44) and the efforts of CARE Peru to increase its own accountability to recipients (Example 45). Readers will find other closely related examples in the CSO Partnerships section of this book, which includes several cases of CSO standard-setting exercises designed to promote increased accountability for results (Examples 72 to 75).

Improved CSO accountability for results as called for in Recommendations 10d and 11b poses special challenges as it relates to the collective performance of CSOs or the overall performance of individual CSOs. While donors note the need for “effective, institution-wide, outcome-based monitoring and evaluation systems” in relation to their engagement with CSOs, there is little documented experience on how this can best be achieved (World Bank, 2005:14). The challenge for donors is how to aggregate results from the large number of relatively small-scale CSO projects that they fund. This remains an issue even when a donor’s support to CSOs is more programme-based, because programme-based support may itself support a series of project activities, the collective results of which are not easy to assemble. Further work and experimentation is needed to better define the problem, and determine how best to account for results emerging from myriad civil society initiatives.

A related area requiring further work is how to ensure greater transparency of aid flows, including those involving CSOs, as called for in Recommendations 11a and 11b. There may be lessons to learn from a database that the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) has put in place to track and publicise their funding to and through Swedish CSOs, which provides information on CSO projects by country and region and by sector or theme, along with information on local partners, and total project budget figures (www.sida.se/ngodatabase).
In practice: Social accountability

Example 39. South Africa’s Budget Information Service*

The Institute for Democracy in South Africa is a CSO working to support the consolidation of democracy in South Africa by building up civil society and governance institutions. Its Budget Information Service was established in order to provide timely and accessible public policy information on the impact of the budget on poor South Africans. The Service is divided into units covering Children, Women, AIDS, Sectors (covering health, welfare, and education budgets) and the Africa Budget.

The Budget Information Service is one of the most experienced budget groups around the world. In operation since 1995, this project has encouraged the creation of similar initiatives in over 50 other countries. It has contributed substantial methodological and conceptual innovations to the field and has served as an inspiration and source of advice and support for many other groups.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 40. Just Budgets: gender-responsive budgeting in Africa*

Involving a partnership with CSOs in four African countries, One World Action’s Just Budgets programme supports CSOs, developing country governments, and donors to track their commitment to gender equality through gender-responsive budgeting. Gender-responsive budgeting analyses the implications of public spending and taxation for women relative to men and can support advocacy for adjustments in public expenditure to match gender policy commitments. The Just Budgets initiative has identified key elements of a framework to ensure that gender analysis is systematically integrated into budget planning processes.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 41. The Ghana HIPC Watch Initiative*

In 2001, the Government of Ghana challenged CSOs to serve as watchdogs with respect to the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). The Ghana HIPC Watch Initiative was launched by the Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa in response to this invitation. In 2002, the initiative covered the country’s 24 poorest districts; by 2005, this was scaled up to 42 districts. The initiative uses Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation to promote good governance, accountability and equity in the implementation of the GPRS.

The approach involves three interrelated components:

- economic literacy and training of civil society groups and District Assemblies around the principles of partnership, participation, good governance and equity that are at the heart of the GPRS;
- monitoring and evaluation of projects implemented with HIPC funds at the local level; and
- advocacy, aiming to influence Parliament, ministries, donors, and INGOs, based on the findings and the policy recommendations generated by the project’s monitoring and evaluation activities.
At the end of each district-level training workshop, a multi-stakeholder District HIPC Monitoring Committee is elected, representing farmers, women, youth, persons with disability, and local government. These members are then trained on how to conduct Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation.

These same groups are also involved in advocacy work. Lobby teams are organised in three groups: women, people with disabilities, and Northern Ghana; and lobby events are organised once a year for each of these groups. Activities include television appearances, radio programmes, newspaper articles and face-to-face meetings.

As a result of this initiative, civil society and government collaboration has been institutionalised at district and regional levels for the first time. The approach has also democratised the implementation of the GPRS, by involving previously excluded groups. By 2004, HIPC Watch was a recognised civil society voice in the GPRS process, championing accountability and transparency.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

**Example 42. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Uganda and Tanzania**

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) are a mechanism for pursuing transparency and accountability from governments. These surveys track the flow of public funds and material resources from the central government, through the administrative hierarchy, and out to the frontline service providers. The aim is to improve the quality of service delivery at the local level. The key question that a survey sets out to answer is whether public funds and materials end up where they are supposed to, or why they do not.

The dramatic impact of PETS in Uganda’s primary education sector has been one of the most cited successes of this approach, leading to a reduction of leakage in primary education capitation grants from an average of almost 90% in 1991-95 to less than 20% in 2001. However, PETS should not be seen as a silver bullet. What made the Ugandan experience special is that PETS formed part of a larger initiative involving several components, including the publication of financial transfers to local government in newspapers, awareness-raising campaigns; and capacity development of local-level stakeholders to understand and demand their rights.

By comparison, the implementation of PETS in Tanzania was not part of such a comprehensive initiative, and due to the absence of political-level acceptance of the findings, CSOs and communities have been limited in their ability to use the results to pursue improved services.

Based on: Sundet (2007).

**Example 43. Monitoring infrastructure projects in the Philippines**

Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government is a CSO that monitors government infrastructure projects in Abra Province, Philippines. It was formed in 1987, in response to the new government policy to increase community participation in development programmes, and received training from the government's National Economic Development Authority.
The organisation works from government documentation, including approved plans and drawings, work programmes, financial information and technical specifications, and holds community meetings to inform citizens about projects in their area. Using local volunteers, experts and staff, Concerned Citizens of Abra visits construction sites and documents progress, which it compares against reports submitted by the contractor on project completion. They then submit an audit report and recommendations to the appropriate authorities. Government responses have included ordering a contractor to replace poorly constructed sections of a roadbed at his own expense, and recovering overpayment from another contractor.

Concerned Citizens of Abra’s growing expertise in monitoring led to a partnership with the National Commission on Audit in 2001 to conduct participatory audits. Their collaborative efforts involved assessing road repair projects, interviewing project officials, examining available records, making site visits, and holding group discussions with local residents. Community involvement played a key role in verifying the accuracy of expenditures and helped to prove that early completion of work on one project was due to poor quality construction. The Commission incorporated lessons from the audit process into its Manual on the Conduct of Participatory Audits. Unfortunately, the participatory audit exercise was terminated after a change in the Commission’s administration.

Extracted from: Ramkumar (2008).

In practice: CSO accountability

Example 44. NGO transparency and accountability in Colombia*

In Colombia, NGOs for Transparency and Accountability is an initiative led by NGO associations and networks to develop and implement minimum standards of information sharing with the public, both individually and on a common web page. Through this initiative, NGOs describe who they are, what they do, how they do it, what resources they use, who the beneficiaries of their actions are, and what they are achieving.

This transparency and accountability exercise has been very effective in highlighting lessons learned and continuing challenges faced by CSOs in Colombia, and has provided the incentive to continue improving CSO effectiveness, while strengthening democracy in the country.

An important lesson learned is that it is easier for CSOs to submit to public scrutiny as part of a collective initiative like a federation or association than individually. In a country where distrust is the rule and the discovery of hidden ties between individuals and institutions with illegal groups has become a common occurrence, the fact that there is a group of CSOs that voluntarily subject themselves to public scrutiny has had a positive impact on public perceptions and confidence.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 45. Accountability to beneficiaries by CARE Peru*

CARE Peru put accountability towards disaster-affected people into practice following the earthquake of 15 August 2007 by putting together an accountability framework, including principles and standards, a statement of purpose, and a statement of desired outcomes (to contribute to the well-being and empowerment of women, men and children affected by the earthquake and to the protection of their rights).

Application of this framework involved four elements:

- provision of public information through public meetings and workshops, messages on national and local radio, flyers and posters;
- mechanisms for the participation of affected people in decision-making;
- mechanisms for systematic feedback from affected communities; and
- application of Sphere humanitarian standards in their programme.

All these aspects helped to ensure that the response was based on genuine needs as expressed by the affected populations.

That CARE Peru was able to establish this system was facilitated by the fact that one of their main funders, DFID, has incorporated a section on accountability to beneficiaries' into its humanitarian funding guidelines. This gave CARE Peru an entry point for explaining accountability and justifying the costs. Donors were supportive in other ways as well, by providing the budget flexibility to cover the costs of implementing the accountability framework and responding to suggestions raised by beneficiaries.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).
Chapter 6

Illustrations on CSO Effectiveness

This chapter provides examples of how developing country governments, donors and CSOs themselves can work together to ensure that CSOs reach their full potential as development and aid actors. It explores how an enabling environment can be provided to enhance the vibrancy and diversity of civil society; discusses different models and facets of donor support; and concludes with examples of how CSO partnerships can be enhanced.
This section focuses specifically on the issue of CSO effectiveness, asking what is required in order for the contributions of CSOs as development and aid actors to reach their full potential. Following the AG-CS Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations, we deal with the subject under three thematic headings: the enabling environment, good donorship, and CSO partnerships. Each of these involves challenges for developing country governments, donors and CSOs alike.

**Understanding the civil society landscape**

An important first step for all stakeholders is to understand the civil society landscape in particular countries or internationally – how it is organised, the functions it performs, and the space that it occupies.

To date, most civil society “mapping” has been done at the level of individual countries. Civil society mapping has mostly been used by Northern CSOs and by official donors to make programming choices, and can be used as well for baseline and assessment purposes (INTRAC, 2008c).

When the main purpose of civil society mapping is to identify potential CSO partners, an inventory approach is often used to produce a list of CSOs active in different geographic areas and sectors, and a description of their activities and capacities. UNDP, for example, has undertaken inventory exercises in collaboration with national-level Civil Society Advisory Committees (UNDP, 2006). Similarly, USAID has developed an NGO Sustainability Index, used primarily to assess the results of their own civil society programming. This index looks at CSO organisational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, public image and the legal environment (INTRAC, 2008c).

Comprehensive approaches to understanding the civil society landscape would need to cover a range of aspects, including:

- formal and informal linkages between CSOs and international or regional counterparts;
- linkages with government and the private sector;
- the enabling environment, including government attitudes toward civil society;
- the history of civil society; and
- local incarnations of civil society, including informal groupings of individuals or organisations that form in response to specific issues and needs.

One of the principal sources of information on the characteristics and status of civil society in different countries today is the growing body of work under the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project, described in Example 46.
In practice: Understanding the CSO landscape

Example 46. The CIVICUS Civil Society Index*

Since 2003, CIVICUS has developed and piloted a Civil Society Index (CSI) to assess the state of civil society in particular countries in a way that allows for cross-country comparability of findings. The approach uses 74 indicators that measure important aspects of the civil society landscape. These are grouped into four categories: structure, environment, values and impact.

The project aims to enhance and strengthen civil society ownership in identifying and developing strategies for its own development. Work in each case is led by a national co-ordinating organisation which forms a National Index Team with two other partners to help carry out the main tasks of the project, with support from the CIVICUS project team. This Team is encouraged to adapt and modify the toolkit provided to better reflect the local context, with the help of a National Advisory Group composed of stakeholders from civil society, government, the media, academia, donors and the private sector.

This approach has been implemented in over 50 countries and 48 country reports have been published to date. These reports provide stakeholders with a comprehensive and inclusive picture of the civil society landscape, and can be used to identify measures that could be taken to strengthen civil society and enhance CSO effectiveness.

Examples of how the reports are being used include the following:

- In Ghana, the knowledge and the sense of ownership among civil society stakeholders generated by the CSI project helped to motivate the establishment of a Resource Centre that contributes to civil society capacity development in the country.
- In Uganda, through the CSI consultative process, civil society stakeholders mobilised and collectively developed proposals to change government policy on legitimacy, transparency and accountability.
- In Fiji, the CSI initiative contributed to the establishment of the “Social Leadership Training Institute” by bringing civil society stakeholders together to find solutions to address the leadership gap in Fiji's civil society.
- In Bulgaria, CSI partner organisations and other CSOs lobbied government to implement a 1 percent tax law to secure greater financial sustainability for CSOs.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Extracted from: “CIVICUS Civil Society Index”, case study (2008), and communication from Sue Le-Ba, Research Fellow, CIVICUS (2008).

Enabling environment for civil society

Recommendation 12a

Stakeholders should recognise that the creation of an enabling environment for vibrant, democratic and diverse civil society is a basic requirement for CSO effectiveness.
The subject of the enabling environment draws our attention to the state of civil society in specific developing countries, in particular – although in principle one can also speak of the enabling environment in donor countries and internationally. Here, we focus on the state of civil society at the country level.

The enabling environment is multi-dimensional. It includes a number of conditions having to do with the general character of governance in a country, including:

- the vitality of democratic parliamentary systems and resultant opportunities for alliance building between CSOs and Members of Parliament to advance agendas of joint interest;
- the quality of the legal and judicial system, which can provide the assurance and means for just settlement of conflicts;
- freedom of the press, and freedom of expression more generally;
- conditions to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights such as the right to peaceful assembly and association, and the right of access to information; and
- the degree of decentralisation and the extent to which there exist opportunities for dialogue and collaboration between CSOs and decentralised government bodies.

Other aspects of the enabling environment more specific to civil society include the following:

- structures and processes for citizen participation and multi-stakeholder dialogue between and among CSOs, government, elected representatives, donors and the private sector;
- CSO-specific policies and legislation;
- taxation regulations, including charitable status provisions and tax benefits to promote individual or corporate philanthropy; and
- regulations and norms to promote CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies.

In what follows, we look at a number of illustrations corresponding to these two aspects of the enabling environment (general conditions and aspects specific to civil society).

**Legal and judicial systems and human rights**

We look first at three examples of general conditions affecting the enabling environment for CSOs:

- an illustration from South Africa, of how an enabling legal and judicial system can be used by CSOs to pursue human rights (Example 47);
- the case of India, which has enacted a *Right to Information Act* (Example 48); and

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**Recommendation 12b**

The enabling conditions required for civil society to meet its potential in different countries should be systematically assessed, with a view to implementing improved practices by all stakeholder groups.

**Recommendation 12c**

Measures should be put in place by all development stakeholders to ensure that CSOs are transparent and accountable first and foremost to their constituencies and stakeholders, while accounting to donors and governments for the use of public funds.
the case of Ghana as a country where press freedom is guaranteed in legislation and upheld in practice, with a high incidence of active, independent media bodies (Example 49).

**In practice: General conditions affecting the enabling environment for CSOs**

**Example 47. Court action and human rights in South Africa**

In 2002, in South Africa, the legal system was able to process a case of public interest litigation pitting the HIV/AIDS Treatment Action Coalition against the Ministry of Health. In a court challenge targeting the government’s health policy, the Treatment Action Coalition appealed to rights enshrined in the country’s constitution to assert the right to anti-retrovirals for pregnant women. The Coalition’s position was that the government was being “unreasonably prohibitive” in limiting anti-retrovirals for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission to only 18 pilot sites. They argued further fault on the government’s part in not providing a comprehensive national programme to address mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

The High Court and Constitutional Court found that the government was not complying with its constitutional obligations, and ordered the government to roll out a nation-wide programme. The ruling gave the Coalition the impetus to press for further changes to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policies. Further civil society action was necessary to ensure that the government implemented the Court’s orders, but the most recent commitment from the Government of South Africa is to provide treatment to 80 per cent of adults who need it by 2011.

Based on: Ferguson (2008:31) and Gauri and Brinks (2008:x).

**Example 48. India’s Right to Information Act**

The right to information has been an issue for CSOs in India for over two decades, and Indian CSOs have achieved a record of success in accessing public information in addressing citizens’ concerns on a case-by-case basis. Based on such successes, CSOs in India pressured the government to apply a more general solution.

The government responded in 2005, by enacting India’s Right to Information Act, which gives Indian citizens access to records of central government and state governments. Civil society observers consider that this Act is one of the most significant laws enacted by the Parliament of India, providing a framework for the establishment of an unprecedented level of access to information by citizens of India.

Under the provisions of the Act, any citizen may request information from a public authority, which is required to reply expeditiously within thirty days. The Act also requires every public authority to computerise their records for wide dissemination and to proactively publish certain categories of information in order to minimise the need for citizens to formally request information. Information disclosure in India was hitherto restricted by the Official Secrets Act 1923 and various other special laws, which the new Act now relaxes.

Working to ensure the application of the Act, the Indian CSO, PRIA is working to raise citizens’ awareness of the Act and has launched a study of its implementation in 12 states (PRIA 2008b).

Based on: Jenkins and Goetz (1999); PRIA (2008b); Wikipedia (2008). For more information, see the Right to Information Community Portal of India at www.rtiindia.org.
CSO-specific practice, policy, and legislation

When it comes to aspects of the enabling environment that relate specifically to CSOs, the existence of policies, institutions and fora that governments put in place to foster citizen participation in policy making and service delivery is one of the most important. South Africa, featured in Example 50, provides a good general case of an enabling environment in this respect.

A country’s framework of policy and legislation on CSOs is considered by many as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can help secure basic rights for CSOs to exist and operate and can establish registration, monitoring, and reporting standards and procedures that help to advance CSO transparency and accountability. In the best of scenarios, legislation governing CSOs is developed in partnership with CSOs, and complements CSOs’ own regulations and norms for transparency and accountability to their constituencies, donors and governments.

However, a country’s CSO framework can also limit the independence of CSOs, in contexts where governments are resistant to CSO actions for fear of being challenged (Mayhew, 2005; Moore, 2006). Instances of this phenomenon are on the rise with the “war on terror” or other considerations providing a rationale for policies and practice that severely restrict CSO activities and existence (Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin, Glasius, 2006).

For example, a bill passed in 2008 in Ethiopia restricts INGOs from several activities that are central to civil society’s roles, in particular: advancing democratic and human rights;
promotion of equality between peoples, sexes or religions; pursuing conflict resolution and reconciliation; and addressing criminal justice issues. This restriction also applies to local CSOs receiving more than ten per cent of their funding from abroad (BBC, 2009).

Standing in contrast with this are two cases of enabling CSO policies illustrated in the examples below:

- Croatia’s National Strategy for the Creation of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development (Example 51); and
- the government of India’s NGO legislation (Example 52).

We conclude with some consideration of tax regulations more specifically. Tax regulations are a determinant of CSOs’ ability to maintain a level of financial sustainability. Three types of tax legislation typically affect CSOs’ financial base and their ability to expand it:

- tax exemption for CSOs;
- tax benefits for contributors to CSOs; and
- designation of a percentage of taxes that can be channelled to non-profit organisations in lieu of payment to the State (ICNL, 2003:37).

Example 53 illustrates a case of this third type of legislation, through the one per cent provision in the Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian tax systems.

Numerous publications have been produced on the subject of enabling legislation for CSOs by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), its European counterpart (European Centre for Not-for-Profit Law), and the Open Society Institute. Guidelines summarised in recent publications (Council of Europe, 2007 and ICNL, 2004) suggest that enabling CSO legislation should do the following:

- acknowledge CSOs’ independence to pursue their own objectives, provided that the means employed are consistent with the requirements of a democratic society (Council of Europe, 2007:2);
- provide for independent and impartial decision-making for granting legal status to CSOs;
- abstain from requiring frequent renewal of CSOs’ legal status;
- allow CSOs to solicit and receive funds from different sources, including public bodies in the country of CSO registration, private donors, other CSOs, other public bodies and multilateral agencies, subject only to laws generally applicable to customs, foreign exchange and money laundering and those on the funding of elections and political parties (Council of Europe, 2007:5);
- include allowances and mechanisms to assist CSOs in soliciting and receiving charitable donations, for example exemption from income and other taxes on such contributions and incentives for making charitable donations through income tax deductions or credits (Council of Europe, 2007:6); and
- include exemptions from taxes on CSO income from investments, rent, royalties, economic activities and capital gains.

A recent publication from the World Movement for Democracy and ICNL (WMD/ICNL, 2008) proposes six International Principles Protecting Civil Society, all of which are aligned with international human rights law:

- the right to entry (freedom of association);
- the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference;
the right to freedom of expression;
the right to communication and co-operation;
the right to seek and secure resources; and
the state's duty to protect.

## In practice: Enabling policies and legislation

### Example 50. Civil society in South Africa

Civil society participation in public affairs has come to be viewed as the natural way of doing business in South Africa. There are historical reasons for this that are related to the closeness of the African National Congress to CSOs during the apartheid struggle and the absorption of key civil society leaders into the post-apartheid government led by the African National Congress. CSOs operate freely in South Africa, and the government engages with them systematically in policy dialogue and in service delivery.

This close relationship between civil society and the State has been bolstered by constitutional provisions, legislative reforms and support mechanisms designed to promote civil society participation and effectiveness in the country. Elements of this enabling framework include the following:

- constitutional provisions for public participation in the National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces, and the provincial legislature;
- the repeal of repressive legislation and an overall reorganisation of the security environment;
- the passage of the Non-Profit Act, which officially recognises civil society, and provides for supportive mechanisms to advance CSO accountability;
- replacement of a 1978 law that restricted CSOs’ fund-raising capability by new legislation to facilitate resource flows to CSOs;
- creation of a national fund to support citizens’ participation; and
- an affirmative action programme to increase women’s participation in political affairs.

Illustrative of the CSO-government relationship in South Africa is how CSOs and the South African government took advantage of the AG-CS process on civil society and aid effectiveness to deepen their relationship. Contrary to how governments maintained a low profile with CSOs in many other countries, the South African government was actively engaged in national consultations with CSOs in the run up to HLF-3 in Accra.

Post-Accra, it has paid serious attention to the AAA’s paragraph 20 on engagement with civil society. The government’s Aid Effectiveness Action Plan includes specific reference to civil society, affirming that South Africa will “work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development, as channels of aid, service providers, advocacy actors and otherwise” and welcoming a proposal from CSOs to engage with government in a CSO-led multistakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness.

Example 51. Croatia’s national strategy to create an enabling environment for civil society

Croatia provides an example of a conscious effort to improve the enabling environment for civil society. The principal instrument for this is the National Strategy for the Creation of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development from 2006 to 2011, adopted by the Croatian Government in July 2006.

Representing a broad consensus on strategic priorities, this strategy seeks to create conditions for community development in which citizens and CSOs participate with other elements of society in building a society of well-being and equal opportunity for all.

Among the strategic priorities identified are the following:

- strengthening the capacities and levels of CSO participation in the development and monitoring of public policies;
- improving mechanisms and standards for multi-stakeholder consultation in policy processes, in line with European Union standards;
- drafting and adopting a Code of Good Practice on Consultation; and
- establishing an Economic and Social Forum.

Planned improvements to the current legal framework include:

- adopting a new law on foundations;
- encouraging institutional, fiscal and social incentives for individual philanthropy and corporate investments in social development partnerships; and
- introducing public benefit status by revisiting tax benefits regulations.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


Example 52. India’s National Policy on the Voluntary Sector

In 2007, the Government of India, responded to calls to recognise CSOs as development actors in their own right, and approved a National Policy on the Voluntary Sector. This policy was developed over a three-year period through a participatory process with representatives from various levels of government and civil society. It has provided much-needed legitimacy and voice to the voluntary sector, while ensuring autonomy and independence of voluntary organisations and CSOs.

In order to expand the reach and impact of the policy, state governments have been asked to prepare similar policies, while state and central ministries dealing with the voluntary sector have been requested to take appropriate steps towards the national policy’s implementation.

CSOs recognise that while the passing of the legislation is an important milestone in the recognition of their roles, monitoring of implementation is required to ensure its effectiveness. To that end, the Voluntary Action Network of India has organised state consultations of CSOs to disseminate the policy’s message and mobilise civil society efforts to impress upon respective state governments the need for similar policies.

Also evident is the need for harmonised legislation on CSOs, more specifically, between the National Policy on the Voluntary Sector and India’s Foreign Contributions Regulation Act, which regulates aid flows to CSOs. Government and CSOs have both expressed
concern about the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act and associated reporting requirements and registration criteria. CSOs have mobilised to review the Act, and dialogue is ongoing.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


**Example 53. Tax incentives in Eastern Europe: the one per cent law**

Several countries in Eastern Europe have introduced legislation to allow taxpayers to channel a portion of their taxes to CSOs in lieu of payment to the State. Such a mechanism was first introduced in Hungary in 1996 through the “one per cent law”, which allowed taxpayers to designate one per cent of their income tax payments to a qualifying NGO, and another one per cent to a church. Taxpayers make the anonymous designation on forms submitted with their tax return, and the tax authority transfers the amounts designated after the beneficiary proves its entitlement. Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania have since enacted similar legislation.

The one per cent mechanism has a number of advantages, and is seen to achieve the following:

- it allows for de-politicised distribution of state funding to CSOs;
- enables local and small CSOs to access funds by mobilising local support;
- creates competition among CSOs, leading to increased professionalism and improved communication with constituencies; and
- raises awareness among taxpayers about the importance of CSOs.

The one per cent law provides an interesting example of how tax legislation can help provide an enabling environment for civil society. However, one should be aware of its limitations, as there are outstanding questions regarding the degree to which it meets its key objectives of increasing the pool of resources available to local CSOs and developing a philanthropic culture among taxpayers. In particular, the one per cent ceiling on contributions limits available resources from this mechanism, and there is a risk that funds will end up in the hands of those CSOs with the best marketing campaigns. No comprehensive study has been undertaken to assess the mechanism’s influence on the culture of philanthropy.


**Good donorship**

The AC-CS Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations includes four sets of recommendations having to do with donorship issues involving CSOs (Recommendations 13 to 16). These recommendations cover four general topics:

- applying enriched principles of aid effectiveness (Recommendation 13);
- support for civil society strengthening (Recommendation 14);
- the choice and range of civil society support mechanisms (Recommendation 15); and
- donor procedures when providing support through Northern CSOs (Recommendation 16).
We cover each of these recommendations separately in what follows. Although one might expect official donor policy with respect to civil society to cover all four of these topics in an integrated way, we are not aware of any official donor that has a comprehensive policy covering all aspects of its engagement with civil society. A comprehensive donor policy with regard to civil society would include a number of elements, including:

- a general policy statement of recognition;
- a made-to-measure statement of aid effectiveness principles;
- a well-defined approach for promoting the strengthening of civil society;
- an appropriate and balanced menu of funding mechanisms for various categories of CSOs or CSO activities; and
- a well-defined partnership strategy for working with CSOs in the donor country.

A number of donors are seeking to clarify their policy positions with regard to civil society and to make their support more efficient and effective (Pratt and Wright, 2008).

**Implementing the enriched aid effectiveness principles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both official donors and CSOs in their capacity as donors, recipients and channels of aid should take measures to implement the enriched aid effectiveness principles identified in the section on enriching the Paris principles, including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) respect for developing country partner ownership and leadership;</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) alignment with developing country partner priorities and use of local systems;</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) greater co-ordination and harmonisation of efforts, while respecting diversity and innovation;</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) managing for results in a dynamic, iterative way; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) enhanced accountability, with emphasis on downward accountability, and mutual accountability in donor-recipient CSO relationships.</td>
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</table>

Recommendation 13 proposes the application by official donors and CSOs in their capacity as donors, of the enriched aid effectiveness principles covered under Recommendations 4 to 11a. It is an overarching recommendation that overlaps with several others, which we will not attempt to illustrate separately here. Indeed, the good practice examples already provided in this paper and in the Case Book include numerous illustrations of CSOs and official donors applying the enriched Paris principles of aid effectiveness. The following table points to some of those examples. All involve CSOs engaged in a donor capacity with support from official donors.
II.6. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CSO EFFECTIVENESS

Support for civil society strengthening

Recommendation 14

Donors should consider the overall strengthening of civil society at the country, regional and international levels as an objective worth supporting in its own right.

AG-CS Recommendation 14 is on donor support for civil society strengthening as a worthy objective in its own right. This recommendation overlaps with Recommendation 6c, which calls for capacity development of CSOs as part of the discussion on local ownership. Attention in this section is focused on more systematic efforts to strengthen civil society as a whole.

The first case we look at in this section is that of an individual donor, Sida, which has developed a relatively comprehensive policy on support to civil society, covering both direct investments in strengthening civil society, and indirect support aimed at fostering a positive enabling environment (Example 54).

Our second case involves multi-donor collaboration in Central and Eastern Europe – the DECIM initiative (Example 55). While DECIM is principally a mechanism for exchanging information and networking, it is of special interest because it is the only effort of its kind that we know of that includes both donors and private foundations and is aimed explicitly at collaboration for strengthening civil society at a regional level.

This is followed by three examples of civil society capacity development at the country level:

- establishment of a CSO Resource Centre in Ghana (Example 56);
- the work of a specialised indigenous NGO in India which includes civil society capacity building as one of its key intervention strategies (Example 57); and
- A CSO capacity development project in Guyana (Example 58).

Highlights from the cases reviewed and from the literature include some general lessons of good practice regarding what makes for effective support for civil society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrative case</th>
<th>CSO</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Principles illustrated by the case</th>
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<td>World Vision’s Fight TB programme in Indonesia</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Example 24</td>
<td>Local ownership and alignment, co-ordination and harmonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for civil society strengthening</td>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>Example 29, Case Book 7</td>
<td>Local ownership and alignment, co-ordination and harmonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development, Mozambique</td>
<td>Aga Khan Foundation</td>
<td>Example 31, Case Book 8</td>
<td>Local ownership and alignment, co-ordination and harmonisation</td>
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<td>Accountability to beneficiaries in Peru</td>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>Example 45, Case Book 14</td>
<td>Local ownership, accountability</td>
</tr>
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<td>Capacity development in Guyana</td>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Example 58 and Case Book 24</td>
<td>Local ownership</td>
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<td>Funding for CSO participation, Honduras</td>
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<td>Foundation for the Philippines Environment</td>
<td>Consortium of official and CSO donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer Services and capacity development</td>
<td>Uniterra</td>
<td>Example 76 and Case Book 25</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
capacity development (Baser and Morgan, 2008; Hailey and James, 2006; James and Wrigley, 2006; Lipson and Warren, 2006; OECD-DAC, 2006; UNDP, 2006). These suggest that successful strategies for supporting civil society capacity development and change should include the following:

- adoption of a complex systems perspective that situates civil society and CSOs as part of a broader system and takes account of different stakeholder interests;
- a flexible approach that respond to opportunities for catalysing change in a flexible, iterative fashion;
- acknowledging and building on strengths rather than merely addressing weaknesses;
- responding to capacity gaps identified by CSOs themselves, through organisational self-assessments and similar exercises that outsiders can facilitate;
- building on local or regional knowledge and expertise through peer-learning and networking;
- using a coaching and mentoring approach rather than merely training, and catering to the specific needs of different organisations; and
- balancing short-term goals and longer-term capacity development objectives.

A limitation of the literature and of many of the case studies available for present purposes is that most of it refers to capacity development at the level of individual CSOs, as opposed to civil society strengthening writ large. Support for capacity development of individual CSOs needs to be combined with broader efforts such as work on the enabling environment, investments in civil society networks, and support for resource centres such as the Ghana one illustrated in Example . This subject need to be further explored, with due attention to the potential and pitfalls of donor involvement in this area.

**In practice: Support for civil society strengthening as an objective in its own right**

**Example 54. Sida’s policy on civil society**

In 2007, Sida adopted a policy to promote the development of a vibrant and democratic civil society that improves the possibilities for poor people to improve their living conditions. The aim of the policy is to provide a consistent, co-ordinated, and over-arching regulatory framework for different forms of Sida support to civil society.

The policy begins by articulating Sida’s views on the importance of civil society’s roles in development in terms of empowering poor people, promoting democracy, peace and stability, and developing a global arena for dialogue and co-operation. It recognises both formal and informal CSOs, and the dynamic, diverse, multi-faceted character of civil society as an expression of society’s values, customs, needs and interests.

Underlying the policy is an appreciation of civil society’s diversity, reflecting different perspectives, ideologies and interests. This diversity is seen to provide constructive energy for change, development and poverty reduction.

The policy outlines two different ways of supporting civil society:

- directly, through various types of contributions:
  - to CSOs as implementing agencies;
  - to strengthen CSO capacity; or
  - to organisations and networks, to strengthen civil society as a whole as an arena for citizen engagement; and
indirectly, by fostering a positive enabling environment and promoting opportunities in
developing countries for CSOs to influence the design and implementation of poverty
reduction measures.

Sida’s support aims to strengthen civil society across the board, without undermining
legitimate state and democratic institutions.

Based on: Brundin and Mast (2008); CIS (2007); Sida (2007).

Example 55. The DECIM initiative on civil society development in Central and Eastern
Europe

The Donor Exchange, Co-ordination and Information Mechanism (DECIM) was
established following a roundtable meeting of donors and CSOs in Bratislava in 2005,
which identified a need for greater co-ordination and synergies among those working on
civil society development in Central and Eastern Europe. Building on the impetus of this
meeting, the World Bank and European Commission teamed up to formulate the concept
of a light mechanism for co-ordination among public and private donors working on the
civil society theme in the Former Soviet Union, Balkans, Turkey and New Member States.

Annual roundtable meetings on themes related to civil society development have taken
place since 2005, on subjects such as the role of social enterprises and social inclusion,
CSOs and advocacy, enabling legislation, and CSO financial sustainability. DECIM also
promotes information sharing via an extranet web portal where registrants share
information on donor policies and procedures, civil society indexes and databases, or
topical subjects such as NGO legislation, human rights, or capacity development. The web
portal is accessible to CSOs as well as donors.

DECIM has four objectives:

- to share information on the operational programmes of DECIM participants;
- to facilitate the identification of synergies and joint initiatives at the country and
  sub-regional level;
- to engage participants in policy discussion of civil society development in Central and
  Eastern Europe; and
- to facilitate joint initiatives to accelerate civil society development where opportunities
  arise.


Example 56. The civil society Resource Centre in Ghana

In Ghana, the knowledge and sense of ownership by civil society stakeholders
generated by the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project fed into a process of dialogue with
UNDP that ultimately led to the establishment of a UNDP-funded Civil Society Resource
Centre as a mechanism for capacity development of individual CSOs and of the civil
society sector as a whole.

Investment in the Centre was preceded by a needs assessment and nationwide
consultations with CSOs. Special efforts were made to reach out to rural-based grassroots
CSOs to create a bridge between these organisations and urban-based CSOs, which bring
different sorts of expertise to the table.

The Resource Centre responds to CSOs’ needs by providing resource materials, access to
computers with Internet connections, and spaces for training and conferences. It offers
training services, facilitates co-ordinated research on civil society issues, and provides a
platform for co-ordination and collaboration among CSOs, including for the development
of a common approach to codes of ethics and quality standards.
A Steering Committee of CSO representatives was established, and strategic partnerships were established with NGO regional networks and Ghana’s main umbrella NGO organisation, which are in a position to advise the Centre in areas such as the selection of trainees and resource persons, and evaluation of the Centre’s activities.


Example 57. PRIA and civil society building in India

The work of the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), an Indian NGO founded in 1952, is a good example of an endogenous NGO dedicated to civil society strengthening. PRIA has been one of the pioneering organisations to promote practices, innovations and discourse on civil society strengthening for the last 25 years in local, provincial, national and international arenas. Its interventions to mobilise and strengthen civil society in India date back to the early 80s. PRIA’s vision is of a world where informed, empowered citizens are actively engaged as democratic actors.

One of its flagship programmes, popularly known as Training of Trainers on Participatory Training Methodology, proved to be a learning ground for many of today’s civil society leaders. It provided an opportunity to prepare hundreds of social activists who became part of the emerging voluntary sector in India and strengthened the capacities of intermediary CSOs to develop strategies and methodologies for supporting the emergence of grassroots community groups around local development issues.

PRIA initiatives promote continuous and systematic organisational learning and reflection as the basis upon which new capacity building occurs. PRIA employs a wide variety of methods to enhance and strengthen capacity at the individual, institutional and sectoral levels, and seeks to play a leadership role in promoting innovative capacity building approaches and methods.


Example 58. CSO capacity development in Guyana*

Many NGOs in Guyana are still in their start-up or emergent phases. Although their potential impact on poverty is high because they are able to work so effectively at the community level, these organisations require intensive capacity building, hands-on support and opportunities to learn from experience as they mature.

CIDA has been providing support for strengthening CSOs in Guyana since 1997, through its support of a programme managed by CHF Partners in Rural Development, a Canadian NGO specialised in partnerships to strengthen the capacity of community organisations. Phase II is a USD 5 million programme running from 2003-08.

Twenty-one CSOs have benefited from this initiative, and are now preferred targets for other donors interested in funding community poverty reduction programmes with reputable, transparent CSOs. The project has targeted voluntary sector organisations in the rural and hinterland areas who could play a collaborative and complementary role in collaboration with the Government of Guyana and other stakeholders in the implementation of the Guyana poverty reduction strategy.

CHF’s model is to build capacity by partnering with community-based organisations and supporting them to design, implement and monitor projects in collaboration with their communities.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

The choice and range of civil society support mechanisms

**Recommendation 15**

Donors, including Northern and International CSOs should identify and implement a range of better co-ordinated and harmonised support mechanisms including core or programme support, capacity development, a long-term perspective, responsive funding mechanisms of various sorts, and the harmonisation of contracting, funding and reporting modalities.

AG-CS Recommendation 15 calls for a range of support mechanisms for CSOs and better co-ordinated and harmonised support mechanisms. There is some overlap between this recommendation and Recommendation 16, which focuses on donor support through Northern CSOs specifically. This section will be used to illustrate two things: examples of the range of support mechanisms used by some donors; and illustrations of innovative approaches to donor support at country level.

Most donors have adapted to the diversity of CSO actors and situations – and indeed the diversity of their own priorities as donors – by adopting a wide range of civil society support mechanisms. Existing analysis suggests that this is an appropriate response, as it provides more choice for CSOs and for donors seeking to support them, and provides opportunities for donors to experiment with different funding mechanisms (FES, no date, in Bissio, 2007; Nordic+, 2007; Sida, 2007; Tjønneland and Dube, 2007; Wood, 2004).

Attention to diversity is particularly important today, because emerging evidence suggests increasing concentration of aid resources in a smaller number of CSOs and increased restrictions on sectors of interventions and types of activities (Pratt, Adams and Warren, 2006; Tjønneland and Dube, 2007). Several authors have called for an appropriate balance to be established between mechanisms that are responsive to CSOs’ priorities and approaches and those that steer CSOs into areas of donor interest (Agg, 2006; Pratt, Adams and Warren, 2006; Uggla, 2004).

In the illustrations that follow, we include two examples of how Sida and Norway manage their funding relationships with CSOs through a diversity of mechanisms, both in headquarters and in the field (Examples 59 and 60). As is typical of most donors, Sida and Norway both have special mechanisms for channelling funds to and through domestic and international CSOs, combined with mechanisms for supporting civil society in the field as part of regular country programming.

Donor support for civil society at field level includes both direct support for Southern CSOs and support that is channeled through Northern CSOs. It covers a range of mechanisms and modalities, including project support, core support, programme support for individual CSOs, support for networks and coalitions of CSOs, and financial contributions to jointly-funded grant-making mechanisms (Disch et al., 2007:20-23).

These different forms of support have been the subject of a number of studies in recent years. One of the most interesting has been a study commissioned by donors at the request of CSOs to provide guidance on donor support to CSOs focused on advocacy and policy work in Tanzania. Results of this study included the production of Guidelines for Support to Civil Society in Tanzania, as described in Example 61, below (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007).
Other studies of this sort have included the following:

- a review of multi-donor support to civil society conducted for DFID (Tembo and Wells, 2007);
- a study of trends and impacts of financial flows to civil society in Southern Africa (Tjonneland and Dube, 2007); and
- a study conducted for a Nordic+ group of donors led by Norway on country-based models of donor support in six countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) (Disch et al., 2007; Nordic+, 2007).

Among the key findings and recommendations emerging from these studies and others cited below are the following:

- the need to articulate clear development goals for civil society support, distinguishing between support for building a strong and diverse civil society and support channeled to and through CSOs as a means of achieving other development goals (Nordic+, 2007);
- the applicability of international aid effectiveness principles such as: local ownership; alignment to the systems, procedures and priorities of host-country CSOs; donor co-ordination and harmonisation; greater attention to development outcomes; and accountability to CSO constituencies as well as donors (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principles 1 and 7; Disch et al., 2007: recommendations 2, 3 and 8; Kassam and Mutakyahwa, 2006:20-22);
- the need for clarity on how to support civil society as a force for democracy and social transformation (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principle 2; Disch et al., 2007: recommendation 4);
- the desirability of protecting and promoting civil society diversity, sustainability, and innovation, by reaching out to a wide range of civil society actors (different categories of NGOs, community-based CSOs, membership-based organisations, and other CSOs), through a diversity of support mechanisms (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principles 2 and 10; Tjonneland and Dube, 2007; Wood, 2004; DFID, 2006; MFA Norway, 2006; O’Neil, Foresti and Hudson, 2007);
- the need to combine support for specific development actions with support for CSO institutional development and growth (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principle 9; Nordic+, 2007);
- the advantages and desirability of long-term core funding for domestic CSOs, umbrella organisations and networks, and funding that is responsive to their priorities and approaches (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principle 7); and
- the importance of establishing strategic partnerships with CSOs considered to be strategic agents of change (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007: principle 5; Kassam and Mutakyahwa, 2006:21-22).

The recent Nordic+ study points to three broad trends in country-based support to civil society in the South as donors strive to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their support (Nordic+, 2007:2-3):

- increased use of core support or programme support as opposed to project support;
- increased use of intermediary bodies as channels for aid; and
- increased recourse to joint funding modalities.
These trends are interrelated, because core or programme support or funding through intermediary bodies often involves the use of pooled funding mechanisms.

The case of the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), in Example 62, illustrates how core and programme funding can enable the recipient organisation to pursue its own self-defined mandate. A second, well-known case of this sort is that of BRAC in Bangladesh, which secures most of its outside support in the form of pooled, programme-based funding (AG-CS Case Book).

We also review three cases involving support for pooled grant-making mechanisms:

- the Manusher Jonno Foundation in Bangladesh (Example 63);
- the PRSP Fund in Honduras (Example 64); and
- the Foundation for the Philippines Environment (Example 65).

The Bangladesh and Honduras cases are featured here because of the interesting way they combine project funding and capacity development objectives. Of interest as well, in the Honduras case, is the involvement of INGOs both as contributing donors and members of the steering committee.

The Foundation for the Philippines Environment example that follows is a mechanism through which long-term funding has been made available due to an endowment established by USAID and the World Wildlife Federation, using an institutional mechanism to guarantee local ownership of the initiative.

The provision of pooled support through intermediary grant-making organisations of this sort offers a number of advantages. It allows donors to take a more comprehensive and strategic view, allows funding to be ramped up, and provides a formula for managing donor transactions costs at a time when operational expenses are being squeezed (Disch et al., 2007). However, such mechanisms require considerable attention at the design stage. The design of sound governance mechanisms and the choice of appropriate intermediaries are both fundamental to the long-term success, legitimacy and sustainability of such arrangements.

Some studies of pooled grant-making mechanisms suggest certain features that merit close attention as such mechanisms are further developed. These include:

- adequate consultations with stakeholders when creating such mechanisms, to promote buy-in and credibility (Wamugo and Skadkaer Perdersen, 2007);
- ensuring that procedural arrangements and processes are not excessively burdensome and complicated (Eurodad, 2008; Hayes, 2008);
- avoiding the tendency to think of the grant-making organisation as representing the voice of CSOs in policy dialogue with donors or with government (Eurodad, 2008; Hayes, 2008);
- ensuring that new mechanisms do not replace other support mechanisms, potentially leaving those CSOs whose priorities or performance standards do not meet a particular fund’s requirements “out in the cold” (ActionAid/CARE, 2006, p. 43); and
- paying adequate attention to development outcomes and strategies for achieving them (Kassam and Mutakyahwa, 2007).
II.6. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CSO EFFECTIVENESS

In practice: Civil society support mechanisms

Example 59. Civil society support mechanisms in Sida

Approximately 17 per cent of Sweden’s total ODA was channelled to and through CSOs in 2007. About a quarter of this was allocated through five to six year framework agreements with Swedish NGOs, some of whom go on to administer grants to smaller organisations, in addition to implementing their own programmes. Sida had 14 such agreements in 2007.

Sida provides additional support to Swedish, international, national, or local CSOs through other funding envelopes, including those of its thematic or regional desks at Sida headquarters, the Division for Humanitarian Assistance, and Swedish embassies in co-operation countries. Most of these contributions are approved under the framework of Sweden’s country and regional co-operation strategies and are therefore subject to greater donor control than support provided under the framework agreements. However there is no presumption that all bilateral aid must be narrowly aligned with government programmes in developing countries, since the complementarity of CSO and government roles is recognised.

Sida also runs a Civil Society Center for Swedish CSOs and their developing and transition country partners that provides training and meeting spaces for work on civil society and development. Sida manages a database of its support to Swedish NGOs through which members of the public can obtain information about these organisations’ initiatives (www.sida.se/ngodatabase).

Based on: Brundin and Mast (2008); Gunnarrson (2006); Pratt, Adams And Warren (2006); Sida (2007); Wamugo and Skadkaer Pedersen (2007).

Example 60. Civil society support mechanisms in Norway

Norway’s current support to Norwegian, international and developing country NGOs is being delivered through a complex system involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad). The Ministry and Norad each manage about 50 per cent of the budget for NGO funding, which accounted for approximately 20 per cent of Norway’s total ODA in 2007.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports NGOs in the field of humanitarian work, peace building and reconciliation, and provides transitional assistance to bridge the gap between humanitarian and long-term development aid. This support is channelled mainly through Norwegian NGOs, who may directly implement projects and programmes or work in partnership with CSOs in other countries.

Norad is responsible for Norway’s NGO support scheme for long-term development work. Defining elements of Norad’s approach are the application of partnership principles and a rights-based approach. The application of partnership principles means that although most of the funding flows first to Norwegian CSOs, activities being funded are planned and implemented by local counterparts, with Norwegian partners playing support roles.

Norad’s scheme of support to Norwegian CSOs includes both multi-year framework agreements and individual agreements for smaller NGOs. Around 100 Norwegian NGOs receive support. Most resources are provided as core funding to around 30 Norwegian NGOs under multi-year frameworks of 3-5 years in duration. There are smaller grant schemes for Norwegian CSOs and there is a budget for NGOs working on information and development education in Norway. A small fund is set aside for projects by very small organisations without previous aid experience. Norad also supports around 30 INGOs and networks, with preference for those with headquarters in the South.
Additional funding is sourced from Norway's ODA allocations for regional and bilateral programming. This allows Norwegian embassies to provide direct support to CSOs in partner countries, or to partner with Norwegian NGOs in support of country programmes. Information provided by: Evensmo and Gedde-Dahl (2008).

**Example 61. Guidelines for civil society support in Tanzania**

Tanzania is a forerunner in implementing aid effectiveness principles; but in 2006, donor support to civil society seemed to be waning compared to government support, and available funding was seen to be unduly short-sighted, unpredictable, and unfocused. There was also a lack of transparency and information on strategies and funding modes. In 2006, a number of CSOs invited donors to establish a set of guidelines to encourage a more co-ordinated approach to donor support for civil society, and increased transparency.

The main result of this initiative to date has been the elaboration and endorsement of Guidelines for Support to Civil Society (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007). The Guidelines include specific commitments to make increased use of core funding and to adopt a longer-term perspective. They also encourage greater co-ordination of efforts, while remaining sensitive to the diversity of CSOs and the wide range of development roles that they play. One of the Guideline’s twelve principles is thus to encourage diversity and transparency of funding strategies. Another calls for support modalities that encourage innovation, results and learning. Also noteworthy is the principle of mainstreaming civil society support in all programmes, through donor support to CSOs in the same sectors as they are supporting governments, and by integrating the theme of civil society issues into the broader donor-donor and donor-government dialogue.

A second result of the initiative has been the establishment of a public database of support to civil society. This is a Web-based instrument for tracking participating donors’ funding to civil society that includes such information as size of budget, geographic coverage and sector of operation (www.civilsocietysupport.net). The database contains a considerable amount of information on donor support to CSOs in Tanzania, although it would benefit from additional information on donor support to and through Northern CSOs in the country.

*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

**Example 62. Programme-based support for ORAP in Zimbabwe**

When the concept of Programme-Based Approaches (PBAs) was coined by the Learning Network on Programme-Based Approaches, in 2002, the idea was that PBA modalities could apply just as well to CSO programming as to government programming. It was pointed out that large, programme-based NGOs, such as BRAC and Proshika in Bangladesh, were already being supported in this way. In Africa, the case of the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) in Zimbabwe was put forward as a similar case. ORAP was a forerunner in demanding a different form of support from the donor community.

ORAP’s strategy for engaging with Northern CSOs and official donors went through three phases in the 1980s and 1990s. In the first phase, from 1980-90, individual supporters provided assistance for individual projects and programmes with different members associations in ORAP. This led to inequities and came with high transactions costs.

A self-evaluation exercise carried out in 1989 revealed dissatisfaction about the imbalance of time spent on the actual work on the ground and that spent managing partner relationships.
This led ORAP to adopt a new approach. In 1990, ORAP called all its funders to a meeting to develop a memorandum of understanding defining mutual obligations and expectations. Seven Northern organisations, including official donors and Northern CSOs, agreed to pool their funds to support ORAP in a more comprehensive way. Each agency signed a separate memorandum of agreement with ORAP, but they accepted a single reporting mechanism for all that would not distinguish how the funds of individual donors were being used.

This approach would be complemented over the years with specific capacity development initiatives with GTZ and JICA, and a third phase began in 1998, in which ORAP retained the PBA approach, but allowed donors to earmark their funds for different programmes. Over time, ORAP developed a strong relationship with its supporters that allowed even sensitive issues to be discussed openly in a spirit of mutual trust.

Based on: Nkomo (2002).

**Example 63. The Manusher Jonno Foundation in Bangladesh**

Bangladesh’s Manusher Jonno Foundation started out in 2002 as a DFID-funded mechanism to support work on human rights and governance in Bangladesh. The fund was managed by a consortium led by CARE, which also included Deloitte and Touche and the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust.

In 2006, the Foundation became an independent, locally-led institution, and in 2007, it began to access funds from additional donors (Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway). The Foundation combines two roles: a traditional funding role and a role as an NGO engaged in strengthening and mobilising civil society toward specific development ends.

The Foundation aims to empower poor women, men and children to achieve their civil, political, economic and social rights and to improve their security and well-being, by working through NGO partners, through which it channels funding as an intermediary funding organisation. It facilitates networking and advocacy, monitors the human rights and governance situation in the country, and publishes information for public use.

Based on: Scanteam and ODI (2007); Tembo and Wells (2007); Wiseman (2007).

**Example 64. The PRSP Fund in Honduras**

The Agencias de Co-operación PRSP Fund in Honduras is a multi-donor initiative dedicated to strengthening the participation of civil society in pro-poor policy making in the context of Honduras' PRSP. The fund has 13 donors, including both official donors and INGOs.

A priority for the Fund is to promote the engagement in policy dialogue of the poorest people and marginalised groups, who have been excluded until now because of their lack of capacity, geographic isolation, or vulnerability. These include women, children, young people, ethnic groups and the disabled. Given that over 70 per cent of the poor live in rural areas, there is a strong rural focus.

Encouragement is provided for civil society groups to develop alliances and share experiences, and efforts are made to promote policy dialogue between civil society and government at the local, municipal, regional and national levels.

This initiative has been successful in a number of ways:

- Donors have demonstrated their interest in funding civil society once appropriate mechanisms are in place.
- Excluded groups have seized upon the opportunities presented by the new arrangements, demonstrating an interest and commitment to becoming involved in political processes.
- Local funding mechanisms have been designed to encourage alliance building and promote solidarity among CSOs, thus strengthening the capacity of civil society to intervene in policy discussions.
II.6. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CSO EFFECTIVENESS

Donor procedures in support of Northern CSOs

Recommendation 16

To the extent that official donors channel funds through Northern CSOs, donor procedures and regulations should be put in place that enable these CSOs to take on their responsibilities for implementing the enriched aid effectiveness agenda and recommendations proposed in the AG-CS synthesis.

AG-CS Recommendation 16 calls for donor procedures and regulations relating to the support that they channel through Northern CSOs that are well adapted to CSO aid effectiveness. As the corresponding section of the AG-CS Synthesis suggests, this subject raises a number of complex issues. These will require considerable additional work, and could be a subject of discussion at the next High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011.

The topic is an important one, because the bulk of donors’ civil society funding goes to their domestic and international CSOs (Centre for International Studies, 2007; Pratt, Adams...
By way of example, the Canadian share of total support to and through CSOs was between 70-80 per cent in 2007-08, the rest going to international or developing country CSOs (estimated from CIDA vendor data). For the US, the corresponding figure was over 95 per cent in 2004 (Centre for International Studies, 2007).

Yet donor requirements and conditions often restrict how Northern and Southern CSOs relate to each other, through restrictions on the sorts of activities that may be supported, limitations on flexible forms of support such as core or programme funding, and arduous monitoring, reporting, and evaluation requirements that overwhelm the autonomous programming capabilities of Southern CSOs. Such restrictions can make it difficult for Northern CSOs to respect the priorities and management systems of their Southern counterparts or to promote their institutional development and sustainability (Tomlinson, 2006; Wallace and Chapman, 2004).

The cases below provide four examples of donor policies, mechanisms and procedures that can contribute to promoting Northern CSO aid effectiveness.

Example 66 refers to DFID’s Partnership Programme Arrangements, which provide long-term support to UK and non-UK organisations, typically for six years. As noted in the example, DFID’s partners have welcomed the flexibility with which these arrangements are managed.

Some of the efforts that Norway is making to strengthen programming with its Norwegian CSO partners are seen in Example 67. As the example indicates, efforts are being made to enhance local ownership and alignment with local partner priorities by requiring Norwegian CSOs to demonstrate their knowledge of the local environment, the linkages that have established with local partners, and the efforts that they are making to align with local partner priorities. Approaches involving greater co-ordination by Northern CSOs working in alliance with each other will likewise be encouraged.

Examples 68 and 69 draw largely on the Canadian experience. Example 68 looks at the relationship that has developed between CIDA and Canada’s Volunteer Co-operation Agencies as an example of how Northern CSOs and a donor agency can work together to encourage greater concentration of efforts and the adoption of a more programmatic approach to development co-operation.

Example 69 addresses the issue of results reporting and accountability, which is flagged in the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations as an area of donor-CSO interaction that requires attention. As Example 69 indicates, there continues to be a tension between “managing for results” and “managing for accountability”. CSOs are finding pockets of receptivity to methods that are better adapted to the needs of CSOs and their beneficiaries, but these openings seem to be idiosyncratic and have not been institutionalised.

Example 70 concludes by looking at the European Commission’s (EC) funding relationship with recipient CSOs, based on a review of EC procedures and interviews with staff of European CSOs in Africa. The authors conclude that the competitive-contractual nature of the current EC approach does not provide an optimal set of incentives for CSOs, who are obliged to concentrate their efforts on financial management and reporting, at the expense of efforts to maximise programme quality, impact and relevance. They call for three types of measures:

- an alternative partnership model in which the degree of flexibility accorded to CSO partners would increase over time, as CSOs demonstrate their competency and reliability;
- increased emphasis on “strategic” accountability; and
- a collaborative approach based on trust and ongoing dialogue.
In practice: Promoting Northern CSO aid effectiveness

Example 66. DFID’s Partnership Programme Arrangements*

One of the main CSO-support mechanisms used by DFID is the Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPAs), introduced in 2000 to provide unrestricted funding to CSOs with which DFID has a significant working relationship, a common ethos and vision, and matching priorities. PPAs typically run for six years. Currently, DFID has 26 PPAs running with UK and non-UK organisations.

Entry to the PPA scheme is based on a range of criteria, including:
- sufficient consistency between CSO and DFID priorities;
- high standards of corporate governance; and
- extensive reach in poor countries or in the UK for building public support for development.

The opportunity of accessing long-term unrestricted funding has been welcomed by PPA partners, as it allows them to focus on strategic and substantive issues instead of constantly chasing funds. PPA funding allows recipient organisations to take a more holistic approach to poverty reduction, and provides opportunities to increase developmental impacts on the ground. It allows them to do research, take calculated risks and fund small community-based organisations to develop their own capacity and voice. It can be used for a wide range of activities including for strengthening an organisation’s own capacity and for learning and adaptation programmes.

PPAs are considered true partnerships between DFID and CSOs, and are accompanied by constructive policy dialogue, an exchange of ideas and sharing of information.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


Example 67. Rationalisation of CSO support modalities in Norway

Norway is currently working to rationalise the modalities it uses for channelling funds to Norwegian CSOs. An aspect of this is to provide increased emphasis on local ownership, by encouraging national social forces to take the lead in setting the action agenda for strengthening civil society, with support from international partners.

Key elements will include better country analysis and greater emphasis on how CSOs can be more effective as change agents. The rights-based approach will remain fundamental, but demands on Norwegian CSO partners will increase in terms of the knowledge that they bring to bear on poverty-reduction strategies, their links to vulnerable groups and grassroots-oriented social movements, and the sustainability of their contributions to development.

Meanwhile, NGOs are being encouraged to form umbrella organisations, harmonise and align their initiatives with Norwegian and developing country partner priorities, and reduce the number of countries in which they work.


Example 68. Canada’s experience with volunteer co-operation agencies

CIDA’s Canadian Partnerships Branch provides support for a number of programmes aimed at encouraging the active participation of Canadian citizens in development activities. In recent years, both CIDA and the Canadian organisations that it supports have
been making efforts to ensure more coherent programming and inter-organisational co-operation. The case of Canadian’s Volunteer Co-operation Agencies (VCAs) provides an example of this.

Canada currently has nine VCAs, support for which is managed through CIDA’s Volunteer Co-operation Programme. Canada’s VCAs have recognised their common interest in greater co-operation, and their initial efforts at working together encouraged them to renegotiate their relationship with CIDA. This resulted in the creation of one coherent programme instead of nine unrelated programmes. Together, CIDA and the VCAs crafted a Framework of Principles setting out the shared goals and development commitments of the partners in the programme.

This spirit of collaboration created space for greater innovation and synergy among the agencies. For instance, WUSC and CECI merged the volunteer co-operation part of their work into a joint programme called Uniterra (Example 76), and rationalised programming by concentrating resources in fewer countries and sectors. CUSO and VSO have gone further by fully merging their respective organisations. When preparing new programme submissions for CIDA funding for 2009-14, the VCAs identified countries where two or more VCAs were planning interventions in the same sector in order to co-ordinate and ensure synergy and complementarity.

This inter-VCA collaboration has transformed the relationship with CIDA, as a result of which a more authentic dialogue between CIDA and the VCAs has emerged. There are now regular quarterly meetings between the CIDA team and the Executive Directors of the VCAs; the VCAs have greater input into reporting modes and formats; and there is increased transparency and equality of treatment in CIDA’s dealings with VCAs. CIDA has demonstrated a willingness to address administrative issues and to engage in policy dialogue on key development issues. Within the international development sector in Canada, this evolving CIDA-VCA partnership is viewed as a model of government-civil society co-operation that is worthy of emulation.


**Example 69. The experience of Northern CSOs with donor approaches to results-based management**

In a multi-stakeholder review of CIDA’s experience with RBM in 2002, CSOs and other recipients of CIDA support expressed a generally favourable view of RBM as a way of promoting a more rigorous approach to the pursuit of results at the outcome and impact level. They also saw it as a useful tool for promoting dialogue with CSO partners and beneficiaries in the South.

However, they found that CIDA was experiencing tensions between “managing for results”, and “managing for accountability” (using performance information to promote learning and improve decision-making in the pursuit of better results vs. demonstrating results to managers and stakeholders). The study identified a number of issues requiring increased attention. These included: excessive use of RBM as a compliance mechanism rather than as a dynamic, learning-based management approach; the need for a change of mindset; and the need to institutionalise appropriate guidance and incentives to use RBM as a strategic management tool (CIDA, 2002a:ii-iii).

CSO experience with RBM in CIDA appears to be quite typical of their relations with other donors. At a series of workshops organised by CSOs with their developing country partners in 2005, participants shared their experiences with donors in terms of their receptivity to the inclusion of participatory or qualitative tools such as community maps, stories, and focus groups. Workshop participants identified several donors, including UNICEF, UNDP
and the United Nations Population Fund whose standardised reporting frameworks left limited room for this type of results monitoring and evaluation. Workshop participants noted that many donors were open to the inclusion of stories of change in reports as a complement to quantitative indicators, provided that quantitative indicators were also provided. Participants concluded that the approach to RBM adopted by donor representatives seems to be considerably person-dependent or desk-dependent.

Based on: CIDA (2002a and b) CPAR, CIH, IDI, WVC (2005), Postma (2009).

**Example 70. Contractual relationships between donors and CSOs – Impact on effectiveness**

Researchers from Engineers Without Borders working in partnership with CSOs working in Africa conducted a study of contractual, reporting, and evaluation mechanisms of the European Commission and considered the effect of these mechanisms on CSO incentives. The authors describe a funding model in which the EC sees its relationship with CSOs as one based on a contractually-defined accountability relationship, and a competitive model of resource allocation.

They describe several features of the EC relationship model with CSOs that lead recipient NGOs to focus their energies on financial management and activity-based reporting. According to the authors, some NGO managers invest up to 30-50 per cent of their time on reporting. Such activities, which are focused on EC and other donor's formal accountability requirements, are inevitably to the detriment of programme quality and of what they call “strategic accountability” focused on outcomes, impact and strategic relevance.

The study concludes by suggesting the need to revisit the “contractual” emphasis of the EC-NGO relationship. The authors recommend instead a relationship based on three underlying principles:

- an alternative partnership model in which the degree of flexibility accorded to CSO partners would increase over time, as CSOs demonstrate their competency and reliability;
- a proper balance between contractual accountability and strategic accountability; and
- partnerships based on trust and a true spirit of dialogue, in the pursuit of shared objectives.

CSO partnerships

CSO are often more effective when they combine forces in CSO-CSO partnerships of various sorts. The AG-CS makes two recommendations in this regard, the first one directed to donors, the second to CSOs themselves. We deal with these in two separate sections, below.

Donor support for CSO co-ordination

**Recommendation 17a**

CSOs should be supported in their efforts to co-ordinate their efforts through umbrella organisations, working groups, networks or coalitions.

Recommendation 17a is specifically about donor funding for CSO co-ordination efforts. We were unable to determine whether support for CSO co-ordination tends to be relatively deficient or relatively abundant compared to other forms of CSO activity, as we were unable to find any systematic evidence of this one way or another. However, the fact that CSO co-ordination appears to be increasing, as evidenced by the growth of national umbrella organisations, regional bodies and international initiatives, suggests that funding may be increasingly available for these types of initiatives. The examples below are of CSO partnerships that we know to be funded at least in part by donors.

A first example worth mentioning is how CSOs successfully mobilised themselves nationally, regionally, and globally to participate in the process leading up to HLF-3 and in HLF-3 itself. CSOs’ ability to organise themselves in this way, and to do so in a way that was broadly representative of CSOs all over the world, is a reflection of the increasingly sophisticated umbrella and network mechanisms that CSOs have established to better co-ordinate their efforts. CSO participation took two overlapping forms: an independent CSO track, organised under the CSOs’ International Steering Group and a multi-stakeholder track, under the AG-CS process. A dozen official donors contributed to these processes, in support of consultations at the national, regional and international levels and other activities.

Donor support for CSO partnerships can take different forms, depending on the character of the partnerships being supported. For instance, partnerships taking the form of umbrella organisations are often CSOs with legal status in their own right that can be funded like any other CSO. A similar case is that of networks that are relatively well established, which may not have legal status of their own, but are based in a CSO through which funding can be channelled. In other cases, such as for more informal or ad hoc networking activities, donor support may be indirect in nature, with participating CSOs drawing on core support or related project and programme budgets to support their participation.

We have already seen several examples of CSO umbrellas or coalitions in previous sections of this paper, most of which involve co-ordination for policy dialogue. These include:

- the Jubilee 2000 coalition (Example 18);
- the Global Campaign Against Poverty (Example 5); and
- the CSO coalition for basic education in Burkina Faso (Example 22).

Four additional examples are provided below:

- the Canadian Coalition for Youth and HIV/AIDS, featuring an example of the sort of support that donors can provide to encourage and support collaborative CSO initiatives to increase the reach and impact of CSO programmes (Example 71);
II.6. ILLUSTRATIONS ON CSO EFFECTIVENESS

The Co-operation Committee for Cambodia’s initiative to develop principles to guide the work of their members and the wider civil society community, which has resulted in a series of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards (Example 72);

an umbrella organisation, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation’s (CCIC), which has developed ethical and partnership standards for its members, including a Code of Ethics, to which its members are bound, and a set of Partnership Principles designed to guide its member CSOs in their relationships with developing country partners (Example 73); and

the International NGO Accountability Charter, illustrating a case of CSO co-ordination at the international level (Example 74).

A literature review of CSO networks and joint policy processes by Perkin and Court (2005) suggests some ways that CSOs and donors seeking to support them can increase the likelihood of achieving significant results:

- balancing the need for clear co-ordination structures with a flexible approach that invites dynamic engagement by all members;
- ensuring clarity of objectives and monitoring network actions against them to avoid goal deflection;
- ensuring genuine representativity of a network’s membership, with ongoing attention to differences in culture, access to resources, and power dynamics;
- employing a network co-ordinator or secretariat rather than relying exclusively on the voluntary actions of members;
- investing in network communications systems that are suitable to local capacity;
- establishing clarity on members’ incentives for participating; and
- recognising that a network is only as strong as its individual members – ensuring the success of a network may require complementary investment in building up the capacity of network members to contribute.

In practice: Donor support for CSO co-ordination

Example 71. The Canadian Coalition for Youth and HIV/AIDS

The Canadian Coalition for Youth and HIV/AIDS in Africa provides an example of donor support for a collaborative programme of activity involving a group of CSOs. The impetus for this coalition effort grew out of a felt need among staff in CARE Canada, Plan Canada, Save the Children Canada, and World Vision Canada to join forces against HIV/AIDS in four African countries. Funding came from the Canada Fund for Africa, in the form of a three-year grant agreement.

Collaborating with their field partners, the four organisations were able to build on international best practice in HIV/AIDS programming for children and young people. The Coalition’s focus was on building the capacity of local community-based organisations, faith-based organisations and NGOs to engage in comprehensive HIV programming. By combining forces, the Coalition reached hundreds of CSOs and thousands of individuals living with HIV/AIDS. The project led to increased levels of collaboration among participating community-based organisations and raised their capacity to engage in dialogue with government.
Although this project represents a good example of donor support for a CSO-led collaborative initiative, the complex organisational dynamics and resource requirements for a group of CSOs to effectively work together on such a large-scale was underestimated. Over time, it became increasingly clear that the collaborative process of building trust and sharing knowledge among members is time-consuming and relationship-driven, requiring that necessary financial and human resources be explicitly incorporated into such a programme’s design and budget. Funding for the Coalition ended in 2007. Since then, some of the Coalition’s individual members have maintained a level of programming outside of the Coalition framework. New sources of funding are being sought.

Based on: Canadian Coalition (2008), Pauw (2007).

**Example 72. An NGO code of principles and standards in Cambodia**

The Co-operation Committee for Cambodia is an umbrella organisation that seeks to facilitate NGO co-operation in Cambodia. Established by 24 INGOs in 1991, the Committee had 102 members in 2008.

In 2004, with financial support from a combination of official donors and INGOs, the Committee established the NGO Good Practice Project. This initiative was a response to mounting pressure, from both within and outside the NGO sector, for NGOs to be more accountable. A working group of representatives of the NGO community incorporated feedback from a wider audience of NGOs and other development stakeholders, and developed the Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGOs in Cambodia.

The Code aims to maintain and enhance standards of good organisational practice and to ensure public trust in the integrity of the individuals and organisations that make up the NGO sector, and the effectiveness of NGO programmes. Nine ethical principles were established: partnership, independence, co-operation, transparency, accountability, non-political affiliation, non-discrimination, non-violence, respect for human rights and communities.

A working group was established under the initiative to develop a system of voluntary self-certification that has now been recognised by the Government Council for the Development of Cambodia. Such self-certification serves as a mechanism for encouraging NGOs to comply with the Code.

The Committee has expanded its network beyond its formal membership to a broad range of CSOs and other stakeholders within Cambodia and internationally, and has seized every possible opportunity to raise awareness about the Code and to share good practice in accountability. This case was presented as an example of good practice at the regional dialogue on civil society and aid effectiveness in Hanoi, Vietnam.


**Example 73. CCIC’s code of ethics and partnership principles**

The Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) is an umbrella organisation of Canadian voluntary sector organisations that includes among its key objectives the strengthening of the civil society sector and facilitating organisational change by its members. CCIC is supported financially through membership fees and a programme agreement with CIDA.

In the early 1990s, members of CCIC developed a membership-wide Code of Ethics. Ratified and adopted in 1995, the Code of Ethics delineates the minimum ethical standards that the organisation’s members must observe in the areas of governance, organisational integrity, management/human resources, financial management and fundraising. It is based on a philosophy of self-certification and peer accountability, supported by a broader ethics programme.
In 2004, CCIC added a set of principles and standards regarding North-South partnerships to the Code. The principles were developed over a two-year period through a process that included Southern CSO participation. One of the principles acknowledges that inequalities often exist as a result of power dynamics in funding relations, and encourages partners to strive for equitable partnerships. Another principle stresses that partnerships should be vehicles for long-term accompaniment that support the right of peoples to pursue their own priorities through their CSOs (CCIC, 2008a:11).

CCIC supports implementation of the Code of Ethics and partnership principles through workshops on ethical practice and the publication of documentation on issues such as managing conflicts of interest and fundraising.

Example 74. The international NGO Accountability Charter

The INGO Accountability Charter grew out of discussions among several prominent INGO leaders who have gathered annually since 2003 at the International Advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations Workshop. Founding members include the Hauser Center for Non-Profit Organisations, CIVICUS, and several INGO leaders. It brings together a diversity of global CSOs engaged in the promotion of social, economic and political justice.

Running costs of the Workshop are covered each year by the host organisations of each Workshop and participants themselves. Complementary grants from various foundations serve to cover aspects of the consultative process in between Workshops; and a small grant was secured from the Ford Foundation in 2006 to support the work of the Secretariat, based in CIVICUS. However, it is intended that implementation of the Charter will be self-sustaining through signatory fees paid on a geared-to-income basis.

The Charter was elaborated over a three-year period of research and consultation, and was endorsed in 2006 by 11 INGO members of the Workshop. INGOs from all sectors are invited to sign onto the Charter, and six more had done so by 2008.

Among the Charter’s nine principles is that on transparency, whereby signatories commit to openness, transparency, and honesty about their structures, mission, policies and activities. Other principles cover good governance, ethical fundraising, professional management, non-discrimination, effective programmes, responsible advocacy, independence and respect for universal principles grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The principle of good governance commits members to have at least the following:

● a governing body that supervises and evaluates the chief executive and oversees programme and budget matters;

● written procedures covering the appointment, responsibilities and terms of members of the governing body, and preventing and managing conflicts of interest; and

● a regular general meeting with the authority to appoint and replace members of the governing body.

Oversight for the Charter’s implementation is provided by an elected Management Committee. The Committee’s work includes the design of compliance and reporting mechanisms, and a peer review process.

North-South division of labour

We turn, finally to North-South partnerships more specifically. As the AG-CS Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations acknowledges, these relationships can suffer from dependencies and power imbalances just as surely as other North-South relationships. Southern CSOs worry as well about competition from INGOs, some of which have more recently established offices in Southern countries to increase their access to decentralised donor funding (Agg, 2006).

Recommendation 17b

Northern and Southern CSOs should work together to define their respective areas of comparative advantage and appropriate division of labour to encourage Southern CSOs to thrive and strengthen their place in society over time.

Recommendation 17b suggests the need to look more closely at the features of successful North-South CSO partnerships. Of obvious importance is that the Northern partner should add value to the relationship. We have seen several cases of North-South partnerships in this paper that are suggestive of the value added of Northern CSOs in terms of international credibility and expertise, as partners in capacity development, or as intermediaries between official donors and Southern CSOs (see the studies highlighting the relationships between CARE and ForoSalud in Peru; CODE and Progresso in Mozambique; CHF and its partners in Guyana; Northern CSOs and Honduran CSOs involved in the Honduras PRSP fund; and Canadian CSOs and Butoke in DRC).

Similar features emerge in the examples featured below:

- The case of CSO Solidarity in Indonesia points to the value of international solidarity in resisting authoritarian regimes, where alternative sources of support are wanting (Example 75). This is a recurring feature of North-South CSO alliances, an additional example of which is documented in the Latin America case as part of the struggle for democracy and human rights in the 1980s (Campodónico and Valderrama, 2005).

- The Uniterra case point to the roles of Northern partners in resource mobilisation and support for capacity development and illustrates how Uniterra works with local partners (Example 76).

- The International Planned Federation (IPPF) case shows how an INGO can bring value to its Southern members through shared standards of service and accountability, using a system of accreditation (Example 77).

- The MASAI-Caritas Neerlandica case in the Philippines illustrates the character of a North-South partnership that combined financial support from a Northern CSO and capacity development services by the Filipino partner. The case shows how the partnership evolved over time in favour of stronger Southern leadership and ownership (Example 78).

In a review of Norwegian CSO partnerships in Tanzania, Chapman and Wendoh stress the importance of solidarity between Northern and Southern partners, and of providing moral and political support for each other’s work. They highlight the opportunities for networking, information sharing and access to information that Northern CSOs provide, and openings for Southern CSOs to engage in policy dialogue internationally (Chapman and Wendoh, 2007).
Work on this topic is considered to be of considerable importance by the international CSO community, and will be an important subject of reflection under the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness described in Example 80. The Forum is a global process that will guide CSOs in elaborating principles and codes of conduct that is expected to address many issues related to CSO effectiveness, including that of North-South CSO partnerships (Global Facilitating Group, 2008).

Example 75. CSO solidarity in Indonesia

Relationships between Northern and domestic CSOs in Indonesia have evolved in line with social and political changes in that country over the last four decades.

CSOs working on development and advocacy emerged during late 1960s, under the Suharto dictatorship (1967-98). These CSOs were established mainly by young intellectuals to promote alternative development approaches and “bottom-up” and participatory methods. They provided social services, promoted community development and social change and advocated for democracy, development alternatives, and human rights.

Northern CSO support was substantial and strategically important. In addition to funding, Northern CSOs provided access to information, which was heavily restricted in the country, and support for capacity building of Indonesian CSOs. This period was marked by a strong sense of solidarity between Northern and Indonesian CSOs.

This era of Northern-Southern solidarity has waned in the post-Suharto era. Many Northern CSOs have now established offices with branches in the regions, and are seen to compete with local CSOs for funding. Another major development has been the creation of a number of donor-dominated funding facilities dominated by the World Bank, each of which has its own scope of work and area of coverage. These act as the new donors in the country with their own programme priorities for supporting the work of CSOs and local governments.

Emerging from this is a landscape of CSO activity in which some Northern CSOs are seen to co-operate with this “donor club” while some Indonesian CSOs are challenging this model which they see as a top-down, World Bank dominated, approach to development. One also finds some Northern CSOs related to political parties in their country of origin engaging in lobbying and in capacity building for government, parliaments and political parties.

What emerges, therefore, is a mixed picture of North-South CSO relationships, characterised by both competition and co-operation, and differences in approach regarding the degree of CSO autonomy from mainstream approaches to development. The dominance of the new funding facilities as a source of funds for CSOs is a key determining feature of this new landscape.


Example 76. Volunteer services and capacity development: the Uniterra Programme*

Uniterra combines a development programme with operations in 13 African, Asian and Latin American countries, and a public engagement programme in Canada. The programme was designed and is being implemented by two Canadian NGOs: Centre d’étude et de coopération internationale (CECI) and World University Service Canada (WUSC). Resources are provided by CIDA’s Partnership branch, CECI, WUSC, volunteers and developing country partners. Uniterra mobilises more than 400 Canadian and Southern volunteers each year in support of 120 local partners. The outreach of the programme is further enhanced by the work of these local partners who are working to strengthen the capacities of more than 800 grassroots organisations.
Uniterra’s goals are twofold: i) to build the capacities of local development actors in targeted sectors and in gender equality; and ii) to enhance the support of Canadians for development co-operation efforts by informing the Canadian public through networks of partners and volunteers, and providing opportunities for tangible engagement in international solidarity work.

Its implementation strategy is based on the Paris principles of aid effectiveness, which it has adapted to take into account the development perspectives and contributions of Southern and Northern CSOs.

In order to promote local ownership and co-ordination, Uniterra operates on the basis of a five-year sectoral action plan developed by local programme partners (5-10 organisations per sector in each country). The plan lays out priority activities and methods for capacity building within the sector and for the organisations. A sectoral programme management committee is formed, through which partners set annual goals and allocate programme resources (volunteers, exchanges, sectoral funds) to attain these goals each year.

This sectoral committee also monitors progress and reports on results with the support of Uniterra field staff and volunteers. The sectoral committee represents a forum for dialogue and co-ordinated action between CSOs in a given sector, thus contributing to mutual capacity building and development of synergies. Committee members are supported in their analysis of relevant policies and programmes, and the experience helps to build up their capacity for policy dialogue.

Uniterra has set up a performance measurement and reporting system based on quantitative and qualitative indicators to track targeted development results. This approach stands in contrast to an approach focused on activities, emphasising, for example, volunteer placement targets. As a result, Uniterra is in a position to determine results such as: how many people have developed new skills; the types of organisational capacities developed (e.g. in management, governance, marketing, advocacy and resource mobilisation); and the number of women who have benefited.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Example 77. Accountability through accreditation*

The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a global network of autonomous member associations, is one of the first international NGOs to implement a process of accreditation. The accreditation system helps to ensure that IPPF’s mission, vision and values are shared by all member associations, and that agreed principles, policies and standards are respected and implemented consistently across the Federation, regardless of the national context in which they are working.

The accreditation process involves an assessment of each association against 65 standards, clustered into four main areas: constitutional issues, good governance, programmes and services, and management. For CSOs that do not at first meet the standards, the organisation will support and assist them to address areas needing to be strengthened.

Accreditation offers a guarantee to external partners that the association adheres to internationally recognised and transparent governance, management, financial, and monitoring systems. By the end of 2007, 137 associations had been through the accreditation process, leading to positive results in terms of policy influence, representativity, service quality, and continuous learning.
With five years of experience, IPPF has emerged as a leader on accountability through accreditation, receiving visits and requests for information from other CSOs, such as Transparency International, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance and the Emergency Capacity Building Consortium of NGOs Project.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


Example 78. The MASAI-Caritas Neerlandica Partnership in the Philippines

The Management Advancement Systems Association, Inc. (MASAI) is a Filipino CSO specialised in the provision of evaluation, training and consultancy services that worked in partnership with Dutch CSO Caritas-Neerlandica in the early 1990s. These two CSOs complemented each other in supporting programme partners working in early childhood care, who were often in need of both financial and technical assistance and other capacity building services.

Beginning in 1994, MASAI and Caritas-Neerlandica established and jointly managed a locally owned mechanism called the Early Childhood Care and Development Committee consisting of 5-7 individuals representing grassroots organisations and CSOs. Under this new mode of partnership, the Filipino partners owned the programmes, and decisions were made by the Committee rather than by the funding agency. The Committee also provided a venue for training, consultancy and capacity building. Criteria for support were that community members themselves should design the programmes being supported. Parents and family members were mobilised to assume tasks and responsibilities, and “People’s Organisations” managed the programme.

The Committee continued to operate for nine years, until 2003. It funded 70 programmes over the course of that period, and made a significant contribution to building up the capacity of the People’s Organisations to run and manage their affairs. The nine-year partnership was only broken when Caritas-Neerlandica was faced with funding constraints and had to withdraw its support. However, the Committee had seen this coming and had recommended that a Sustainability Plan be part of all the proposals submitted to it. It proved to be the blueprint to help the implementers continue their programmes beyond the Caritas-Neerlandica support.

The union of MASAI and Caritas-Neerlandica under this initiative was the result of years of working together, learning from each other and finally embarking on a new, locally-owned, type of partnership. This new mode of relating contributed to the continued existence of community-based programmes even after the end of funding support.

Chapter 7

The Forward Agenda

This chapter addresses recommendations on how to pursue the CSO effectiveness agenda following HLF-3 in Accra. It draws attention to a number of current efforts by the stakeholder community, including work at the country level, the incorporation of CSOs into the WP-EFF, and an international CSO-led process on CSO effectiveness.
The AG-CS’ Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations closes with four recommendations for a forward multi-stakeholder agenda.

### Recommendation 18

Ongoing multi-stakeholder consultations on CSO effectiveness should be initiated or extended in all countries, with the aim of developing a comprehensive and actionable perspective on how civil society and CSOs could be strengthened in their various roles as agents of development, participation, and accountability.

### Recommendation 19

All stakeholders, jointly and individually, should pilot good practices in relation to the various recommendations emerging from the work of the Advisory Group, and track progress on these practices to inform ongoing learning and dialogue.

### Recommendation 20

Ministers in Accra should endorse and encourage the CSO-led process of dialogue and consensus-building on CSO development effectiveness principles, guidelines and good practices, which will include multi-stakeholder participation. This process should be recognised in the AAA, and donors and developing country governments should collaborate with CSOs to recognise and address the responsibilities shared by all development actors for enhancing CSO development effectiveness.

### Recommendation 21

CSOs and CSO effectiveness should be an integral part of any future processes and agreements on development and aid, post-Accra.

There were some discussions in Accra about how to operationalise the AG-CS recommendations on the forward agenda in Roundtable 6 on The Role of Civil Society in Enhancing Aid Effectiveness, and this was followed by further discussion during a special meeting of interested parties organised for that purpose in October 2008. These discussions led to a set of complementary recommendations that were submitted to the WP-EFF when it met in November 2008 (AG-CS, 2008a). They included the following:

- that CSOs be formally integrated into the WP-EFF and be involved as full participants in the various work streams of the WP-EFF;
the creation of a core group of WP-EFF members to promote and monitor action on the AG-CS Findings and Recommendations and sections of the AAA of special relevance to CSOs;

- special attention to multi-stakeholder efforts at the country level; and

- creation of a pooled fund to support CSO processes of engagement in the civil society effectiveness forward agenda.

Work under this forward agenda will take place on three levels:

- at the country level, where stakeholders can work together to operationalise many of the recommendations included in the AG-CS Synthesis;

- at the international level, as CSOs and donors continue to engage among themselves and with each other on aid and development effectiveness issues; and

- at the level of individual stakeholders, where the onus for implementing the types of good practice recommended in this paper ultimately lies.

At the country level, the example below on Mali’s national consultations, launched with encouragement from the AG-CS, provides a good illustration of the sorts of multi-stakeholder efforts that can be envisaged (Example 79). Other efforts of this sort are being piloted in Ghana, Zambia, and Mozambique by a Nordic+ group of donors that are looking for more effective ways of jointly supporting civil society in those countries.

Internationally, the stage is now set for formal CSO participation in the WP-EFF and its work streams beginning in July 2009, and CSO issues are likely to be an important subject of the next High Level Forum in 2011.

CSOs themselves are mobilising considerable efforts to address issues of CSO effectiveness, both nationally and internationally. The International Steering Group (now called the Better Aid Co-ordinating Group), which was organised to co-ordinate CSO inputs into the Accra process, will continue to function and will co-ordinate the Better Aid platform as a vehicle for ensuring maximum participation and representation of different categories of CSOs.

One of the most significant CSO initiatives internationally is known as the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness and is described in Example 80. This initiative is acknowledged in paragraph 20b of the AAA and will further stimulate CSO discussions of effectiveness issues.

In sum, it would appear that the Findings and Recommendations of the AG-CS are bearing fruit, and that the next few years will involve considerable work in this area. This publication is intended to help fuel that process.

In practice: Examples of implementing the forward agenda on civil society and aid effectiveness

Example 79. Mali’s national consultations on civil society and aid effectiveness

The AG-CS process helped to provide space for civil society voice at the national level as well as regionally and internationally. A total of 35 countries held multi-stakeholder consultations on civil society and aid effectiveness, and Mali was one of the countries most heavily engaged in this type of consultation.
Mali’s consultation process took place from June to September 2007. Facilitated by Canada and France, and organised by a National Consultation Steering Committee comprised of the main CSO umbrella organisations in Mali, the Mali consultation process brought together 650 people in regional, district and national consultations, representing 292 separate CSO, government, and donor organisations. The National Consultation Steering Committee intends to transform itself into a national umbrella organisation for all CSOs in Mali in order to improve representation of civil society in the country.

This consultation process provided an opportunity for CSOs and donors to better co-ordinate their efforts and to raise government’s awareness of the vibrancy and diversity of Mali’s civil society. The consultations created a momentum for greater tripartite dialogue among all partners. A result of the consultation process is expected to be increased representation of CSOs and more comprehensive inclusion of their concerns in regular fora such as PRSP reviews and donor roundtables. A draft code of ethics for dialogue has been developed that envisages a permanent mechanism of annual meetings on global challenges, similar to the national consultations, for all CSOs and donors, and two to three meetings per year on specific issues.

A donor Action Plan for the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Mali provided for the reorganisation of donors’ thematic groups to include a 14-member Thematic Group on Civil Society that was created in February 2008. This Group’s mandate is to co-ordinate, support and facilitate dialogue involving government, donors and civil society.

In addition, a tripartite commission involving government, civil society, and donors has been established to design and fund a national CSO support programme. The aim is to set up a jointly-managed programme for civil society capacity development in policy dialogue, beginning in September 2009, using a pooled funding mechanism, with contributions from Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The European Union, Sida and Spain are expected to join later, while other countries, such as the US, have promised to co-ordinate their efforts with those of the pooled fund.

* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).


Example 80. Open Forum for CSO development effectiveness

In June 2008, more than 70 CSO delegates from developed and developing countries met in Paris at an Exploratory Meeting on CSO Effectiveness, and agreed to launch a global two-year process titled Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, to run from 2009 to 2011. The Forum will be managed and facilitated by a 25 member CSO Global Facilitation Group, working closely with the Better Aid Platform.

A progress report compiled following the Exploratory Meeting outlines key directions and challenges for the Forum:

- The elaboration of CSO effectiveness principles will focus on CSOs’ diverse roles as development and aid actors, in particular their roles in areas such as human rights and women’s rights, livelihoods, environmental sustainability and democratic development.
- The Forum will be a CSO-led global process of consensus building that will seek to engage all development actors (not just CSOs) at the country, regional and international levels.
- The Forum will provide a learning space for CSOs in which key principles affecting CSO development effectiveness will be elaborated. These principles will be complemented with guidance on their application, and suggestions of good practice for holding CSOs accountable to the principles. Application of the principles will be context-specific. It is not the intention to produce a universal international code of conduct for CSOs.
- It is envisaged that the Forum’s process and outcomes will be a key CSO contribution to a multi-stakeholder declaration on Development Effectiveness at the next High Level Forum in 2011.

It is the CSOs’ intention that the Open Forum process will help to ensure their equal participation in negotiations for the next High Level Forum.

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* Cases marked with an asterisk are included in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book.


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ANNEX A

The Accra Agenda for Action
(Highlighted to show references to civil society)

Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions endorsed the following statement in Accra, Ghana, on 4 September 2008 to accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2 March 2005).

This is a moment of opportunity

1. We are committed to eradicating poverty and promoting peace and prosperity by building stronger, more effective partnerships that enable developing countries to realise their development goals.

2. There has been progress. Fifteen years ago, two out of five people lived in extreme poverty; today, that figure has been reduced to one in four. However, 1.4 billion people – most of them women and girls – still live in extreme poverty,\(^1\) and access to safe drinking water and health care remains a major issue in many parts of the world. In addition, new global challenges – rising food and fuel prices and climate change – threaten the advances against poverty many countries have made.

3. We need to achieve much more if all countries are to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Aid is only one part of the development picture. Democracy, economic growth, social progress, and care for the environment are the prime engines of development in all countries. Addressing inequalities of income and opportunity within countries and between states is essential to global progress. Gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men, and children. It is vital that all our policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent way.

4. In 2008, three international conferences will help us accelerate the pace of change: the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations High Level Event on the MDGs in New York, and the Financing for Development follow-up meeting in Doha. Today at Accra, we are leading the way, united in a common objective: to unlock the full potential of aid in achieving lasting development results.
We are making progress, but not enough

5. Learning from our past successes and failures in development co-operation and building on the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, in March 2005 we adopted an ambitious set of reforms: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed to develop a genuine partnership, with developing countries clearly in charge of their own development processes. We also agreed to hold each other accountable for achieving concrete development results. Three and one-half years later, we are reconvening in Accra to review progress and address the challenges that now face us.

6. Evidence shows we are making progress, but not enough. A recent evaluation shows that the Paris Declaration has created powerful momentum to change the way developing countries and donors work together on the ground. According to the 2008 Monitoring Survey, a large number of developing countries have improved their management of public funds. Donors, in turn, are increasingly improving their co-ordination at country level. Yet the pace of progress is too slow. Without further reform and faster action we will not meet our 2010 commitments and targets for improving the quality of aid.

We will take action to accelerate progress

7. Evidence shows that we will need to address three major challenges to accelerate progress on aid effectiveness:

8. Country ownership is key. Developing country governments will take stronger leadership of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies. Donors will support them by respecting countries’ priorities, investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their systems to deliver aid, and increasing the predictability of aid flows.

9. Building more effective and inclusive partnerships. In recent years, more development actors – middle-income countries, global funds, the private sector, civil society organisations – have been increasing their contributions and bringing valuable experience to the table. This also creates management and co-ordination challenges. Together, all development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty.

10. Achieving development results – and openly accounting for them – must be at the heart of all we do. More than ever, citizens and taxpayers of all countries expect to see the tangible results of development efforts. We will demonstrate that our actions translate into positive impacts on people’s lives. We will be accountable to each other and to our respective parliaments and governing bodies for these outcomes.

11. Without addressing these obstacles to faster progress, we will fall short of our commitments and miss opportunities to improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in the world. Therefore, we are reaffirming the commitments we made in the Paris Declaration and, in this Accra Agenda for Action, are agreeing on concrete and monitorable actions to accelerate progress to meet those commitments by 2010. We commit to continuing efforts in monitoring and evaluation that will assess whether we have achieved the commitments we agreed in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and to what extent aid effectiveness is improving and generating greater development impact.
Strengthening country ownership over development

12. Developing countries determine and implement their development policies to achieve their own economic, social and environmental goals. We agreed in the Paris Declaration that this would be our first priority. Today, we are taking additional steps to turn this resolution into a reality.

We will broaden country-level policy dialogue on development

13. We will engage in open and inclusive dialogue on development policies. We acknowledge the critical role and responsibility of parliaments in ensuring country ownership of development processes. To further this objective we will take the following actions:

a) Developing country governments will work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans. They will also engage with civil society organisations (CSOs).

b) Donors will support efforts to increase the capacity of all development actors – parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector – to take an active role in dialogue on development policy and on the role of aid in contributing to countries’ development objectives.

c) Developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability.

Developing countries will strengthen their capacity to lead and manage development

14. Without robust capacity – strong institutions, systems, and local expertise – developing countries cannot fully own and manage their development processes. We agreed in the Paris Declaration that capacity development is the responsibility of developing countries, with donors playing a supportive role, and that technical co-operation is one means among others to develop capacity. Together, developing countries and donors will take the following actions to strengthen capacity development:

a) Developing countries will systematically identify areas where there is a need to strengthen the capacity to perform and deliver services at all levels – national, sub-national, sectoral, and thematic – and design strategies to address them. Donors will strengthen their own capacity and skills to be more responsive to developing countries’ needs.

b) Donors’ support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership. To this end, developing countries and donors will i) jointly select and manage technical co-operation, and ii) promote the provision of technical co-operation by local and regional resources, including through South-South co-operation.

c) Developing countries and donors will work together at all levels to promote operational changes that make capacity development support more effective.

We will strengthen and use developing country systems to the maximum extent possible

15. Successful development depends to a large extent on a government’s capacity to implement its policies and manage public resources through its own institutions and systems. In the Paris Declaration, developing countries committed to strengthen their systems and
donors committed to use those systems to the maximum extent possible. Evidence shows, however, that developing countries and donors are not on track to meet these commitments. Progress in improving the quality of country systems varies considerably among countries; and even when there are good-quality country systems, donors often do not use them. Yet it is recognised that using country systems promotes their development. To strengthen and increase the use of country systems, we will take the following actions:

a) Donors agree to use country systems as the first option for aid programmes in support of activities managed by the public sector.

b) Should donors choose to use another option and rely on aid delivery mechanisms outside country systems (including parallel project implementation units), they will transparently state the rationale for this and will review their positions at regular intervals. Where use of country systems is not feasible, donors will establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures.

c) Developing countries and donors will jointly assess the quality of country systems in a country-led process using mutually agreed diagnostic tools. Where country systems require further strengthening, developing countries will lead in defining reform programmes and priorities. Donors will support these reforms and provide capacity development assistance.

d) Donors will immediately start working on and sharing transparent plans for undertaking their Paris commitments on using country systems in all forms of development assistance; provide staff guidance on how these systems can be used; and ensure that internal incentives encourage their use. They will finalise these plans as a matter of urgency.

e) Donors recollect and reaffirm their Paris Declaration commitment to provide 66% of aid as programme-based approaches. In addition, donors will aim to channel 50% or more of government-to-government assistance through country fiduciary systems, including by increasing the percentage of assistance provided through programme based approaches.

**Building more effective and inclusive partnerships for development**

16. Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors – bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To support developing countries’ efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors.

**We will reduce costly fragmentation of aid**

17. The effectiveness of aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially at country and sector levels. We will reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries. To this end:

a) Developing countries will lead in determining the optimal roles of donors in supporting their development efforts at national, regional and sectoral levels. Donors will respect developing countries’ priorities, ensuring that new arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individual developing countries receiving less aid.
b) Donors and developing countries will work together with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to complete good practice principles on country-led division of labour. To that end, they will elaborate plans to ensure the maximum co-ordination of development co-operation. We will evaluate progress in implementation starting in 2009.

c) We will start dialogue on international division of labour across countries by June 2009.

d) We will work to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient aid.

**We will increase aid’s value for money**

18. Since the Paris Declaration was agreed in 2005, OECD-DAC donors have made progress in untying their aid. A number of donors have already fully untied their aid, and we encourage others to do so. We will pursue, and accelerate, these efforts by taking the following actions:

a) OECD-DAC donors will extend coverage of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Aid to non-LDC HIPC\(^3\)s and will improve their reporting on the 2001 DAC Recommendation.

b) Donors will elaborate individual plans to further untie their aid to the maximum extent.

c) Donors will promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that their procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to compete. We will build on examples of good practice to help improve local firms’ capacity to compete successfully for aid-funded procurement.

d) We will respect our international agreements on corporate social responsibility.

**We welcome and will work with all development actors**

19. The contributions of all development actors are more effective when developing countries are in a position to manage and co-ordinate them. We welcome the role of new contributors and will improve the way all development actors work together by taking the following actions:

a) We encourage all development actors, including those engaged in South-South co-operation, to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in providing development co-operation.

b) We acknowledge the contributions made by all development actors, and in particular the role of middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of aid. We recognise the importance and particularities of South-South co-operation and acknowledge that we can learn from the experience of developing countries. We encourage further development of triangular co-operation.

c) Global funds and programmes make an important contribution to development. The programmes they fund are most effective in conjunction with complementary efforts to improve the policy environment and to strengthen the institutions in the sectors in which they operate. We call upon all global funds to support country ownership, to align and harmonise their assistance proactively, and to make good use of mutual accountability frameworks, while continuing their emphasis on achieving results. As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level.
d) We encourage developing countries to mobilise, manage and evaluate their international co-operation initiatives for the benefit of other developing countries.

e) South-South co-operation on development aims to observe the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content. It plays an important role in international development co-operation and is a valuable complement to North-South co-operation.

**We will deepen our engagement with civil society organisations**

20. We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector. We share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential. To this end:

a) We invite CSOs to reflect on how they can apply the Paris principles of aid effectiveness from a CSO perspective.

b) We welcome the CSOs’ proposal to engage with them in a CSO-led multistakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness. As part of that process, we will seek to i) improve co-ordination of CSO efforts with government programmes, ii) enhance CSO accountability for results, and iii) improve information on CSO activities.

c) We will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development.

**We will adapt aid policies for countries in fragile situations**

21. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that aid effectiveness principles apply equally to development co-operation in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from conflict, but that these principles need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership or capacity. Since then, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations have been agreed. To further improve aid effectiveness in these environments, we will take the following actions:

a) Donors will conduct joint assessments of governance and capacity and examine the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity, engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stakeholders to the maximum extent possible.

b) At country level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women. This process will be informed by international dialogue between partners and donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development.

c) Donors will provide demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery. They will work with developing countries to design interim measures that are appropriately sequenced and that lead to sustainable local institutions.

d) Donors will work on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled basis where appropriate, to i) bridge humanitarian, recovery and longer-term development phases, and ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace building, and the building of capable, accountable and responsive states. In collaboration with developing countries,
donors will foster partnerships with the UN System, international financial institutions and other donors.

c) At country level and on a voluntary basis, donors and developing countries will monitor implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and will share results as part of progress reports on implementing the Paris Declaration.

**Delivering and accounting for development results**

22. We will be judged by the impacts that our collective efforts have on the lives of poor people. We recognise that greater transparency and accountability for the use of development resources – domestic as well as external – are powerful drivers of progress.

**We will focus on delivering results**

23. We will improve our management for results by taking the following actions:

a) Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating data by sex, region and socioeconomic status.

b) Developing countries and donors will work to develop cost-effective results management instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust them as necessary. We will better co-ordinate and link the various sources of information, including national statistical systems, budgeting, planning, monitoring and country-led evaluations of policy performance.

c) Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems. They will support, and invest in strengthening, developing countries’ national statistical capacity and information systems, including those for managing aid.

d) We will strengthen incentives to improve aid effectiveness. We will systematically review and address legal or administrative impediments to implementing international commitments on aid effectiveness. Donors will pay more attention to delegating sufficient authority to country offices and to changing organisational and staff incentives to promote behaviour in line with aid effectiveness principles.

**We will be more accountable and transparent to our publics for results**

24. Transparency and accountability are essential elements for development results. They lie at the heart of the Paris Declaration, in which we agreed that countries and donors would become more accountable to each other and to their citizens. We will pursue these efforts by taking the following actions:

a) We will make aid more transparent. Developing countries will facilitate parliamentary oversight by implementing greater transparency in public financial management, including public disclosure of revenues, budgets, expenditures, procurement and audits. Donors will publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting, and audit by developing countries.

b) We will step up our efforts to ensure that–as agreed in the Paris Declaration–mutual assessment reviews are in place by 2010 in all countries that have endorsed the Declaration. These reviews will be based on country results reporting and information
systems complemented with available donor data and credible independent evidence. They will draw on emerging good practice with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement. With them we will hold each other accountable for mutually agreed results in keeping with country development and aid policies.

c) To complement mutual assessment reviews at country level and drive better performance, developing countries and donors will jointly review and strengthen existing international accountability mechanisms, including peer review with participation of developing countries. We will review proposals for strengthening the mechanisms by end 2009.

d) Effective and efficient use of development financing requires both donors and partner countries to do their utmost to fight corruption. Donors and developing countries will respect the principles to which they have agreed including those under the UN Convention against Corruption. Developing countries will address corruption by improving systems of investigation, legal redress, accountability and transparency in the use of public funds. Donors will take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets.

**We will continue to change the nature of conditionality to support ownership**

25. To strengthen country ownership and improve the predictability of aid flows, donors agreed in the Paris Declaration that, whenever possible, they would draw their conditions from developing countries’ own development policies. We reaffirm our commitment to this principle and will continue to change the nature of conditionality by taking the following actions:

a) Donors will work with developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually agreed conditions based on national development strategies. We will jointly assess donor and developing country performance in meeting commitments.

b) Beginning now, donors and developing countries will regularly make public all conditions linked to disbursements.

c) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level to review, document, and disseminate good practices on conditionality with a view to reinforcing country ownership and other Paris Declaration Principles by increasing emphasis on harmonised, results-based conditionality. They will be receptive to contributions from civil society.

**We will increase the medium-term predictability of aid**

26. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that greater predictability in the provision of aid flows is needed to enable developing countries to effectively plan and manage their development programmes over the short and medium term. As a matter of priority, we will take the following actions to improve the predictability of aid:

a) Developing countries will strengthen budget planning processes for managing domestic and external resources and will improve the linkages between expenditures and results over the medium term.

b) Beginning now, donors will provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a position to accurately record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their accounting systems.
c) Beginning now, donors will provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that developing countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic frameworks. Donors will address any constraints to providing such information.

d) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level on ways of further improving the medium-term predictability of aid, including by developing tools to measure it.

**Looking forward**

27. The reforms we agree on today in Accra will require continued high level political support, peer pressure, and co-ordinated action at global, regional, and country levels. To achieve these reforms, we renew our commitment to the principles and targets established in the Paris Declaration, and will continue to assess progress in implementing them.

28. The commitments we agree today will need to be adapted to different country circumstances – including in middle-income countries, small states and countries in situations of fragility. To this end, we encourage developing countries to design – with active support from donors – country-based action plans that set out time-bound and monitorable proposals to implement the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

29. We agree that, by 2010, each of us should meet the commitments we made on aid effectiveness in Paris and today in Accra, and to reach beyond these commitments where we can. We agree to reflect and draw upon the many valuable ideas and initiatives that have been presented at this High Level Forum. We agree that challenges such as climate change and rising food and fuel prices underline the importance of applying aid effectiveness principles. In response to the food crisis, we will develop and implement the global partnership on agriculture and food swiftly, efficiently and flexibly.

30. We ask the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to continue monitoring progress on implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to report back to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. We recognise that additional work will be required to improve the methodology and indicators of progress of aid effectiveness. In 2011, we will undertake the third round of monitoring that will tell us whether we have achieved the targets for 2010 agreed in Paris in 2005. To carry forward this work, we will need to develop institutionalised processes for the joint and equal partnership of developing countries and the engagement of stakeholders.

31. We recognise that aid effectiveness is an integral part of the broader financing for development agenda. To achieve development outcomes and the MDGs we need to meet our commitments on both aid quality and aid volumes. We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to transmit the conclusions of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to the High Level Event on the MDGs in New York later this month and the Financing for Development Review meeting in Doha in November 2008. We welcome the contribution that the ECOSOC Development Co-operation Forum is making to the international dialogue and to mutual accountability on aid issues. We call upon the UN development system to further support the capacities of developing countries for effective management of development assistance.
32. Today, more than ever, we resolve to work together to help countries across the world build the successful future all of us want to see – a future based on a shared commitment to overcome poverty, a future in which no countries will depend on aid.

Notes

1. These figures are based on a recent World Bank study that found the poverty line to be USD 1.25 a day in 2005 prices.

2. These include, but are not limited to, systems for public financial management, procurement, audit, monitoring and evaluation, and social and environmental assessment.

3. The 2001 DAC recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) covers 31 so-called Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at its 2008 High Level Meeting agreed to extend the 2001 Recommendation to cover the remaining eight countries that are part of the HIPC initiative: Bolivia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua and Republic of Congo.

4. We will have that information available for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, along with comprehensive second phase evaluations of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action as of 2010. Attention will also be paid to improving and developing communications on aid effectiveness for long-term development success and broad-based public support.
Better Aid

Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICE

In the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), donors and developing country governments commit to deepening their engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs). Better aid requires a broader understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda and a place for CSOs as development actors in their own right and as aid donors, recipients and partners.

This book is a resource for implementing the recommendations on civil society and aid effectiveness emerging from the Accra High Level Forum and its preparatory process. These recommendations address a broad community, including developing country governments, donors, and CSOs from developing and developed countries. The report summarises the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, which was set up in the run-up to Accra. It draws on analytical work, multi-stakeholder consultations and case study investigations carried out in 2007 and 2008.

This book is specifically designed as a reference tool for readers wishing to explore the practicalities of specific recommendations and offers concrete examples of good practice in different parts of the world.

The full text of this book is available online via these links:
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